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THE FOURTH BITE AT THE APPLE: A STUDY OF THE 
OPERATION AND UTILITY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION'S APPEALS COUNCIL 
CHARLES H. KocH, JR. AND DAVID A. KaPLOW 
The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council performs the 
fourth and final administrative evaluation of appealed disability 
claims. Very little information about the Appeals Council has been 
available to claimants and their representatives, even though 
claimants must request Appeals Council review before filing an 
appeal in federal court. In response to criticism and controversy 
surrounding this obscure branch of the Social Security 
Administration, the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS) asked Professors Koch and Kaplow to study the Appeals 
Council's effectiveness in disability claims and adjudication. In this 
Article, the authors examine Appeals Council operations and the 
Council's relationship to the administrative and judicial disability 
claims procedure and make recommendations for streamlining and 
improving the claims process. These recommendations, originally 
presented in a report to the ACUS, were evaluated and substantially 
adopted by ACUS and are presently being considered by the Social 
Security Administration. 
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THE FOURTH BITE AT THE APPLE: A STUDY OF THE 
OPERATION AND UTILITY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION'S APPEALS COUNCIL 
CHARLES H. KocH, JR.* AND DAVID A.KoPLow** 
T HE APPEALS Council provides the final administrative review of benefit claims under the purview of the Social Security Admin-
istration (SSA). 1 As a central unit in the adjudicatory bureaucracy, the 
Council reviews the work of an immense and diverse network of fed-
eral and state adjudicators and handles a wide variety of cases. 2 
Recently, however, the operation and the very existence of the Ap-
peals Council have become highly controversial. Indeed, SSA claim-
ants' representatives have argued that "serious consideration should 
be given to eliminating the Appeals Council or severely limiting its 
• Woodbridge Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William 
And Mary; B.A., 1966, University of Maryland; J.D., 1969, George Washington University; 
L.L.M., 1975, University of Chicago. 
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Director, Center for Applied 
Legal Studies, Georgetown University; B.A., 1973, Harvard University; J.D., 1978, Yale Uni-
versity. 
I. This Article derives from a study undertaken during the summer and fall of 1987 under 
the auspices of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), which provided 
valuable support and assistance. The ACUS evaluated the study and prepared its own recom-
mendations, which were adopted December 18, 1987 and codified at I C.F.R. § 305.87-7 (1987). 
See also REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 625 (1987). 
The authors are indebted to a number of people for their extraordinary st:pport and assistance 
in this project. Special appreciation is due to Jeff Lubbers of the Administrative Conference of 
the United States, Gil Fisher of the Social Security Administration, Bill Taylor and Burt Berkley 
of the Appeals Council and Eileen Sweeney of the National Senior Citizens Law Center, who 
were exceptionally generous with their time and attention throughout the project. In addition, 
our thanks go to Mariam Naini, our research assistant, and Karen Bouton, our typist. 
2. Existing studies of intermediate administrative appellate bodies include the following: 
C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §§6.71 tO .79 (1985); Cass, Allocation of Author-
ity Within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U.L. REv. I (1986) 
[hereinafter Allocation of Authority]; R. CASS, BACKGROUND REPORT FOR RECOMMENDATION 83-
3: AGENCY REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES' DECISIONS, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 115 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 
ACUS REPORT]; E. ELLIS, REPORT IN SUPPORT OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF PRE-
SIDING OFFICERS: SUBPARAGRAPH i(B) OF RECOMMENDATION No. 6, I REPORTS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES !55 (1971); J. FREEDMAN, 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE IN SUPPORT OF INTERME-
DIATE APPELLATE BOARDS: SUBPARAGRAPH i(A) OF RECOMMENDATION No. 6, I REPORTS AND RE-
COMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 125 (1971). 
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functions," 3 while members of Congress,4 neutral scholars,5 federal 
judges,6 and Reagan administration officials7 have criticized the Ap-
peals Council, questioned its mandate, and called for its abolition. As 
a result, the Administrative Conference of the United States, at the 
behest of the SSA, requested us to study the Appeals Council. In this 
Article, we discuss the operation of the Appeals Council and its rela-
tionship to the rest of the adjudicatory bureaucracy and the courts. 
We also make recommendations for improvements.8 
We have been struck repeatedly by the lack of information available 
to the public about the internal organization and operation of the Ap-
peals Council. Despite the importance of the Appeals Council and its 
central position in the SSA network, little has been written about the 
Appeals Council. Most outside commentators, even those who focus 
on the hearings and appeals process, have devoted their attention else-
where. We discern important costs in this ''invisibility'' and hope that 
dissemination of our findings through the Administrative Conference 
and the Florida State University Law Review can aid in the process of 
restoring the prominence and effectiveness of the Appeals Council. 
This Article is organized into three basic sections: "Background," 
"Goals," and "Findings and Recommendations." The "Back-
ground" section provides an overview of federal disability law, out-
lines the SSA's claims adjudication process, and describes the 
organization and operation of the Appeals Council and the precise 
standards and procedures for case handling. The "Goals" section 
identifies six institutional objectives for the Appeals Council and de-
scribes the overlapping and partially conflicting imperatives facing the 
SSA bureaucracy and the Appeals Council. It then evaluates the suc-
cess of the institution in attaining these goals, and concludes that the 
3. Current Problems in the Social Security Hearings and Appeals Process: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Social Security of the Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 18, 1986) (statement of Eileen Sweeney, Staff Attorney, National 
Senior Citizens Law Center) [hereinafter 1986 Hearing]. 
4. See H.R. 2ll7, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced by Rep. Archer). 
5. See 0. COFER, JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY 
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING PROCESS 12, 13 (1985). "The arguments are 
persuasive that the $18 million a year expense of the [Appeals Council] could be put to better 
use." ld. at 190. 
6. See Salling v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046, 1058-59 (W.O. Va. 1986). 
7. Lambro, Ritualism in Social Security, The Commercial Appeal (Apr. 16, 1981). 
8. We received an extremely high level of cooperation from the Appeals Council, other 
components of the SSA, and outside commentators. We found these sources to be frank, con-
structive, and generous with their time. 
Although our numerous sources spoke freely and generally without restrictive attribution 
rules, we have elected not to quote them directly or cite them by name. In an already heavily 
foo.tnoted Article, citation of individual interviews would excessively burden the text. 
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overwhelming crush of cases (currently close to 50,000 cases per year 
for the twenty members of the Appeals Council) precludes the com-
plete accomplishment of any of these goals. The "Findings and Re-
commendations" section offers suggestions on how to defeat this 
"tyranny of the caseload." Our primary concern is to redirect the Ap-
peals Council from focusing exclusively on individual cases toward us-
ing its unique perspective to develop, promote, and implement 
streamlined proposals that make the claims process more accurate, 
uniform, efficient, and acceptable to the public. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This section contains an overview of federal disability law, the SSA 
disability claims adjudication process, and the organization and oper-
ation of the Appeals Council. 
The federal disability overview section focuses on the financial and 
medical criteria that a claimant must satisfy in order to be eligible for 
the programs, the standards of proof required for a finding of eligibil-
ity, and the available benefits. 
The section on claims adjudication reviews each stage in the proc-
ess, from initial application to judicial review. This section also con-
tains observations about the claims process and the nature of SSA 
disability cases. 
Finally, the Appeals Council section provides a detailed review of 
the Appeals Council, including the legal authority for its existence, its 
history, its composition and its staff. This section also contains a de-
tailed review of the adjudication process at the Appeals Council level, 
a review of other Appeals Council functions and a review of the costs 
of the Appeals Council. 
A. Federal Disability Programs 
This Article encompasses the disability provisions of two basic fed-
eral public benefits programs: Retirement, Survivors, Disability, and 
Health Insurance (RSDHI);9 and Supplemental Security Income 
9. Certain portions of the Retirement, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance 
(RSDHI) program are also known as Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI). 
These were enacted as Title II of the Social Security Act and are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 to 
433 (Supp. 1986) (see §§ 423 to 425 for the disability portions). Implementing regulations are 
located at 20 C.F.R. § 404 (1986). The Health Insurance provisions of RSDHI are contained in 
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act and are now largely administered by the Health Care 
Financing Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services. The health insur-
ance provisions are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982). 
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(SSI). 10 As of 1987, the disability components of these two programs 
together accounted for approximately $29 billion of annual disburse-
ments to seven million recipients, 11 making them the Western world's 
largest income support program for people unable to engage in sub-
stantial gainful activity. 12 
A variety of other specialized disability programs exists in the 
United States. 13 These include state workers' compensation pro-
grams,14 Veterans' Administration programs, 15 and private insurance 
10. The SSI program (also known as Title XVI of the Social Security Act) is codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1381 to 1383c (1982). Implementing regulations are located at 20 C.F.R. § 416 (1986). 
II. Statistics on program size: 
RSDHI DISABILITY SSI DISABILITY 
Number of Total 
Recipients Payments 
Number of Total 
Year workers others workers others ReciEients Pa~ments 
1987(est.) 2.8m !.3m $17 .5B $2.4B 2.9m $9.2B 
1986 2.7m !.3m $17.1B $2.4B 2.8m $8.5B 
1985 2.7m !.2m $16.3B $2.4B 
1984 2.6m !.2m $15.4B $2.3B 
1983 2.6m !.2m $15.2B $2.4B 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 29, 31 (1987) (here-
inafter 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CON'!~SS). 
12. In 1986, 417,000 workers and 341,000 of their dependents were added to the disability 
rolls. This was the largest number of new awards of any year in the 1980s, but was significantly 
below the 1975 peak, when 592,000 new awards were made to disabled workers alone. Sherman, 
Fast Facts and Figures about Social Security, 1987, 50 Soc. SECURITY BuLL. 5, 10 (May 1987). 
For a comparison of social insurance programs (covering disability as well as other support de-
vices) in other nations, see SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS 
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD-1983 (1984); D. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE passim (1984). 
13. For comparisons among various categories of disability programs, see F. BLOCH, FED-
ERAL DISABILITY LAw AND PRACTICE passim (1984) (discussing RSDHI, SSI, veterans' benefits, 
federal civil service benefits, and black lung benefits); D. Swansburg, The Relationship Between 
Pain and Disability Benefits: A Literature Survey (Oct. 1985) (background paper prepared for 
the Commission on the Evaluation of Pain); Social Security Programs in the United States, 
1987, 50 Soc. SECURITY BuLL. 5 (Apr. 1987) (describing RSDHI, SSI, unemployment, workers' 
compensation, and numerous other programs); Johnson, Disability, Income Support, and Social 
Insurance, in DISABILITY POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 87 (E. Berkowitz ed. 1979). 
14. Workers' compensation programs, created and administered by state governments, vary 
substantially. In general, they provide compensation for partial or total disabilities arising during 
the course of employment. Price, Workers' Compensation: Coverage, Benefits and Costs, 1983, 
49 Soc. SECURITY BuLL. 5 (Feb. 1986). The disability may be permanent or temporary, but reha-
bilitation, rather than an expectation of long-term receipt of benefits, has been stressed as the 
rationale for the program. D. Swansburg, supra note 13, at 20-29. 
15. The Veterans' Administration (VA) manages a disability compensation program for 
service-connected partial or total disability, as well as a program for non-service-connected total 
disability. In addition to cash benefits, the VA provides medical treatment, rehabilitation serv-
ices and other programs. D. Swansburg, supra note 13, at 14-19; F. BLOcH, supra note 13, at 
320, 328-31. 
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plans. 16 Additionally, various federal programs have been established 
to aid, for example, "black lung" victims, 17 retired railroad workers, 18 
and federal employees. 19 RSDHI and SSI, however, are uniquely im-
portant, not only because of their huge volume of disbursements and 
recipients, but also because of the heavy administrative burden this 
volume places on the SSA. The Appeals Council, as stated earlier, is 
particularly burdened by this volume. 
Federal disability law is as complex as it is important.20 Part of this 
complexity results from the piecemeal fashion in which legislation for 
these two programs was enacted.21 Although the Social Security Act 
was passed in 1935,22 it was not until1956 that Congress made support 
available to workers disabled prior to retirement age. 23 By 1958, bene-
fits were extended to the dependents of disabled workers.24 In 1960, 
the previous age restriction, limiting benefits to disabled workers over 
16. Private insurance carriers offer an array of individual or group disability insurance poli-
cies. These vary widely in their terms, cost, and coverage. C. SoULE, DISABILITY INCOME INSUR-
ANCE: THE UNIQUE RisK passim (1984); D. Swansburg, supra note 13, at 30-37. 
17. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (The Black Lung 
Benefits Act), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 to 945 (1982), provides federal benefits to coal miners who 
become totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, or "black lung" disease, as a result of inhaling coal 
dust in mines. The program was originally administered by the SSA, but has been transferred to 
the Department of Labor, effective with applications filed in 1973. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 
499-589. 
18. The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1982), established a federal 
pension program for retired and disabled railroad employees. The Railroad Retirement Board 
administers the program. F. BLOcH, supra note 13, at 19-25; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1401 to .1413 
(1986). 
19. Prior to January I, 1984, federal employees were exempt from most of the RSDHI 
program but were eligible for disability benefits under the Civil Service retirement program. 
Newer employees are now included in SSA programs. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 427-96. 
20. Berkowitz, The American Disability System in Historical Perspective, in DISABILITY 
POLICIES AND GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS 21 (E. Berkowitz ed. 1979). 
21. Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security In-
come: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARv. L. REv. 833 (1976). Liebman 
identifies three costs of the disjointed political process that has generated disability law: it is 
difficult for the public to comprehend the system and its fair application; de facto delegation of 
authority from Congress to diverse judicial and administrative bodies leads to inconsistent re-
sults; and complex compartmentalized programs lead to rigidity in the system, with resistance to 
comprehensive evaluation and change. /d. at 834. 
22. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 301 to 1397f (1982)). 
23. See Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, 70 Stat. 807, 815-24. The 1954 
amendments had provided a freeze for a disabled worker's earnings record, ensuring that the 
worker's ordinary retirement pension would no longer be reduced due to having paid little or no 
FICA tax during a period of disability. Social Security Amendments of 1954, ch. 1206, 68 Stat. 
1052, 1080. "FICA" stands for Federal Insurance Contributions Act. l.R.C. ch. 21 (1986). 
24. See Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, 72 Stat. 101; F. BLOCH, 
supra note 13, at 8-9. 
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age fifty, was repealed. 25 In 1974, the current SSI program was estab-
lished, superseding prior state-run welfare and disability programs 
partially funded by the federal government-26 Other significant legisla-
tive modifications in the disability programs occurred in 1977,27 
1980,28 1984,29 and 1986.30 Minor adjustments have been made almost 
annually, and the SSA issues new regulations or internal instructions 
with great frequency. 31 
1. Financial Eligibility 
Currently RSDHI and SSI have two eligibility requirements: one fi-
nancial and one medical. 32 A claimant must satisfy both to be eligible 
for benefits under either programY As elaborated below, however, 
the medical criteria for the programs are identical. 34 Additionally, al-
though the financial eligibility tests of the two programs are very dif-
ferent, a claimant may satisfy both programs' definitions. Therefore, 
a disabled person may be eligible for RSDHI, SSI, or both. 35 
a. Financial Eligibility-RSDHI 
The RSDHI program is essentially an insurance plan. A person ob-
tains coverage by working in employment "covered" by the SSA. 
25. See Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 403(b), 
74 Stat. 924, 967, 969. 
26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 to 1383c (1982). 
27. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §§ 101, 201, 331, 91 Stat. 
1509, 1510, 1514, 1541. The 1977 amendments raised payroll taxes and reduced benefit levels to 
protect the financial integrity of the RSDHI disability trust fund. W. AcHENBAUM, Social Secu-
rity: Visions and Revisions 67-68 (1986). 
28. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304, 94 Stat. 
441, 453. The 1980 amendments provided for a more frequent and searching review of approved 
claims, improved work incentives, and limitations on benefit levels. See id. 
29. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 
1794. The 1984 Act modified many disability provisions, including those regarding assessment of 
medical improvements in continuing disability review cases, assessment of pain, consideration of 
multiple impairments, and evaluation of mental impairments. Sweeney, New Disability Legisla-
tion Enacted, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 819 (1984). 
30. The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act, Pub. L. No. 99-643, 100 
Stat. 3574 (1986), made permanent what had been experimental SSI provisions for continuing 
benefits (and Medicaid eligibility) for people who engage in substantial gainful activity. It also 
continued Medicaid for people whose earnings caused their income to exceed the financial eligi-
bility criteria for SSI, provided they had not medically recovered from the disabling conditions. 
31. See, e.g., [Regulations volume) Social Sec. Report Serv. (W) (1983) (containing nearly 
1500 pages of regulations). "Frequent" issuance of regulations, of course, does not necessarily 
equate with "timely" issuance. In a number of instances, the SSA has been very slow to promul-
gate regulations regarding emerging areas of law. 
32. LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ELDERLY, DISABILITY PRACTICE MANUAL FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 
AND SSI PROGRAMS I (1983) (hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL). 
33. /d. 
34. /d. 
35. See id. 
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Premiums, in the form of FICA taxes, 36 are automatically deducted 
from the worker's payroll check and are matched by the employerY If 
a worker earns a sufficient amount in wages38 in a given quarter of a 
calendar year, the worker is deemed to have paid enough premiums to 
earn a "quarter of coverage" for purposes of calculating RSDHI eli-
gibility.39 
Financial eligibility for RSDHI disability benefits requires that the 
worker earn a sufficient number of quarters of coverage and that the 
quarters of coverage be relatively "recent" with respect to the onset 
of the disabling impairment. 40 For most claimants, these standards re-
quire forty quarters (ten years) of work in covered employment at any 
time during the worker's life, twenty of which must be earned within 
the forty-quarter period immediately prior to disability .41 
Thus, RSDHI disability coverage lapses if a worker voluntarily 
leaves covered employment for a significant time before the onset of a 
disabling impairment. If the impairment is determined to have become 
disabling prior to a lapse in coverage, the claimant will be eligible to 
36. I.R.C. ch. 21 (1986). Self-employed workers are also embraced by RSDHI, although the 
procedures for remitting the taxes are different. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1065 to .1096 (1986). Monies 
received from these premiums are pooled into four independent trust funds (one for disability, a 
second for the retirement and survivors account, a third for hospital insurance, and a fourth, 
somewhat different account for supplementary medical insurance) from which benefits are paid. 
37. As of 1987, Social Security covered 125 million workers in the United States, which 
accounted for 9507o of the entire labor force. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CoNGRESS, supra note II, 
at Introduction. 
38. RSDHI coverage is earned by working, not by paying the FICA tax, so even if the tax is 
erroneously not withheld, the worker may still accumulate quarters of coverage. See 20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1001 to .1096 (1986). The amount of earnings necessary to qualify for a quarter of cover-
age is adjusted annually by an automatic statutory index. /d.§ 404.143(a)(2). In 1987, earning at 
least $460 in covered employment during one calendar quarter of the year would qualify a 
worker for one quarter of coverage. 52 Fed. Reg. 8247 (Mar. 17, 1987) (to be codified at 20 
C.F.R. Appendix to Subpart B). In 1986, the required minimum was $440. U.S. Dep't of Health 
and Human Services, Press Release (Oct. 23, 1986). 
A worker earns one quarter of coverage (up to a maximum of four quarters per year) for each 
multiple of the basic amount earned, even if all the work and all the income occurred in only one 
quarter. 20 C.F.R. § 404.143(a) (1986). Thus, a worker who earned at least $1840 (4 x $460) at 
any time during 1987 would be credited with four quarters of coverage for the year. 
39. Regulations for calculating quarters of coverage are located at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.140 to 
.146 (1986). 
40. Earning a sufficient number of quarters of coverage results in obtaining what the SSA 
calls "fully insured status," a threshold of eligibility for any RSDHI program. !d. §§ 404.110 to 
.115. Earning sufficient recent quarters of coverage results in "disability insured status"; this is 
the special test for the disability portion of RSDHI. !d. §§ 404.130 to .133. 
41. Special rules apply to younger workers who may not have had a full opportunity to 
accumulate an adequate number of quarters of coverage prior to becoming disabled. These spe-
cial rules generally require the claimant to have earned quarters of coverage equivalent to one-
half the number of quarters between age 21 and the time of disability, with a minimum of six 
quarters of coverage. !d. §§ 404.110(b)(2), 404.130(c). 
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receive permanent monthly disability checks.42 If the disability occurs 
after coverage expires, no RSDHI disability benefits will be granted.43 
b. Financial Eligibility-SSI 
In contrast to RSDHI, SSI is a means-based welfare program, not 
an insurance program. Therefore, no "quarters of coverage" calcula-
tion is necessary, and the claimant need not ever have worked. 44 In-
stead, the focus of the SSI financial eligibility inquiry is on the 
claimant's level of need, considering both income and resources. 45 
For SSI purposes, income is defined broadly to include earned as 
well as unearned income and "in kind" support such as subsidized 
room or board.46 Certain exclusions, however, are allowed. 47 For ex-
ample, a flat amount for work-related expenses and a percentage of 
other receipts can be deducted. 48 The SSI "resource test" is a ceiling 
on the value of assets that a person may own without losing eligibility. 
Again, certain items are excluded (for example, a car or a residence), 49 
but the maximum allowance, after exclusions, is low: $1800 for an 
individual or $2700 for a couple as of 1987.50 
42. RSDHI disability benefits are not really permanent. For example, subject to certain 
exceptions, if a claimant's impairment diminishes, allowing resumption of work, disability bene-
fits will be terminated. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982) (amending 42 U.S.C. 
§ 223(f)); 20 C.F .R. §§ 404.1588 to .1598 (1986). Various rehabilitation incentives-including a 
provision for a "trial work period" allowing a disability benefits recipient the opportunity to 
attempt re-entry into the work force without losing benefits-support the process of recovery. 20 
C.F.R. §§ 404.1592, .2101 to .2127; 416.992, .2201 to .2227 (1986); see also DEP'T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERV. CoMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAtN, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EVAL-
UATION OF PAtN 19-21 (1986) (hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN); 
Rocklin & Mattson, The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act: Legislative 
History and Summary of Provisions, 50 Soc. SECURITY BuLL. 25 (Mar. 1987) (describing the 
section 1619 provisions through which Pub. L. No. 99-643 (1986), extended programs designed 
to support employment attempts of SSI disability recipients, by providing special SSI payments 
and Medicaid coverage). 
Moreover, at age 65, a Title II disability recipient is automatically transferred from the "disa-
bility" portion of RSDHI to the "retirement" account. 20 C.F.R. § 404.316(b)(2) (1986). 
A claimant may also be awarded a "closed period of disability," which is a determination that 
the claimant is entitled to benefits for a period of time but is no longer disabled. Benefits are 
then payable for those months in which the claimant was under a disability. /d. §§ 404.320 to 
.322, 416.992a. 
43. However, under these circumstances, the worker may be eligible for retirement or survi-
vors coverage. 
44. SSI is financed out of general federal tax revenues, not out of the RSDHI trust funds. 
45. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 5. 
46. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1986). 
47. /d.§416.1103. 
48. /d.§§ 416.1100to .1112. 
49. §§ 416.1201 to .1266. 
50. 50 Fed. Reg. 38,982 (1985) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205 (1986)). 
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2. Medical Eligibility-RSDHI and SSI 
Although the programs use different tests for financial eligibility, 
they employ the same standard of medical eligibility51 and virtually 
identical statutory definitions of "disability": "inability to engage in 
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determina-
ble physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 
period of not less than [twelve] months. " 52 
The mechanism for assessing a claim against this standard is the 
SSA's "sequential evaluation process, " 53 a multi-step inquiry into sev-
eral key variables. 54 
Step 1: Substantial Gainful Activity 
The first inquiry is whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial 
gainful activity." "Substantial" activity is that which involves signifi-
cant physical or mental duties, 55 and "gainful" activity embraces all 
work ordinarily done for pay or profit. 56 Earnings in excess of a cer-
tain amount are presumed to indicate substantial gainful activity, and 
51. The regulations governing RSDHI medical assessment, 20C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 to .1599 
(1986), are substantially identical to the corresponding sections for SSI. See id. §§ 416.901 to 
.998. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1982) ("inability to enage in"); cf. id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) ("un-
able to engage in"). 
The Act also specifies that an individual: 
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment 
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work 
but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other 
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of 
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific 
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 
/d. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(B). 
53. By regulation, the sequential evaluation process has governed disability adjudications 
since 1979. See 44 Fed. Reg. 18,170-71 (1979) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404(P), 416(1)). It is 
incorporated into SSA publications and into decisional documents sent to claimants. 
54. 20 C.F .R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1986). If at any stage of the sequential evaluation, it is 
determined that the claimant is or is not disabled, the evaluation proceeds no further. PRACTICE 
MANUAL, supra note 32, at 7. Two special disability categories do not fit neatly into the sequen-
tial evaluation process but may be important to a particular claimant. One grants benefits to a 
claimant who has only a marginal education and work experience of 35 years or more doing 
arduous physical labor, and who is no longer able to perform that type of work due to a severe 
impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1562, 416.962 (1986). The other special category grants benefits to 
a claimant who is of advanced age, has a limited education, and has no work experience. S.S.R. 
82-63 (1982). For an illustration of the SSA's "seqential evaluation process, see Chart 1, infra 
page 320. 
55. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a) (1986). 
56. /d. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b). 
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preclude eligibility. 57 However, even if the claimant is paid less than 
this amount and is working only on a part-time basis with reduced 
responsibilities, the performance of such work may indicate a latent 
ability to perform substantial gainful activity, unless the work has tri-
fling importance or requires unusual supervision or support. 58 
Step 2: Severity 
The next inquiry is whether the claimant's impairment is "se-
vere"-i.e, whether it significantly limits the claimant's physical or 
mental ability to engage in basic work activities, 59 and satisfies the 
statutory twelve-month duration requirement. 60 This particular step in 
the sequential evaluation has caused much turmoil. Several circuit 
courts had invalidated the "severity" test, finding either that it was 
facially inconsistent with the Social Security Act or that the SSA had 
regularly misapplied it by transforming a de minimis preliminary 
screening process into a much more powerful barrier justifying per-
emptory denials of large numbers of substantial cases.61 
The Supreme Court recently upheld the logic of the "severity" step, 
finding it consistent with the enabling statute, allowing the SSA to 
pose some sort of threshold screening test. 62 However, the Court did 
57. !d. §§ 404.1574(b)(2)(vi), 416.974(b)(2)(vi). Different monetary cutoff levels are appli-
cable to blind persons, who are not presumed to be engaged in substantial gainful activity until 
their earnings rise to a significantly higher level. !d.§ 404.1584(d). Different rules are also appli-
cable to self-employed persons. !d. §§ 404.1575, 416.975. 
58. See id. §§ 404.1571, 416.971. Activities such as taking care of oneself, pursuing seden-
tary hobbies, etc., do not ordinarily constitute substantial gainful activity. See id. §§ 
404.1572(c), 416.972(c). 
Under the section 1619 program of Pub. L. No. 99-643 (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982), the 
question of substantial gainful activity will remain relevant at the initial application level of an 
SSI claim, but will not be used in SSI continuing disability review cases . 
. 59. "Basic work activities" include walking, standing, seeing, hearing, understanding, us-
ing judgment, responding appropriately to co-workers, etc. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921 
(1986). The severity regulation provides: 
If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly 
limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you 
do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider 
your age, education, and work experience. 
/d. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 
60. !d. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. The duration requirement is not really a part of any single 
step of the sequential analysis. The claim must be assessed for duration at all stages, but discus-
sion of it fits most logically into this segment of the analysis. See S.S.R. 82-52 (1982). 
61. "[A)ll II Regional Federal Courts of Appeals have either enjoined the Secretary's use 
of the step 2 [severity] regulation or imposed a narrowing construction upon it." Bowen v. 
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Baeder v. Heckler, 768 
F.2d 547 (3rd Cir. 1985); McDonald v. Heckler, 624 F. Supp. 375 (D.Mass. 1986); McDonald v. 
Heckler, 629 F. Supp. 1138 (1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub. nom. 
McDonald v. Secretary of HHS, 795 F.2d 1118 (1st Cir. 1986); Pratt v. Heckler, 629 F. Supp. 
1496 (D.D.C. 1985). 
62. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 154. 
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not reach the question of whether the severity step, as applied in prac-
tice by the SSA, was a valid exerciseY In the interim, the SSA has 
issued a Social Security Ruling on severity, again defining it as a bar 
to only the weakest cases. 64 
Step 3: Listings 
The next step in the sequential evaluation is to determine whether 
the claimant's impairment meets or equals one or more of the pre-
sumptively disabling medical conditions defined in the regulations' 
"Listing of Impairments. " 65 If the claimant's abnormalities, singly or 
together, meet or equal66 a listed criterion, benefits will be awarded 
without further inquiry into the impairment's effects upon the clai-
mant's lifeY 
The listings contain more than 100 precisely defined medical condi-
tions, organized by thirteen body systems (e.g., musculoskeletal, car-
diovascular, neurological). 68 Each listing specifies the impairment and 
the tests required to diagnose its presence and severity.69 Approxi-
63. !d. at !54 n.12. The concurrence (Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens) noted 
that statistics tended to support the allegation that the severity step had been molded into a 
substantial barrier. !d. at 157. Prior to the current severity regulation, only 80Jo of disability 
claims had been denied as nonsevere; later, 400Jo were eliminated at that stage. /d. After circuit 
courts began invalidating the regulation, the nationwide rate of "nonsevere" denials fell to 25%. 
/d. Three dissenters, led by Justice Blackmun, agreed with Justice O'Connor that the validity of 
the severity step as applied remains problematic. /d. at 179. 
64. S.S.R. 85-28 (1985) states in part: 
An impairment or combination of impairments is found "not severe" and a finding of 
"not disabled" is made at this step when medical evidence establishes only a slight 
abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than 
a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work even if the individual's age, educa-
tion, or work experience were specifically considered (i.e., the person's impairment(s) 
has no more than a minimal effect on his or her physical or mental ability(ies) to 
perform basic work activities). 
/d. at 22. 
65. 20 C.P.R.§§ 404.1525,416.925 (1986); id. § 404 subpart P, app. I. 
66. !d.§§ 404.1526, 416.926. The "equals" option applies to impairments (or combinations 
of impairments) which are not listed, but which are "medically equivalent" to a listing and 
impinge upon the ability to perform basic work activities in a manner equivalent to a listed 
impairment. In recent years only 8% to 9% of disability awards have been based on "equaling" 
a listing. In 1976 this standard was responsible for over 45% of the awards. HousE CoMM. ON 
WAYS AND MEANS, IOO'TH CoNG., 1ST SESS. BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS 
WITIDN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 36 (Comm. Print 1987) 
[hereinafter 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL). 
67. 20 C.P.R.§ 404.1520(d) (1986). 
68. See id. § 404 subpart P, app. I. A separate set of listings exists for the evaluation of 
impairments of persons under the age of 18, where the progression or effects of the disease may 
be different from those for adults. /d.§§ 404.1525(b)(2), 416.925(b)(2). 
69. See id. § 404 subpart P, app. I. For example, the first listed impairment, rheumatoid 
arthritis, is defined as follows: 
1.02 Active rheumatoid arthritis and other inflammatory arthritis. 
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mately three-quarters of disability awards are based on these listings. 70 
Step 4: Past Relevant Work 
If the claimant's condition does not meet or equal a listing, 71 the 
next question in the sequential evaluation is whether the previous em-
ployment performed by the claimant could be resumed despite the 
claimant's impairments.72 If resuming the former job is possible, the 
claim will be denied. 73 
With both A and B. 
A. History of persistent joint pain, swelling, and tenderness involving multiple ma-
jor joints (see l.OOD) and with signs of joint inflammation (swelling and tender-
ness) on current physical examination despite prescribed therapy for at least 
three months, resulting in significant restriction of function of the affected 
joints, and clinical activity expected to last for at least twelve months; and 
B. Corroboration of diagnosis at some point in time by either. 
I. Positive serologic test for rheumatoid factor; or 
2. Antinuclear antibodies; or 
3. Elevated sedimentation rate; or 
4. Characteristic histologic changes in biopsy of synovial membrane or subcu-
taneous nodule (obtained independent of Social Security disability evalua-
tion). 
/d. part 404 subpart P, app. I, part A, § 1.02. 
70. The irregularity in basis for disability awards is suggested by the following chart: 
Basis for disability 
Allowance: 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986 
Meets listing 700Jo 52% 39% 29% 62% 67% 
Equals listing 20% 32% 43% 45% 14% 9% 
Vocational factors 10% 160Jo 18% 26% 24% 24% 
D. STONE, supra note 12, at 226; SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Sen., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Ill (Aug. 18, 1982). 1987 BAcK-
GROUND MATERIAL, supra note 66, at 36. 
71. Widows, widowers and surviving divorced spouses claiming RSDHI disability benefits 
based upon the work record of a deceased spouse are eligible for disability benefits only based 
on the listings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1577, .1578 (1986). These claimants do not traverse the same 
sequential evaluation process as others, and are not evaluated within the context of the voca-
tional factors of the "grids." See id. Similarly, children under age 18 claiming SSI disability 
benefits are eligible only based on the listings. /d. § 416.924. 
Allegations have been made that the SSA and Disability Determination Services (DDS's) have 
systematically circumvented the legal standards of the sequential evaluation process by effec-
tively terminating the analysis after step three. See City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 
1109 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986). Claim-
ants-especially those alleging mental impairments-who did not win benefits at the listings 
stage were sometimes categorically denied, without individualized examination of vocational fac-
tors. /d. 
72. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1 520(e), 416.920(e) (1986). 
73. /d. In investigating the possibility of a claimant returning to past relevant work, the 
SSA looks at work that (a) constituted substantial gainful activity, (b) lasted long enough for the 
claimant to learn the job, and (c) was performed within the past 15 years. /d. §§ 404.!565(a), 
416.965(a); S.S.R. 82-61 (1982); see also Lauer v. Bowen, 818 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1987). It is 
assumed that gradual changes may occur in the standards and requirements of most jobs, so 
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Step 5: Grids 
If a claimant cannot resume the former job, the next inquiry is 
whether the claimant can perform other substantial gainful activity 
despite all impairments. 74 The primary mechanism for this assessment 
is the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" or "grids, " 75 a series of 
charts designed to consider four key variables affecting ability to 
work. These variables are: (a) "residual functional capacity," a meas-
ure of how much basic work activity (standing, walking, lifting, carry-
ing, etc.) the claimant can still do;76 (b) age;77 (c) education;78 and (d) 
previous work experience and transferability of acquired skills. 79 
Each variable is reduced to a few categories. For example, residual 
functional capacity is clustered as "sedentary," "light," or "me-
dium," depending upon the level of exertional capability.80 The grids 
combine all the variables into eighty-two "rules," each deemed "disa-
bled" or "not disabled. " 81 If a claimant's medical-vocational coordi-
previous work experience gained in the distant past is no longer considered vocationally relevant. 
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565(a), 416.965(a) (1986). 
"Past relevant work" is not confined to the demands of the job as it was actually performed 
by the claimant. Rather, the SSA directs its inquiry into the functional demands and job duties 
of the occupations as they are generally required by all employers throughout the national econ-
omy. S.S.R. 82-61 (1982). 
74. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 22. 
75. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 2 (1986). Unlike the listings, which assess the 
claimant based on "medical" criteria alone, the grids also incorporate the principal "voca-
tional" factors. In so doing, the grids take "administrative notice" of the existence of jobs in 
the national economy that could be performed by a person of defined vocational characteristics. 
This notice procedure replaces the pre-1978 reliance upon the testimony of vocational experts, 
and obviates the necessity of identifying the specific job categories that each individual claimant 
could satisfy. See id. Use of the grids for this purpose was endorsed by the Supreme Court. 
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983). See generally Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in 
Categorical Decision-Making: A Study of Social Security's Medical- Vocations Guidelines-Two 
Birds With One Stone or Pigeon-Holing Claimants?, 42 Mo. L. REv. 329 (1983) (analyzing ef-
fectiveness of grids in promoting sound decisions). 
76. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945 (1986). 
77. /d. §§ 404.1563, 416.963. The age categories are: approaching retirement age (60-64), 
advanced age (55-60), closely approaching advanced age (50-54), and younger (18-49). The cate-
gories are not to be applied mechanically in a borderline situation. See id. 
78. Jd. §§ 404.1564, 416.964. The education categories are: unable to communicate in Eng-
lish, illiterate, marginal (completed sixth grade or less), limited (completed 7th-11th grade), high 
school and above. See id. 
79. Id. §§ 404.1568, 416.968. The categories for previous work experience are: unskilled, 
semi-skilled, and skilled. Skills may be categorized as transferable or nontransferable. See id. 
80. /d. §§ 404.1567, 416.967. Residual functional capacity may also be classified as capable 
of heavy or very heavy work, but these categories are not used on the grids. See id. 
81. /d. part 404, subpart P, app. 2, tables 1-3. For example, a person (a) with the residual 
functional capacity for light work, (b) closely approaching advanced age, (c) of limited or less 
education, and (d) who is skilled or semi-skilled with skills not transferable, would be found 
"not disabled" under Rule 202.11 of subpart P. If the person is of advanced age, however, with 
all the other variables unchanged, a finding of "disabled" would be made under Rule 202.02 of 
subpart P. I d. 
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nates fall squarely on a grid rule, then that outcome determines the 
case. 82 
Step 6: Off The Grids83 
Some claimants do not fall squarely onto the grids, either because 
no combination of rules precisely describes their situation, or because 
the alleged impairment is ''non-exertional.' ' 84 In such cases, the grids 
are merely advisory. 85 The claim procedure then turns on the presence 
or absence of a substantial number of job categories that the claimant 
could perform. 86 This final step in the sequential evaluation process 
thus recapitulates the disability inquiry in toto: Considering all of a 
person's medical and vocational limitations, could the person perform 
job functions in a competitive economy? 
3. Standards of Proof 
The burden of proving eligibility for disability benefits generally 
rests with the claimant. 87 Social Security regulations recognize three 
categories of medical evidence: signs, symptoms and laboratory find-
ings. 88 "Signs" are anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnor-
malities observable by trained professionals using medically 
acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques. 89 "Symptoms" are the clai-
82. /d.§§ 404.1569, 416.969. 
83. The regulations do not identify this as a separate step in the sequential evaluation pro-
cess, considering it to be simply a variation of step 5 and the focus on the medical-vocational 
grids. However, because the substantive standards and the procedures of evaluation are signifi-
cantly different when the case is not evaluated within the strength limitations context of the 
grids, it seems more compelling to denominate a sixth step in the analysis. Compare Capowski, 
supra note 75, at 359 (describing the provisions regarding nonexertional impairments as an "es-
cape clause" from the grids). 
84. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 2, § 200.00(h) (1986); S.S.R. 83-12 (1983). The 
claim of an individual who was unable to perform the "full range" of work would not be de-
cided directly by the grids. S.S.R. 83-12 (1983). 
85. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 2, § 200.00 (1986). 
86. /d. §§ 404.1561, 416.961. The test of ability to work is whether a significant number of 
jobs exist in the national economy (not necessarily in the claimant's region) that the claimant 
would be able to perform. /d.§§ 404.1566, 416.966. 
87. /d. §§ 404.1512, 416.912. Courts have shifted the burden of coming forward with the 
evidence from the claimant to the SSA at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process because the 
government is more knowledgeable than individual claimants about the job categories and de-
mands in the national economy. E.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Torres v. 
Schweiker, 682 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); Tennant v. Schwei-
ker, 682 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1982). This burden shifting is not mentioned in the regulations, but is 
"consistent with SSA policy and practice." Assoc. Comm'r Frank Smith, Memorandum on Cir-
cuit Court Case Study 7 (June 17, 1986). The original decision creating the shift was Kerner v. 
Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960). 
88. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1528, 416.928 (1986). Regulations also specify the acceptable sources 
and preferred contents of medical evidence. Id. §§ 404.1513, 416.913. 
89. /d.§§ 404.1528, 416.928. 
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mant's own descriptions of physical or mental impairments.90 "Labo-
ratory findings" are the results of x-rays, blood tests, and other 
medically recognized tests. 91 
The SSA must consider all of these categories in making a disability 
determination. 92 The most compelling evidentiary category, however, 
is that of "objective" reproducible tests and findings. 93 The regula-
tions specify that without professional corroboration, symptoms alone 
are insufficient to prove the existence of an impairment.94 Similarly, 
conclusory statements from a medical examiner, such as a claimant's 
doctor's writing that the claimant "is unable to work," will not carry 
much weight unless buttressed by additional evidence explaining the 
conclusion. 95 
The definition of disability embodied in the Social Security Act and 
its regulations is extremely strict.96 Unlike many other disability pro-
grams, the Social Security Administration Act is designed to redress 
only the most catastrophic medical losses-those associated with near-
total and near-permanent inability to work. Individuals who readily 
meet the medical criteria of other types of disability programs are fre-
90. /d. 
91. /d. 
92. /d.§§ 404.1512, 416.912. 
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (1982) and Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 3(a)(l)-(2); see also Note, 
Proving Disabling Pain in Social Security Disability Proceedings: The Social Security Adminis-
tration and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 22 Duo. L. REv. 491, 505-06 (1984); Goldham-
mer & Bloom, Recent Changes in the Assessment of Pain in Disability Claims before the Social 
Security Administration, 35 ADMIN. L. REv. 451 passim (1983); D. SToNE, supra note 12, at 79 
(concluding that insistence upon objective criteria evidencing disability served to enhance the 
strictness of the eligibility criteria and the restraints upon program growth). However, the SSA's 
preference for objective evidence does not authorize it to overlook testimony from a claimant or 
others regarding subjective conditions such as pain. See Avery v. Secretary of HHS, 797 F.2d 19 
(1st Cir. 1986); Foster v. Heckler 780 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1986); Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 
1320 (8th Cir. 1984) and 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984). 
94, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1528(a), .1529; 416.928(a), .929 (1986). 
95. /d. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disability 
Cases in the Federal Cowts, 35 SYRAcus~; L. REv. 897, 931 (1984). The opinion of a treating 
physician, who has observed the claimant repeatedly over time, is ordinarily entitled to greater 
weight than the opinion of a consl!ltative physician, who may have seen the claimant only once. 
Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F,2d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1981); Davis v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1324 (5th 
Cir. 1979); Hephoer v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978). Nevertlleless, it is the logic and 
the S\lpporting evidence of the physician, rather than a conclusory opinion, that is compelling. 
S.S.R. 82-48c (Cum. Ed. 1986); see also Schisler v, Heckler, 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986); Stieber-
ger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1343-50 (S.D. N.Y. 198,), vacated 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). 
96. NAT'L ACADEMY Of SCIENCES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMM. ON PAIN, DISABILITY, 
AND CHRONIC ILLNESS BEHAVIOR, PAIN AND DISABILITY: CLINICAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND PUBLIC POL· 
ICY PERSPECTIVES 22-23, 33 (1987) (hereinafter INSTITUTE Of MEDICINE). Heaney, Why the High 
Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases?, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. I, 4 (1984). 
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quently denied by the SSA97 and must be extremely sick or injured to 
qualify for disability benefits under RSDHI or SSI. 
4. Benefit Levels 
RSDHI monthly disability benefits are calculated using a complex 
formula. The claimant's prior annual average earnings in covered em-
ployment are adjusted for inflation by comparison to the national av-
erage wage level for the corresponding years. 98 In 1988, the average 
RSDHI benefit paid to a disabled worker was $491 per month; the 
average for a disabled worker with dependents was $905 per month.99 
In general, consistent with the insurance plan nature of RSDHI, the 
higher the claimant's prior covered earnings, the higher the payments 
the claimant receives. An SSI monthly disability check is designed to 
bring the claimant's income up to the established federal support 
level. 100 
5. Other Benefits 
A disabled worker's spouse, children, divorced spouse, or survivors 
may also be eligible for certain types of RSDHI assistance, regardless 
of whether they are disabled. 101 SSI benefits are payable to an eligible 
individual and spouse only, but in rare cases an eligible person's sti-
pend may be increased if an "essential person" (e.g., one who helps 
care for the disabled person) is part of the household. 102 Additionally, 
an individual who has been entitled to RSDHI disability benefits for 
twenty-four months is also eligible for Medicare benefits, 103 and an 
individual who is entitled to SSI disability benefits is also thereby enti-
tled to Medicaid coverage in most states. 104 
97. D. Swansburg, supra note 13, passim; see 20 C.f.R. §§ 404.1504, 416.904 (1988). Part 
of the disparity occurs because some of the other programs such as VA and workers' compensa-
tion are authorized to pay benefits for partial and temporary disability, whereas the SSA targets 
exclusively those suffering from complete, long-term impairments. 
98. 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart C (1986). 
99. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT TO TilE CoNGRESS 18 (1988). 
100. The support level benefit amount is reduced by the amount of the claimant's countable 
income as determined under 20 C.F.R. part 416, subpart K (1986); id. part 416, subp;trt D. 
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia voluntarily provide to at least some SSI reci-
pients a small supplementation above this minimum federal level. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE 
CoNGREss, supra note 11, at 2. These supplementations may be "voluntary" or part of a mang!l-
tory "pass through" required for state receipt of Mecticaid funr;ls. Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 
F.2d 401 (D.C. Clr. 1981). 
101. 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpart D (1986). 
102. /d. §§ 416.220 to .223. 
103. 42 U .S.C. § 426(b)(2)(A)(i) (1982). 
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 appropriates funds to be distributer;! to medical assistance plans for 
individuals and families meeting certain requirements, including those qualifying for SSI disabil-
ity benefits./d. § 1396(a)(l0)(A)(i). 
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6. Timing of Benefit Payments 
RSDHI benefits differ from SSI benefits in two respects. First, a 
statutory waiting period of five calendar months after the onset of 
disability applies before the first RSDHI check is issued; 105 SSI pay-
ments can start immediately. 106 Second, RSDHI benefits may apply 
retroactively, enabling the claimant to receive benefits for the twelve 
months preceding the filing of the application if a prior date of onset 
of the disabling impairment is proven; 107 SSI eligibility, on the other 
hand, does not provide any compensation predating the application 
filing date. 108 
B. Disability Claims Process 
Both RSDHI and SSI applications are handled through the same 
claims network. 109 The process involves both federal officials and state 
agencies operating under the supervision of the SSA. 110 
105. !d. § 423(c)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 404.315(d) (1986). 
106. 20 C.F.R. § 416.501 (1986). An SSI claimant who is "presumptively eligible" (i.e., who 
presents strong evidence of the likelihood of meeting the financial and medical eligibility criteria) 
can be awarded up to three months of disability benefits before a final determination of eligibil-
ity is made. !d. §§ 416.931 to .934. 
107. !d. § 404.621(a)(l). The number of months of retroactive RSDHI disability benefits is 
maximized if the onset of disability is 17 months prior to the date of application. The first five 
of these months will then be allocated to the waiting period and 12 months of back benefits will 
be payable. An onset date further back in time will not increase beyond 12 the number of 
months of retroactive award. 
108. Id. §§ 416.340 to .350, .501. A claimant may be eligible for both RSDHI and SSI con-
currently. This could occur, for example, if the individual worked for a sufficiently long time in 
Social Security-covered employment to establish RSDHI entitlement, but if the individual's 
wages were relatively low, so that current resources and income are beneath the SSI ceilings. A 
monthly RSDHI benefit check does count as income for SSI purposes, so unless the individual's 
prior earnings (and, hence, monthly RSDHI disability payment) were low, the SSI disability 
payment would be low or zero. 
109. The SSA provides separate application forms for RSDHI and SSI, and a claimant who 
applies for both will receive parallel responses, again on separate forms. The procedures for 
investigating and administering the medical aspects of the two programs are identical, however, 
and concurrent applications are handled largely in tandem. For samples of the applicable forms 
and SSA notices, see PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 51-73. 
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 421(a), 1383(a) (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503, 416.903 (1988). Prior to 
1980, the relationship between the SSA and the state agencies was contractual. In the 1980 
amendments, Act of June 9, 1980, Pub. L. no. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, Congress changed the 
relationship to a regulatory one. 
The federal part of the claims bureaucracy is organized as follows. The SSA (headed by a 
Commissioner) is one of five principal operating units of the Department of Health and Human 
Services. The SSA has four deputy commissioners (for Management and Assessment, Policy and 
External Affairs, Operations, and Programs). Each of these oversees one or more associate com-
missioners. The network of local SSA district offices is organizationally placed directly under the 
Deputy Commissioner for Operations. The Office of Disability Operations is located under the 
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I. Initial Application 
A claimant begins the process by filing an application at one of the 
SSA's district or branch offices. 111 The district office begins a two-
part initial determination by first investigating the claimant's financial 
eligibility for RSDHI, SSI or both. 112 If the claimant is found finan-
cially ineligible, a notice of denial is mailed. 
If the claimant satisfies the applicable financial eligibility tests, the 
file is forwarded to another office for the second half of the initial 
determination, which pertains to medical eligibility. This office is part 
of a state government agency (usually within the state's vocational re-
habilitation service) operating as a federally funded Disability Deter-
mination Service (DDS) under the SSA's regulation. 113 The DDS 
develops the medical file by soliciting records and other documents 
from the claimant's physicians, hospitals, clinics, etc. 114 The DDS may 
also obtain additional medical assessments by ordering a "consulta-
tive examination," in which a physician under contract with the DDS 
performs specified tests or measurements. 115 A two-person team com-
posed of a medical consultant and a disability examiner makes the 
DDS decision regarding medical eligibility . 116 The process consumes, 
Deputy Commissioner for Operations and the Associate Commissioner for Central Operations. 
The corps of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ's), the Appeals Council, and the Office of Ap-
peals Operations are all located under the Deputy Commissioner for Programs and the Associate 
Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals. See Chart 2, infra page 321. 
Ill. 20 C.P.R. §§ 404.611, 416.325 (1986). 
112. /d. §§ 404.902 to .905, 416.1402 to .1405 (1988). For RSDHI claims, the local district 
office obtains a copy of the wage earner's earnings record (showing all SSA-covered income and 
quarters of coverage) from the SSA's Office of Operational Policy and Procedures. For SSI 
cases, the Office of Central Operations and the local district office investigate the claimant's 
income and resources. 
Il3. /d. part 404, subpart Q; part 416, subpart J. The 1980 amendments made it possible for 
the SSA to replace the DDS in a particular state, and perform the medical evaluation itself, 
where the DDS fails to conform to SSA standards. 42 U.S.C. § 421(b) (1982). 
114. The DDS may pay reproduction costs for obtaining these records. 20 C.P.R. §§ 
404.1514, 416.914 (1988). If the DDS is not as vigorous as it should be in collecting medical 
records, the shortage of such documentation usually disadvantages the claimant, who bears the 
burden of proof of disability. See id. §§ 404.705, 1516, 416.916; Weinstein, supra note 95, at 
931. 
Apprehensions about the adequacy of DDS workups of the medical file have been exacerbated 
recently as SSA budget cuts have reverberated in reduced DDS staffing and services. See letter 
from Reps. Rostenkowski, Pickle & Jacobs to SSA Comm'r Hardy (Feb. 3, 1987). 
115. 20 C.P.R.§§ 404.1517 to .1518, 416.917 to .918 (1986). The quality and sufficiency of 
typical DDS consultative examinations have become controversial issues. See COMM. ON Gov'T 
OPERATIONS, CONSULTATIVE EXAMINATIONS INVESTIGATION, H.R. REP. No. 981, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. passim (1986); F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 234, 273-76; D. STONE, supra note 12, at 121-
24. A claimant's failure to cooperate with a consultative examiner is grounds for denial of the 
claim. 20 C.P.R.§§ 404.1518, 416.918 (1988). 
116. These officials conduct a paper review only; they do not meet with the claimant. The 
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from application to notification, approximately eighty days. 117 Ap-
proximately 1.5 million initial determinations in disability cases are 
made each year; forty percent are granted. 118 If the decision is not 
"fully favorable," the claimant has sixty days to appeal. 119 
An initial determination is also made when benefits are periodically 
reviewed. These "Continuing Disability Reviews" (CDRs) are under-
taken to assess possible improvement in the claimant's condition and 
to remove from the disability rolls people who are no longer eligible 
for benefits. 120 The CDRs, and the standards and procedures for con-
ducting them, have been controversial in recent years and were sus-
pended from 1984-86, pending the enactment and implementation of 
new statutory standards. 121 
disability examiner or specialist ordinarily does the bulk of the work on the application. The 
medical consultant is a physician employed part-time or full-time by the DDS to evaluate medi-
cal conditions beyond the expertise of the disability examiner and assess the claimant's residual 
functional capacity. These two officials may also be assisted by a vocational expert. F. BLOcH, 
supra note 13, at 235; see also REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 
42, at 23. 
117. Average DDS processing time for initial RSDHI applications rose from 63 days in Sep-
tember 1985 to 89 days in February 1986, then fell to 80 days in September 1986. Similarly, 
average SSI disability case processing time rose from 55 days in September 1985 to 85 days in 
February 1986 and declined to 79 days in September 1986. Part of the overall rise is attributed to 
the learning process required in implementing the new regulations concerning mental impair-
ments and medical improvements. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CoNGREss, supra note II, at 14. 
118. 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 66, at 41. . 
119. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909, 416.1409 (1988). In this instance, as with all succeeding time 
limits described below, the 60-day period runs from the date of the claimant's receipt of the 
decision, and the SSA assumes (until evidence to the contrary is presented) that the claimant 
receives the notice five days after it is dated. Id. §§ 404.901, 416.1401. The SSA allows extension 
of the time period for good cause. /d. §§ 404.909(b), .911; 416.1409(b), .1411. 
120. CDR procedures vary somewhat from the initial sequential evaluation process. They 
focus on the extent to which the claimant's condition has improved or been mitigated by new 
medical techniques, and whether any improvement affects the claimant's ability to work. Cases 
fall into three categories according to the initial likelihood of subsequent medical improvement, 
and the frequency of review varies from once every six months to once every seven years. /d. §§ 
404.1590, .1594; 416.990, .994; see also General Accounting Office, Social Security: Adjusting 
Continuing Disability Review Priorities (Oct. 1986) (critiquing the selection of types of cases for 
early CDRs); Sweeney, The New 'Medical Improvement' Standard in Social Security and SSI 
Disability Cases passim, (Mar. 1986). 
121. LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ELDERLY, DISABILITY PRACTICE MANUAL FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 
AND SSI PROGRAMS 12-34, (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter DISABILITY PRACTICE MANUAL, SUPP. 1987). 
The 1980 legislation provided for a review of current beneficiaries, and this process was 
greatly accelerated by the Reagan administration. Approximately one million cases were then 
reviewed, and almost half of them were terminated, producing huge financial savings for the 
SSA. However, over half of those terminations were later. reversed on appeal, and the standards, 
the seemingly brusque CDR procedures, the often improper CDR practices, and the prolonged 
delays occasioned by the skyrocketing caseloads alienated many people. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT 
OF SOCIAL SECURITY SUBCOMM., HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, DISABILITY LEGISLATION 
1983: BACKGROUND AND IssUES (Comm. Print 1983); 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 
66, at 43; D. CoFER, supra note 5, at 116; Weaver, Social Security Disability Policy in the 1980's 
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Prior to claimant notification, a sample of DDS decisions is sub· 
jected to "Quality Assurance Review" by regional and national SSA 
appraisers who have authority to reverse state agency determinations 
or to remand them for correction. 122 
2. Reconsideration 
A dissatisfied claimant may request "reconsideration." 123 Under re-
consideration, the same procedures are followed as in making an ini-
tial determination, but different people within the respective offices 
make the assessments. 124 For example, if the initial denial was based 
and Beyond, in DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 29 (1986); SociAL SECURITY DISABILITY IN-
SURANCE PROGRAM: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Sen., 97th Cong., 2d Sess.47-
64 (Aug. 18, 1982); Report from Secretary of HHS Margaret Heckler to the Congress Regarding 
Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, at 67-72 (Jan. 4, 1985). 
122. 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503(d), 416.903(d) (1988). 
The SSA reviews the work of the DDS according to two distinct sampling programs. Under 
one, 650Jo of all DDS awards are reviewed, prior to effectuation, by regional and national tiers 
of SSA officials. In fiscal year (FY) 1986, this amounted to 250,000 decisions, of which only 
0.25o/o were returned to the DDS for correction or collection of additional evidence. The other 
review program selects 50Jo of all DDS decisions-a total of 83,000 cases in FY 1986, divided 
equally among favorable and unfavorable actions-for review by SSA regional offices. The SSA 
Central Office then reviews 10,000 of the regional offices' cases to promote consistency across 
the nation. Through these reviews, the SSA has concluded that DDS disability decisions were 
highly accurate, being correct 96.60Jo of the time for initial determinations and 95.50Jo of the time 
for reconsideration actions. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CoNGRESS, supra note II, at 13. 
On the other hand, in some instances DDS offices have distorted their accuracy records by 
removing erroneous cases from the supposedly random sample of files to be sent to the SSA 
quality assurance reviewers and substituting correctly-decided cases. Report of Thomas W. 
Hayes, Auditor General, State of California (Feb. 17, 1987). 
Historically, the degree of SSA review of DDS decisions has varied substantially. Before 1972, 
up to 700Jo of state disability allowances were routinely reviewed by the SSA prior to effectua-
tion. Later, to save administrative costs, the SSA sampled only 50Jo of the awards, and only for 
post-effectuation analysis. Under the 1980 amendments, Congress required an increasing per-
centage (150Jo in FY 1981, 350Jo in FY 1982 and 650Jo thereafter) of DDS allowances to be re-
viewed by the SSA before payment. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, S. REP. No. 408, 6th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1283-84 (1979), reprinted in 3 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws, 1277, 1290-1312 (1980) 
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 408); D. COFER, supra note 5, at 114; 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL, 
supra note 66, at 37. 
123. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907 to .922, 416.1407 to .1422 (1986). No reconsideration has taken 
place in SSI or concurrent SSI/RSDHI continuing disability cases. An SSI recipient whose bene-
fits were to be cut off would proceed immediately from an adverse initial determination to an 
ALJ hearing. /d.§§ 404.907, 416.1407 (1988). This procedure, however, has been altered with 
the institution of "disability hearings" at the reconsideration stage in all RSDHI and SSI CDR 
cases. See infra note 124. 
124. /d.§§ 404.915,416.1415 (1986). The SSA has promulgated new regulations, implement-
ing a requirement of the 1984 amendments authorizing face-to-face "disability hearings" before 
a DDS disability examiner at the reconsideration stage in cases where benefits are being termi-
nated due to a claimant's medical improvement. These disability hearings will address only the 
question of the claimant's medical condition; other issues (SSI income level, performance of 
substantial gainful activity, etc.) will continue to be handled in the ordinary reconsideration 
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on financial eligibility grounds, a new person within the SSA district 
office will review the files; if the original determination was based on 
a finding of medical ineligibility, a new two-person team at the DDS 
will examine that aspect of the case. The claimant may submit addi-
tional evidence at this time, but ordinarily does not appear in person 
before the SSA or DDS decisionmakers. 125 
Again, the claimant is notified by mail of the decision, and again 
accorded sixty days to- appeal. 126 Approximately 380,000 reconsidera-
tion decisions were issued in 1986, of which seventeen percent were 
favorable. 127 The reconsideration process typically takes a minimum 
of two months. 128 
3. Administrative Law Judge Hearing 
Should the claimant choose to appeal, the next step is a de novo 
hearing before a federal administrative law judge (ALJ). 129 This hear-
ing ordinarily affords the claimant the first opportunity to meet face-
to-face with the person who makes a decision on the claim. It is also 
the first occasion to take sworn testimony from other witnesses and 
typically the first stage at which the claimant obtains legal or other 
representation. 130 
The ALJ may order additional consultative examinations before or 
after the hearing, 131 call vocational or medical experts to testify, 132 and 
process. /d. §§ 404.914 to .918, 416.1414 to .1418 (1988); DISABILITY PRACTICE MANUAL, SUPP. 
1987, supra note 121, at 7-11; Memorandum from Eileen Sweeney, Nat'l Senior Citizens Law 
Center, to Legal Services Advocates and Members of the Private Bar Representing Social Secu-
rity and SSI Beneficiaries in Cessation Cases (Feb. 5, 1986). 
125. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.933, 416.1433 (1986). Pilot projects have provided for face-to-face 
meetings between the claimant and decisionmaker at the DDS reconsideration level in new appli-
cations. D. CoFER, supra note 5, at 184. 
126. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.933, 416.1433 (1986). 
127. 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 66, at 41. 
128. The time required for reconsideration is comparable to that for an initial determination 
and is subject to the same types of delay. 
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(l), 1383(c)(l) (1986); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929 to .965, 416.1429 
(1986). These decisionmakers were originally designated as "hearing examiners" until Congress 
changed the designation in 1972 in an effort to upgrade the stature and autonomy of the posi-
tion. D. COFER, supra note 5, at 65-66. 
130. At the ALJ hearing approximately 650Jo of the claimants have legal representation and 
180Jo have non-attorney representation. 9 Soc. SECURITY F. 7 (Mar. 1987). ALJs are often 
charged with a special responsibility to help an unrepresented claimant. See Heckler v. Camp-
bell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
131. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929 to .965, 416.1429 to .1465 (1986). The classic description of a 
non-adversarial" SSA administrative hearing is that the ALJ must "wear three hats," executing 
simultaneous responsibility for (I) ensuring that the claimant-especially when appearing pro 
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question the claimant and any other witnesses. 133 The claimant (or a 
representative) may submit additional medical records and a brief, de-
liver opening and closing remarks, and question all witnesses. Hear-
ings are non-adversarial, and the level of formality varies. 134 A hearing 
is tape recorded and lasts an average of thirty to sixty minutes. 135 
The volume of disability cases decided by ALJ s has fluctuated 
widely in recent years. 136 The SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals 
has undertaken a number of controversial measures to enhance the 
productivity of ALJs. These measures include "reconfiguring" the lo-
cal hearing offices by "pooling" the staff attorneys and hearing assis-
tants who had previously been assigned to specific ALJs, setting 
national "targets" for case processing speeds, arranging peer counsel-
ing for low-producing ALJs, and attempting direct job discipline. 
Most of these measures have been bitterly resented by ALJ s and 
se-puts forward the strongest case possible, (2) developing the record fully and critically, and 
(3) deciding the case. 
132. /d. A vocational expert (VE) appears in approximately 200Jo of the ALJ hearings, most 
often when the issues concern non-exertional impairments or the level and transferability of the 
claimant's skills. 9 Soc. SECURITY F. 7 (Mar. 1987). Usage of VE testimony has increased over 
the past several years, but is still substantially below the level experienced in the late 1970s, prior 
to implementation of the "grid" rules. ld. at 8; see also OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 30 (Sept. 30, 
1986). 
133. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, 416.1444 (1986). No SSA advocate opposes the claimant in the 
hearing. An experiment in selected locations, with "government representatives" who would 
develop an advocacy position, cross-examine claimants' witnesses, etc., has been terminated. 52 
Fed. Reg. 88 (1987) (ending the experiment); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.965, 416.1465 (1986). 
134. See 1. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, 
SociAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1987) (a study for the National Center for Adminis-
trative Justice) [hereinafter NAT'L CENTER STUDY]. For a critical description of the ALJ hearing 
process, see id. at 64-99. 
135. Hearings in which the claimant is unrepresented are typically much shorter (e.g., 20 to 
30 minutes); hearings with counsel, and especially with multiple witnesses, may run beyond two 
hours. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 4 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
The claimant is often the only witness in the case. However, a spouse, a friend, or an expert 
frequently appears as well. In FY 1986, the percentages of involvement in hearings were: claim-
ant involved 97% of the time; family or friend, 34%; vocational expert, 21 %; medical advisor, 
10%; translator, 4%; and claimant's physician, I%. 9 Soc. SEcURITY F. 7 (Mar. 1987). 
136. Moratoria on CDR cases are responsible for a large part of the recent fluctuation. Data 
regarding ALJ hearing workload are as follows: 
Fiscal Number Cases Average Average Process 
Year of Cases Cases Pending ALJs Disposed Time 
(Oct.) Received Disposed (end of) on duty per ALJ (days) 
1982 320,680 296,548 152,896 754 34 174 
1983 363,533 342,998 173,431 797 37 184 
1984 271,809 337,459 107,781 763 37 185 
1985 245,090 245,829 107,042 730 29 167 
1986 230,655 220,313 117,384 703 27 172 
OHA KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS (July 1987). 
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claima'fits' representatives as official attacks upon ALJs' decisional in-
dep't'ndence,.137 an independence guaranteed by the Administrative 
Procedures Act. 138 
Approximately three months after the hearing, the claimant will be 
notified~ by mail of the ALJ's decision and accorded a further sixty-
day appeal opportunity. 09 The ALJ stage, from the time of request 
for a hearing through the date of a decision, typically takes six to 
seven months. 140 
4. Appeals Council 
A claim denied at the ALJ stage may be appealed to the SSA Ap-
peals Council. The Appeals Council is described in detail in the suc-
ceeding subsection. 
5. Judicial Review 
A claimant dissatisfied with the final agency determination 141 may 
appeal within sixty days to a federal district court. 142 The statutory 
137. D. CoFER, supra note 5, passim. 
138. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 3105, 7521, 5362, 3344, 1305 
(1982). 
139. 20 C.P.R. §§ 404.968, 416.1468 (1986). Of the 220,313 cases taken to the ALJ stage in 
FY 1986, 173,675 went to a hearing. Of these, 106,385 (6llrfo) resulted in an award of benefits. In 
FY i986, 46,638 cases (21.1% of the total presented to ALJs) were dismissed without a hearing, 
including 20,198 mental impairment cases that were returned to DOSs for further proceedings. 
The FY 1985-86 figures are unusual and reflect that, when the SSA issued the new mental im-
pairment listings in August, 1985, thousands of cases had to be returned for review under the 
new standards. Dismissal rates in prior years were significantly lower: 12.4% in FY 1985, 15.1% 
in FY 1984, 9.7% in FY 1980. In a typical year, most of these dismissals arise when a claimant 
abandons the matter or when time deadlines are not met. An ALJ may also award benefits, 
without conducting a hearing, if the documentary record is sufficient. 
Based on the entire ALJ caseload (including dismissals), ALJs awarded benefits in 48.3% of 
the cases in FY 1986, 50.9% in FY 1985, 51.6% in FY 1984, and 55.8% in FY 1980. Excluding 
dismissals, the allowance rates were 61% in FY 1986, 58% in FY 1985, 61% in FY 1984, and 
62% in FY 1980. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 24-26 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
140. OHA KEY WoRKLOAD INDICATORS (July 1987). At the start of FY 1986, the Associate 
Commissioner established the goal of 155 days average processing time for hearings. Actual 
performance averaged 172 days. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 4 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
The expanding ALJ caseload over several years generated huge backlogs and extraordinary 
delays pending an ALJ hearing. Some courts intervened to establish or require fixed time limita-
tions oriSSA actions. E.g., Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978). The 
Supreme Court, however, in Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984), ruled that district courts did 
not have the legal authority to create such timeliness standards on a broad class-wide basis, and 
could continue to do so only within the context of individual cases. /d. at 119. 
141. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before a claimant may pursue a claim 
in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), (h) (1982); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). How-
ever, where the Secretary or the court deems it appropriate, the exhaustion requirement may be 
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standard of review followed in judicial appeals upholds the Secre-
tary's findings of fact if they are supported by "substantial evi-
dence." 143 The court will also review the case for errors of law, 
although this is a less common basis for appeal. 144 The reviewing court 
may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand the Secretary's decision. 145 
Reversals occur when the Secretary's decision is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence and the claimant satisfies the burden of proof of dis-
ability. 146 · 
waived. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986). 
An expedited appeals process is available to bypass the ALJ or Appeals Council stages and 
proceed directly from reconsideration to federal court when the claimant and the SSA stipulate 
that the only issue remaining in the case is the alleged unconstitutionality of a provision of Social 
Security law. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.923 to .928, 416.1423 to .1428 (1986); OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND 
APPEALS HANDBOOK 5-38-18D (1984) [hereinafter OHA HANDBOOK]. 
142. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 (1986). Federal court jurisdiction is founded upon 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). It is noteworthy that appeal of SS'A decisions, unlike those of most other 
administrative agencies, lies with the federal district court, rather than directly with the court of 
appeals. The volume of the cases, and their orientation to facts rather than law, probably com-
pel this level of review. 
Many federal courts now routinely channel disability cases for consideration by a U.S. magis-
trate, rather than the district judge. The magistrate may hear the case (often proceeding more 
quickly than the court could) and make a recommended decision for the judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636 
(1982). The district judge will review the magistrate's recommendations (and the parties' com-
ments thereon) and retain power to affirm, reverse or modify them. Matthews v. Weber, 423 
U.S. 261 (1976). By consent of the parties, a magistrate may be authorized to conduct all pro-
ceedings and enter a final judgment, with no review by the district judge. 28 U .S.C. § 636(c) 
(1982). 
In FY 1985, 394 cases were appealed to circuit courts. (This was 7.5'Vo of the cases denied or 
dismissed by district courts.) That year, the circuit courts ruled in favor of claimants in 21% of 
the cases. The Supreme Court rarely takes cognizance of disability cases, hearing none in FY 
1985. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 96, at 48-49. 
For a critical assessment of the operation of judicial review, see NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra 
note 134, at 125-50. 
143. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). Substantial evidence is defined as "more than a mere scin-
tilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. 
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
Critics have argued that district courts often ignore the substantial evidence test and engage in 
making de novo factual determinations. H.R. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABTLITY AMENDMENTS OF 
1980, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1409. 
As early as 1960, SSA Commissioner Mitchell argued: "Nevertheless, in some cases, courts 
have not followed the 'substantial evidence' rule and have made their own assessment and ap-
praisal of the facts." Report to the Secretary from SSA Commissioner Mitchell3 (Sept. 6, 1960). 
144. A federal court does not show the same deference to the administrative conclusions of 
law as it does to findings of fact. Ridgely v. Secretary of HEW, 345 F. Supp. 983, 988 (D. Md. 
1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1973); Ferran v. Flemming, 293 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1961). 
145. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). A federal district court also holds equitable power to issue 
injunctions in SSA disability cases. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979). 
146. Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (lith Cir. 1982); Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 
(9th Cir. 1982); Wander v. Schweiker, 523 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Md. 1981). 
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Remands to the Secretary occur in a variety of circumstances. A 
court may order a remand for a new hearing or new decision if an 
improper legal standard or procedure was adopted, 147 if the adminis-
trative record was incomplete, 148 or if the SSA failed to accord proper 
weight to the evidence. 149 Additionally, a remand may also be ordered 
on the Secretary's motion, to allow SSA to review or correct an ALJ 
decision denying benefits. 150 The Secretary's motion must be made be-
fore an answer is filed and must be based on good cause. 151 
The number of new federal district court cases filed against the SSA 
in disability matters each year fluctuates widely: roughly 9000 cases 
were filed in 1981; 13,000 in 1982; 27,000 in 1983; 26,000 in 1984; 
19,000 in 1985; 9000 in 1986; and 4000 in the first five months of 
1987. 152 The reversal rate has fluctuated similarly: 200Jo in 1982, 30% 
in 1983, 57% in 1984, 46% in 1985, and 38% in 1986. 153 Throughout 
this period, 40,000 to 50,000 SSA disability cases have been pending 
in the federal courts at any given time. 
Even beyond the quantity of cases reviewed, the federal judiciary 
has had a major impact on the disability programs, shaping the proce-
dures and standards adhered to by the SSA, and generally nudging the 
system in the direction of expanded eligibility. 154 
147. See, e.g., Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981). 
148. Diabo v. Secretary of HEW, 627 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
149. Camp v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1981). 
150. 42 U .S.C. § 405(g) (1982). Prior to the 1980 amendments, the Secretary had an absolute 
right to have the case remanded for further administrative consideration. This unqualified au-
thority arguably reduced the SSA's incentive for developing the case properly on its first oppor-
tunity. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 308; S. REP. No. 408, supra note 122, at 58. 
151. 42 u.s.c. § 405(g) (1982). 
152. Calendar year data provided by Don Gonya, Chief Counsel for the SSA (June 24, 
1987). Of the total of SSA cases, 990Jo involved claims for disability benefits. In FY 1986, 10,716 
new cases were filed in federal courts appealing SSA denials. Of these, 10,700 (960Jo) concerned 
disability: 5930 on the disability portion of RSDHI, 1255 on SSI and 2885 concurrent. OHA KEY 
WORKLOAD INDICATORS (July 1987). 
153. Gonya, supra note 152. These figures do not include court remands. The annual num-
ber of court remands is large and irregular (17,711 in FY 1985; 11,993 in FY 1984). Many of 
these were mandated by the 1984 legislative changes in medical improvement standards and by 
the resolution of major class actions. 
In FY 1986, 8604 final court decisions were reached in SSA disability cases, resulting in 4212 
affirmations, 3308 reversals, and 1084 dismissals. In addition, court remands totaled 9143 in FY 
1986. At the end of FY 1986, 47,334 disability cases were pending in federal courts. 1987 SSA 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note II, at 33. 
!54. Weinstein, supra note 95, passim; see also Social Security Hearings and Appeals: Pend-
ing Problems and Proposed Solutions, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Hearings]; D. 
STONE, supra note 12, at 152-61; Liebman, supra note 21, at 845 (asserting that court's freedom 
to ignore the operation of disability program as a whole and the aggregate financial conse-
quences of expanding eligibility standards, inclines judges toward allowances). Contra J. MAS-
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6. Observations 
From the preceding description of the standards and procedures for 
handling RSDHI and SSI disability claims, the following observations 
may be made. 
(a) The SSA disability mechanism is responsible for receiving, docu-
menting, and adjudicating a staggering number of claims each year. 
At every step of the appeals process, the volume of cases drives SSA 
procedures. The DDS apparatus must cope with almost two million 
initial application and reconsideration actions each year, and the SSA 
ALJ s collectively render more decisions annually than the entire fed-
eral article III judiciary. 155 The federal courts have become the final 
resting place for 10,000 claims each year. 156 No other administrative 
agency processes anywhere near the same number of cases as the 
SSA. 157 Moreover, while the surge in the disability caseload may have 
crested, the powerful economic, social, and medical factors that cre-
ated it remain operative. 158 
Concomitant with the volume of cases is the proliferation of the 
SSA decisionmaking units, including 19,000 staff members in more 
than 1300 district offices, 4300 disability examiners in 111 DDS 
branches, and 700 ALJs in 132 hearing offices. 159 Establishing any de-
HAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SociAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 186 (1983) 
(asserting that judicial review has had only minor impact on the bulk of administrative deci· 
sions); Liebman & Stewart, Bureaucratic Vision, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1952, 1959 (1983) ("the 
ALJs and the judges reverse particular denials, but do not make the law of the system"). 
155. Weinstein, supra note 95, at 900. Of the 1003 ALJs that were employed by the federal 
government as of July 21, 1987, 673 (670Jo) were in SSA. Letter from William Taylor, Appeals 
Council Member (July 31, 1987) (on file with authors). 
156. In 1986, Social Security cases represented 21 OJo of the federal courts' civil docket where 
the United States was a party. This load was 50Jo of the federal courts' total civil docket. (Com· 
parable figures for 1984 were 370Jo and 120Jo respectively.) Gonya, supra note 152. 
This volume of cases has prompted numerous proposals to establish a dedicated "Social Secu-
rity Court" (or a "Disability Court") with jurisdiction over all disability appeals from a final 
order of the Secretary of HHS. Advocates of this institution claim that it would free the district 
courts from a substantial burden and promote national uniformity in the implementation of 
disability law. Opponents assert that the true burden on the federal judiciary is overstated, be-
cause disability cases tend to be resolved relatively quickly and easily, and that recourse to a 
"generalist" district court is an important safeguard for claimants, whose interests would be less 
searchingly protected by "specialists" on a disability bench. Ogilvy, The Social Security Court 
Proposal: A Critique, 9 J. OF LEGIS. 229, 238-40 (1982); Rains, A Specialized Court for Social 
Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, !5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. I (1987); An Address by 
Justice Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court, 34 FED. BAR NEws & J. 252 (July-Aug. 
1987); 1981 Hearings, supra note !54, at 13-14; Pear, New Court Sought for Benefit Cases, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 9, 1986, at I, col 5. But see Arner, The Social Security Court Proposal: An Answer 
to a Critique, 10 J. OF LEGIS. 324 (1983). 
157. 1983 ACUS REPORT, supra note 2, passim. 
158. Weinstein, supra note 95, at 904. 
!59. REPORT OF THE CoMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 42, at 49. 
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gree of consistency and national uniformity among such diverse and 
widespread individuals is a daunting task. 
(b) Typical disability cases are different from most other adminis-
trative matters because disability cases are extremely fact-based. De-
spite a dense thicket of statutory. regulatory, and case law, SSA 
adjudicators generally feel that their sole task is to apply known law 
to new facts, not to make policy, extrapolate decisions in unforeseen 
areas, or enlarge the various slots into which cases are pigeonholed. 
To the extent that one can describe bipolar models of agency deci-
sionmaking, 160 the SSA is structured to follow the "judicial" style of 
neutral adjudication based upon an objective determination of de-
scriptive facts, rather than the "political" style of focusing upon the 
identity of interested parties and the intensity of their respective con-
cerns. This is not to imply that the SSA is above politics, 161 but the 
nature of the typical disability case necessarily tilts the system in the 
direction of fine-grained attention to the intimate facts on the record, 
rather than to the reform of social policy. 
(c) In addition to being grounded largely in fact, rather than law, 
the SSA disability caseload exhibits other unusual characteristics. 
First, it tends to be quite complex, requiring the adjudicator to be 
familiar with a wide range of medical and vocational sources and con-
cepts, as well as a substantial body of statutes, regulations, SSA rul-
ings, and SSA implementing policies. The decisionmaker must 
ordinarily master a substantial file of medical records replete with re-
ferences to obscure impairments and arcane scientific jargon, and 
must be able to apply medical, including psychiatric, evidence to a 
vocational setting. In short, the fact that each case is of relatively lim-
ited scope does not mean that the overall body of jurisprudence is 
easy to comprehend. 162 
Second, although each individual case may be insignificant from a 
societal viewpoint, 163 each is terribly important to the particular claim-
160. 1983 ACUS REPORT, supra note 2, at 117. 
161. Frequent proposals have been made to take the SSA out of the Department of Health 
and Human Services and make it an independent agency, as well as to remove it still further 
from the unified federal budget. Advocates contend that these restructurings would insulate the 
SSA from the caprice of economic and political factors properly affecting the rest of the govern-
ment. See Koitz, Social Security: Legislation to Create an Independent Agency, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, Issue Brief No. 1886120 (Aug. 18, 1986); see also J. 
MASHAW, supra note 154, at 58, 71. 
162. D. STONE, supra note 12, at 166 (quoting former Commissioner Ball as stating that the 
medical criteria of the listings are "so necessary to the program but give us the most trouble" 
and paraphrasing former Commissioner Cardwell that the vocational criteria are "impossible to 
specify but we do it anyway"). 
163. In 1987, for example, the average RSDHI claimant received $488 per month. An SSI 
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ant, because the disability benefits often provide the barest cushion 
against destitution. Mor.eover., SSA benefits (at least for the RSDHI 
program) are not seen as social welfare. but as an ''.earned entitle-
ment" that the worker has paid for over a lengthy period of time. 164 
The claimant appears as a party to a contract, not as a supplicant for 
the dole, 165 and the cases are typically contested vigorously .166 Many 
claimants have little to lose by filing or appealing a case, and have a 
powerful incentive to do so. 
A third characteristic of SSA disability cases is their inherent sub-
jectivity. It may be impossible to jud.ge another person's impairments 
objecti:vely; certainly many of the most compelling and damaging dis-
abling conditions-pain,167 for .example-elude outside measure-
ment.168 Social Security disability law .explicitly eschews judgments 
made on the ''average person" basis; instead, each claimant is entitled 
to individualized case-by-case analysis.169 SSA decisionmakers, there-
fore, must judge credibility in every case. 
Because face-to-face confrontation between claimant and adjudica-
tm takes place only at the ALJ stage, this credibility judgment be-
recipient received substantially less. On the .other hand, these .figures can add up quickly on an 
,actuarial computation, so that the total present value cost .of awarding permanent monthly bene-
fits to a worker disabled at age 50 may exceed $100,000. :E.EPPRT OF THE .CoMM'N ON THE EvALu-
ATION OF PAIN, supr.a note 42, at 165. in addition, .the value of associated services .(Medicare, 
rehabilitation) may be substantial. 
164. Liebman suggests a continuum of social welfare programs, from those generally consid-
ered most legitimate (such ali RSDHI) to those carrying more stigma .(such as SSI). Disability 
programs are typically seen as being further toward the "honorable" end of the spectrum-as 
having been "earned" or at least having eligibility beyond the manipulating control of a victim 
of medical disaster. Liebman, supra note 21, at 857. 
165. In addition, many reviewing courts ,use standard language to the effect that the Social 
Security Act is a remedial statute and must 'be constru,ed liberally. See, e.g., Damon v. Secretary 
of HEW, 557 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1977); Mandrell v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1102, Wl3 (lOtb Cir. 
1975). 
166. One unfortunate but probably common exception to the generalization about vigoro.us 
pursuit of a claim occurs when one symptom of the claimant's impairment, such as a disabling 
mental condition, operates by it~lf to prevent the claimant from engaging in such focused, goal-
oriented behavior, or even from retaining (and cooperating effectively with) a representative to 
pursue the matter. Similarly, an uneducated or illiterate individual may be intimidated by the 
SSA bureaucracy and by .the rigor and complexity .of its rules, and cowed into dropping a meri-
torious case. 
167. See REPORT OF THE CoMM'N ON THE EVALUATION .OF PAIN, supra note 42, passim; INSTI-
TUTE oF MEDICtNE, supra note 96, passim. 
168. Liebman & Stewart, SJJpra note 154, at 1957 ("fill is doubtful that there can be any 
'correct' disposition .of individual cases presenting such 1disabilityl questions"); Weaver, supra 
note 121, at 49 (comparing the .difficulty of determining the occurrence of the insured contin-
gency in the disability program and the retirement and ·survivors programs}. 
169. D. STONE, supra note 12, at 159; Capo:wski, supra note 75, at 349 {criticizing grids for 
.departing fr.om individualization and adopting ".the average man" concept). The listings, too, 
are at least in part .directed to the impact of a condition up.on an "average'' person, independent 
of the actual .effects upon a particular claimant.. 
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comes even more difficult to make. In many instances, a disability 
case turns upon the decisionmaker's subjective sense of the expertise, 
reliability, and credibility of a treating physician, consulting examiner, 
or other expert whose opinion appears only in unsworn documents. 170 
Ironically, the disability programs have traditionally been presented to 
the public, and "sold" to Congress, as incorporating exclusively "ob-
jective" "medical" assessmentsY' In reality, the definition of disabil-
ity necessarily embraces a variety of vocational, economic, social, and 
political considerations, making close cases frequent and ineffably 
complex. 172 
(d) The SSA claims adjudication structure is also procedure-laden. 
A claim may traverse four administrative and three judicial decision-
making levels (not counting possible remands) before running its 
course over two or more years. Claimants are given numerous "bites 
at the apple," including three explicitly de novo stages. 
Moreover, a profound variation exists in the award rates of the var-
ious tiers of review, with the probability of success fluctuating as one 
climbs the appellate ladder .173 The process tends to reward persever-
170. Some judgments required of SSA decisionmakers are usually straightforward: in the 
typical case, assessments of a claimant's age and education, for example, are elementary, and 
many of the listings are defined with a level of detail that leaves relatively little scope for individ-
ual flexibility. Other listings, however (e.g., those defining mental impairments or substance 
abuse), and the assessment of an individual's "residual functional capacity," often require sub-
jective opinions. 
171. See D. CoFER, supra note 5, passim. 
172. Liebman, supra note 21, at 850 (inability to work may truly be attributable to a combi-
nation of medical handicaps and adverse labor market conditions). 
173. Variability exists within each tier of review and across tiers. At the initial determination 
level in 1986, for example, 52.6% of the claims in Massachusetts, and 52.20J'o in Connecticut, 
were allowed, while comparable award rates for Louisiana and West Virginia were only 28.30J'o 
and 28.60J'o respectively. Allowances at the reconsideration level ranged from a high of 31.50J'o in 
Massachusetts to a low of 6.90J'o in Mississippi. ALJ award rates ranged from 71.70J'o in Hawaii 
and 71.60J'o in Montana to 45.50J'o in Michigan, Iowa, and Alaska. Finally, federal court allow-
ances varied from 50.90J'o (for Region VII-Iowa, Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska) to 24.80J'o 
(Region VI-Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas). DISABILITY ADVISORY 
COUNCIL BRIEFING BooK, reprinted in 9 Soc. SECURITY F. 7, 7-8 (May 1987). 
Some of the variability in award rates may be due to the record remaining open throughout 
the early stages of administrative appeal, so the ALJ is typically dealing with a much more 
comprehensive set of medical records and other documents than is available to the DDS. Simi-
larly, the Appeals Council may be provided with materials that were not before the ALJ. 
However, a great deal of the variability is also due to the different attitudes, procedures or 
"mind sets" of the various decisionmakers. In one SSA study, three different sets of reviewers, 
from DDS, ALJ and SSA Office of Assessment groupings, came to very different results even 
when confronted with the same cases. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT ON 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 304(0) OF PUBLIC LAW No. 96-265, passim (known widely as 
the BELLMON REPORT in recognition of the senator whose amendment to the Social Security Disa-
bility Amendments of 1980 resulted in the study) [hereinafter BELLMON REPORT]; NAT'L CENTER 
STUDY, supra note 134, at 3. 
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ance, fostering the notion that a claimant who has the endurance to 
battle the system may eventually fare better than a more disabled but 
less tenacious counterpart. 
(e) Less obvious from the foregoing background is the fact that the 
SSA programs (and the disability programs no less than others) have 
become a hotly, often bitterly contested battleground. On the national 
level, alarms are regularly sounded about the programs and their re-
spective trust funds being "in crisis. " 174 Within the program units, es-
pecially the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), ALJs and others 
have resisted what they see as policymakers' attempts to compromise 
their decisional independence under the guise of promoting efficiency 
and productivity. 175 The SSA was once commonly cited as "an agency 
at war with itself." 176 The skirmishes have now abated or been driven 
underground, but a substantial reservoir of mutual suspicion and hos-
tility still lingers. 177 
C. The Appeals Council 
Review by the Appeals Council is the "fourth bite at the apple" for 
SSA claimants. The Council's order is a final decision of the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (Secretary) that exhausts all adminis-
trative remedies. 
1. Legal Authority 
No explicit statutory requirement supports the Appeals Council; the 
only even implicit statutory mandate for further post-ALJ administra-
tive review of a disability claim provides that "[t]he Secretary is fur-
ther authorized, on his own motion, to hold such hearings and to 
174. REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (Jan. 20, 1983); D. STONE, 
supra note 12, at 186-92; W. ACHENBAUM, SoCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS (1986). 
175. A number of studies and several lawsuits have examined the tensions inside OHA, par-
ticularly between the ALJs and the series of associate commissioners. In many instances, the gist 
of the controversy is how far OHA leadership may proceed in administratively organizing and 
streamlining the handling of cases without impermissibly compromising the quality and inde-
pendence of the ALJs. This is an exceptionally difficult line to draw, and controversy has 
reigned since at least 1975. D. CoFER, supra note 5, passim; 1981 Hearings, supra note 154, 
passim; Rosenblum, Contexts, and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion for Removal of 
Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. passim (1984); 
Chassman & Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings: A Case Study in Quality Assurance 
and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (1980). 
176. 1981 Hearings, supra note 154. 
177. The various components of the OHA (policymakers, ALJs, members of the Appeals 
Council, the union of OAO analysts, etc.) appear to be on somewhat more harmonious terms 
than they were, for example, during the height of the CDR case1oad explosion. In our inter-
views, however, we still found a substantial amount of latent distrust. 
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conduct such investigations and other proceedings as he may deem 
necessary or proper for the administration ofthis subchapter." 178 
The Appeals Council was created by rulemaking procedures and is 
now governed by a handful of regulations. 179 These regulations gener-
ally define the circumstances under which the Appeals Council will 
review a case, 180 the procedures to be followed before the Appeals 
Council, 181 and the claimant's recourse to federal court after a final 
adverse decision of the Secretary .182 The Appeals Council is also gov-
erned by norms inferior to the statute and regulations. These include 
"Social Security Rulings" (SSRs), which are interpretive statements 
based upon statutes or recent decisions by the courts, SSA policymak-
ers, ALJs, the Appeals Council, and others. 183 The SSA generates and 
disseminates SSRs and collects them quarterly and annually but does 
not publish them in the Federal Register. 184 The status of these rulings 
is therefore ambiguous. The SSA claims that rulings "do not have the 
force and effect of the law or regulations but are to be relied upon as 
precedents in determining other cases" 185 and that a ruling "is binding 
on all components of the Social Security Administration. " 186 Many 
ALJs, on the other hand, do not consider rulings binding upon them 
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(I), 1383(c)(l) (1982). The statute also warrants the Appeals Council 
performing the final agency review function for the Secretary: "The Secretary is authorized to 
delegate to any member, officer or employee of the Department of Health and Human Services 
designated by him any of the powers conferred upon him by this section .... " /d. § 405(1). 
SSA review of a number of ALJ awards is required under the Bellmon Amendment, § 304(g) 
of Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 411, but even this review would not necessarily have to be 
performed by the Appeals Council; the function could be delegated elsewhere. 
Another statutory provision guiding the work of the Appeals Council is section 557(b) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. This section establishes the standards for agency review of a 
hearing decision, and states that in its review the agency retains "all the powers which it would 
have in making the initial decision." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (Supp. Ill, 1985). 
179. Regulations governing RSDHI are located at 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1986). For regula-
tions governing SSI, see id. at § 416.1467. For additional Appeals Council procedures see id. at§ 
422.~05. 
180. /d. §§ 404.970, 416.1470 (1986). 
181. /d. §§ 404.976, 416.1476 (1988). 
182. /d.§§ 404.981,416.1481. 
183. SOCIAL SECURITY RULINGS ON FEDERAL 0LD·AGE, SURVIVORS, DISABILITY, SUPPLEMEN-
TAL SECURITY INCOME, AND BLACK LUNG BENEFITS at iii (Cum. Ed. 1986) (hereinafter SociAL 
SECURITY RULINGS). A Ruling may also be based on opinions of the Office of the General Coun· 
sel, Commissioners' decisions, and "other interpretations of the law and regulations." /d. 
184. The SSA has used "Policy Interpretation Rulings" (formerly called "Program Policy 
Statements") as a vehicle to inform SSA adjudicators quickly about clarifications or interpreta-
tions in an operational policy. These rulings or statements were eventually published in the quar-
terly rulings. However, the use of Policy Interpretation Rulings has been discontinued because 
SSA has decided to publish the Rulings as frequently as necessary, instead of quarterly. 
185. SociAL SECURTTY RULINGS, supra note 183, at iii, 
186, Id; see alsQ 20 C.F.R. § 422.408 (1988). 
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because SSRs are not promulgated under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. 187 
The SSA also maintains the Program Operations Manual System 
(POMS), which collects standard policies and operating procedures 
for internal SSA use. The POMS, which is not "published" under 
APA standards but is generally available for public review at SSA of-
fices, is designed to provide interstitial guidance to district offices and 
DDSs where the statute and regulations are incomplete. It supplies 
step-by-step guidance for developing a claims file, helping to ensure 
national uniformity in the implementation of SSA practices. By its 
own terms, POMS is not directly applicable to the ALJs or the Ap-
peals Council, but its contents help shape the case file that may be 
presented for appellate review. Although the POMS statements are in-
tended to be interpretive only, 188 controversy has arisen in instances 
where POMS might be read as imposing new, unpublished substantive 
standards restricting eligibility for benefits. 189 
The SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) also maintains an 
OHA Handbook' 90 that, like the POMS for the DDDs, offers proce-
dural guidance to ALJs and the Appeals Council. As with the POMS, 
the avowed purpose of the handbook is to implement, not to alter, 
187. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). ALJs frequently consider themselves bound by statute, case law 
and published regulations only, and conclude that SSRs, at least those that are "substantive", 
rather than merely "interpretative," are not law. The Appeals Council and the SSA are equally 
adamant that SSRs are binding on all components of the agency. 
There is a complex history regarding the applicability to SSA of AP A standards regarding 
rulemaking. HHS and SSA, like other federal agencies, have always been within the ambit of the 
APA, but the exception in section 553 of the act, covering "public property, loans, grants, bene-
fits, or contracts," tended to exempt much of HHS (especially SSA) rulemaking from the re-
quirements of notice and comment. In 1971, Secretary of HEW Eliott Richardson had the 
department voluntarily eschew that exception. 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (Feb. 5, 1971). 
188. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 225. 
189. E.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (the SSA claims manual has no legal, 
binding force); Salling v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046, 1052-53 (W.D. Va. 1986); F, BLOcH, supra 
note 13, at 225; D. CoFER, supra note 5, at 125. The 1984 Disability Act requires the SSA to 
publish all major disability policies under the APA's notice-and-comment procedures. Beyond 
that, the Con-gressional Conference Committee that considered the 1984 amendments noted 
"[w)hile it is not required in the legislation, the conferees urge the Secretary to publish under the 
AP A public notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures all OASDI and SSI regulations which 
relate to benefits." 130 CoNG. REc. H9831 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984). 
190. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at introductory note. The OHA HANPBOOK com-
prises a multi-volume series of loose-leaf binders, Part five of w}lich is applicable to the Appeals 
Council. Its contents have been irregularly updated by issuing replacement or additional insert 
pages. Part five has fallen into disuse; very few updates have been issued during the past five 
years despite substantial alteration in the operation of the Appeals Council. Various staff memo-
randa and circulars have filled the void. Reportedly, a revision of the OHA HANDBOOK is under-
way. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND INNOVATION, OFFICE OF APPEALS 
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT 36 (Dec. 1986). 
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basic disability law; again, however, the dividing line between those 
two functions is not always bright. 
The SSA does not accord precedential value to its previous deci-
sions in disability cases, whether reached by a DDS, an ALJ, or the 
Appeals Council. The OHA does circulate noteworthy decisions in the 
OHA Law Reporter, published quarterly; this reporter, however, "is 
not to be considered an authority which can be cited, but rather an 
informative aid which may lead to individual research." 191 Selected 
administrative cases are displayed with identifying details removed. 
Finally, it should be noted that the SSA's posture vis-a-vis decisions 
of federal courts remains controversial and largely outside the scope 
of this Article. Under prior policies, the SSA would accept as binding 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, but also asserted 
the authority to "non-acquiesce" in an adverse decision of a circuit 
court of appeals. In a non-acquiesence situation, the SSA would im-
plement the adverse order in the case at bar, but would decline to give 
it prospective applicability in other cases even within the same cir-
cuit. 192 In June and December of 1985, the SSA changed its policy to 
one of "acquiesence." Now, if a circuit court decision is at variance 
with an agency policy, the SSA issues an "Acquiesence Ruling," ad-
vising agency adjudicators and claimants within that circuit about 
how the SSA will implement the court's decision. Of course the SSA 
reserves the right to appeal the issue, or to relitigate it in the same or 
other circuit courts. 193 
2. History 
The Appeals Council was established in January 1940 by the Social 
Security Board, which at that time administered the provisions of the 
191. 11 OHA Law Reporter I, unnumbered preface page (Jan. 1987). The OHA Law Re-
porter publishes selected Appeals Council decisions and remands, ALJ decisions, federal court 
cases, Appeals Council minutes, Social Security Rulings, Federal Register Notices, and other 
materials. It carries a disclaimer that "material herein does not necessarily represent the official 
policy of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, the Social Security Administration or the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services." /d. 
192. The SSA's non-acquiesence practice had been criticized as a flagrant violation of judi-
cial authority, and defended as a necessary concomitant of a national program which (as with 
the Internal Revenue Service or the National Labor Relations Board) used non-acquiesence to 
promote uniformity. Lauter, Disability-Benefit Cases Flood Courts, 6 NAT'L LAw J. at !_(Oct. 
17, 1983); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1351-74. (S.D.N.Y. 1985); (non-acquies-
cence policy violates separation of powers and due process), vacated on other grounds, 801 F.2d 
29 (2d Cir. 1986); Heaney, supra note 96, at 9. 
193. Interim Circular No. 185 (June 3, 1985) (for inclusion in OHA HANDBOOK); SociAL 
SECURITY RULINGS, supra note 183, at iii. 
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Social Security Act. 194 The original charter established a three-person 
Appeals Council with responsibility for directing and supervising ref-
erees (later, ALJs) and for reviewing their decisions. 195 
When the Social Security Board was abolished in 1946, its functions 
were transferred to the administrator of the Federal Security Agency 
(FSA), who in turn delegated most of those powers to the Commis-
sioner of Social Security. The administrator of the FSA, however, re-
tained authority over the Appeals Council, and thus began the 
tradition under which the Appeals Council receives its mandate di-
rectly from the Secretary (or head of the Department) rather than 
from the Commissioner .196 
In 1953, the FSA was folded into the new Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, 197 and the Appeals Council became a part of 
the Office of the Commissioner of the SSA. 198 Authority over hearings 
and appeals, however, continued to flow from the Secretary directly 
to the Appeals Council. 199 
Even today, the Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals 
exercises only "administrative direction" over the Appeals Council, 
and members are to exercise independent judgment with "complete 
decisional authority for all programs within the jurisdiction" of the 
194. BASIC PROVISIONS ADOPTED BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD FOR HEARINGS AND REVIEW 
OF OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE CLAIMS (Jan. 1940) (hereinafter BASIC PROVISIONS). This 
document elaborated 14 provisions regarding the procedures and structures for adjudicating 
claims, long before the enactment of the disability programs. Provisions 9 through 11 dealt with 
the Appeals Council, establishing it as the supervisory structure for referee (ALJ) proceedings. 
195. /d. at 38. 
196. For an outstanding early history of the hearings and appeals structure, see C. Horsky & 
A. Mahin, The Operation of the Social Security Administration Hearing and Decisional Machin-
ery 293-312 (1960) (mimeograph on file with authors). 
197. /d. at 296. 
198. 20 Fed. Reg. 1997, § 8.10 (1955), superseded by 22 Fed. Reg. 1050, § 8.10 (1957). In 
effect, the Appeals Council was merely reorganized as the Office of Hearings and Appeals in 
August, 1959. That is, instead of putting a previously independent Appeals Council under an 
Associate Commissioner who already had other responsibilities, the real reform was to merge 
additional duties into the Appeals Council. The head of the Appeals Council became an office 
director, not a subordinate to one. Only later did the "other" duties of the Associate Commis-
sioner overwhelm those associated with the Appeals Council. DEP'T oF HEW, BRIEFING PAM-
PHLET FOR THE BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 9 (June 30, 1971); Letter from Alvin M. 
David, Director, Division of Program Evaluation and Planning, to Eugene J. Keogh (July 3, 
1964) (responding to Congressional inquiry regarding the rationale for placing the Appeals 
Council under the Commissioner instead of within the Office of the Secretary). 
199. 20 Fed. Reg. 1997, § 8.20(b) (1955). Among the express delegations from the Secretary 
to the Appeals Council are: 33 Fed. Reg. 5837 (1968) (authority to review Title II and Title 
XVIII hearings); 34 Fed. Reg. 6985-86 (1969) (same); 35 Fed. Reg. 7033-34 (1970) (black lung 
cases); 38 Fed. Reg. 15,648 (1973) (SSI cases); 39 Fed. Reg. 27,746 (1974) (same); 40 Fed. Reg. 
21,062 (1975) (Medicare); 40 Fed. Reg. 25,080 (1975) (same); 40 Fed. Reg. 27,506 (1975) (same); 
43 Fed. Reg. 26,615 (1978) (same). 
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Appeals Council. 200 This bureaucratic relationship between the Secre-
tary, the Commissioner, and the Appeals Council is a factor fre-
quently cited by members in underscoring the Appeals Council's 
status and autonomy. 201 
The Appeals Council has grown irregularly in size, from its original 
complement of three members in 1940, to six in 1956, eight in 1959, 
seven in 1960, and nine in 1975.202 In 1976, the Council was increased 
to fourteen members; by 1983 it had grown to twenty members. 203 
To date, the Appeals Council has received relatively little critical 
public scrutiny, as most observers have focused attention on more vis-
ible aspects of the bureaucracy, such as the DDS or ALJ. The Appeals 
Council remains, therefore, a subject of confusion and uncertainty 
among outside observers,204 including many who are intimately famil-
iar with other aspects of the SSA process. 
3. Composition 
In addition to its twenty members, the Appeals Council has an As-
sociate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals, who serves as Chair 
of the Appeals Council, 205 and a Deputy Associate Commissioner, 
who is an ex officio member.206 One other member is designated the 
Deputy Chair and manages the day-to-day operations of the Appeals 
Council. 207 
200. C. Horsky & A. Mahin, supra note 196, at 300; OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-
10. Because the Associate Commissioner serves in a dual capacity as director of the Office of 
Hearings and Appeals and chair of the Appeals Council, the Associate Commissioner provides 
only administrative direction in the former capacity, while retaining the right to exercise greater 
substantive leadership in the latter role. 
The Appeals Council, and all of the OHA, have been somewhat aloof from the other compo-
nents of the SSA. As recently as 1985-86, the OHA was accorded a special status, reporting 
directly to the Commissioner, until it was again placed within the jurisdiction of the Deputy 
Commissioner for Programs. Even today, however, there is strikingly little contact between the 
Appeals Council members and other related offices. 
201. This factor was mentioned often in our interviews with Appeals Council members. 
202. C. Horsky& A. Mahin, supra note 196, at 311-12. 
203. Letter from William Taylor, Appeals Council member, supra note 155. 
204. This generalization has two conspicuous exceptions. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra 
note 134; J. MASHAW, supra note 154 (providing searching reviews of the operation of the Ap-
peals Council). Nat'! Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives, SocLAL SEcu-
RITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 15.04 (MB) (1986), is also helpful. Most other analysts simply 
summarize the applicable regulations concerning the Appeals Council. See, e.g., F. BLOCH, supra 
note 13, ~t 246-47, 287-91; PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 50-54. 
205. The Associate Commissioner ordinarily is occupied with other duties and does not regu-
larly participate in the work of the Appeals Council. 
206. The degree of "hands-on" involvement in the work of the Appeals Council varies 
among deputy associate commissioners. 
207. Only two persons have held the operational deputy chairs of the Appeals Council, Irwin 
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The selection process for new members begins with the posting of a 
"merit promotion vacancy announcement. " 208 The job description re-
quires that an applicant have seven years of increasingly responsible 
experience as a member of the bar, involving the preparation, presen-
tation, or hearing of formal cases before courts or governmental regu-
latory agencies. 209 
A "Best Qualified" list of applicants who possess the minimum cre-
dentials is then reviewed by the Deputy Chair, who interviews some 
applicants, checks references, and makes a recommendation to the 
Associate Commissioner of the OHA. Although this recommendation 
must ultimately be approved by both the Commissioner and the Dep-
uty Commissioner for Programs, in practice it is the Deputy Chair, 
with a varying degree of involvement by the Associate Commissioner, 
who makes the selection. 
The selection process has been characterized by strikingly little par-
tisan politics; we know of no instances where pressure was applied to 
appoint political cronies or to exclude applicants because of political 
persuasions. Numerous sources confirm that the selection process is 
traditionally based on merit among career civil servants, rather than 
on loyalty to a particular person or ideology. 210 Similarly, we discov-
ered no instances where a member has been forced, or even asked, to 
resign from the Appeals Council. 2l1 As of 1987, members of the Ap-
peals Council included six women, three blacks, and one Hispanic. 
A. Friedenberg from 1976 to 1980 and Burton Berkley from 1980 to the present. Prior to 1976, 
when the caseload and the Appeals Council itself were smaller, the Associate Commissioner 
(then called a Bureau Director) or the Deputy Associate Commissioner provided the day-to-day 
leadership of the Appeals Council. 
208. The vacancy announcement may be advertised only inside the SSA, within the entire 
Department of Health and Human Services, or even more broadly. The wider the search field, 
the longer the search. In early 1987, in the interest of filling two vacancies expeditiously, the 
Appeals Council advertised only within HHS. 
209. Prior to 1976, the standards for appointment as a member of the Appeals Council did 
not require that the appointee be an attorney. At the time of our original report all members of 
the Appeals Council were attorneys. 
The original philosophy of the SSA procedures was that attorneys were not necessary in order 
to assure fairness, and that their presence might make the enterprise more formal and adversarial 
than it should be. It was deliberate, therefore, that seven of the original referees (ALJs) and one 
of the first three members of the Appeals Council had no legal training. A tty General's Comm. 
on Admin. Proced., Monograph No. 16, at 37-38; SociAL SECURITY BoARD (Apr. 1940). 
210. One former SSA policymaker advised us that political influence in the selection of Ap-
peals Council members was unlikely for practical reasons: a GS-15 employee is simply so far 
down the government ladder that grand political machinations are not brought into the appoint-
ment process. 
211. Even the location of the Appeals Council reflects its independence. The Appeals Coun-
cil sits in Arlington, Virginia, substantially removed from both the SSA headquarters in Balti-
more and the HHS headquarters in Washington, D.C. (Other components of the OHA, 
including the Associate Commissioner and the national Chief ALJ, are also in Arlington.) 
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In hiring new members of the Appeals Council, candidates from 
within or near OHA are preferred. At the time our original report was 
prepared, five of the members had been ALJs immediately prior to 
appointment to the Appeals Council, seven had been in the HHS Of-
fice of the General Counsel, four had been branch chiefs within the 
Office of Appeals Operations, and four had held other positions, 
mostly within the SSA. 212 
The turnover among members is low. As of 1987, seven current 
members had been on the Appeals Council more than ten years, six 
had served from five to ten years, and seven had served less than five 
years.213 
The training of a new member varies, depending on previous experi-
ence and knowledge. Sometimes a new Appeals Council member will 
attend the same training course that new ALJs attend. 214 
Members of the Appeals Council are compensated at the GS-15 
level, the same grade as ALJs.215 Although the Deputy Chair's posi-
tion has been approved for inclusion in the federal Senior Executive 
Service, the SSA has not yet dedicated a slot for this purpose. 
Unlike ALJs, Appeals Council members are not protected by the 
AP A. 216 Members participate in the "merit pay" system and receive 
performance evaluations from the Deputy Chair. 217 In principle, this 
arrangement allows the OHA policymakers a substantial degree of au-
thority over Appeals Council members, but that authority has not 
been exercised, at least not directly. Members have consistently re-
212. Letter from William Taylor, supra note 155. Obviously, in a period of high caseloads, 
the Appeals Council benefits by bringing on board new members who will not require extensive 
background training before they can assume a full complement of cases. 
213. /d. 
214. A new member might also receive additional "on the job training," such as having the 
Deputy Chair or a particular designee serve as the second member on the new member's early 
cases. 
215. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra note 134, at 41-42. 
216. As noted, ALJs enjoy virtually lifetime tenure and are exempt from any substantial 
system of performance evaluation and compensation. See Rosenblum, supra note 175, passim. 
217. Appeals Council members are evaluated on the timeliness and quality of their work. 
Timeliness has recently been quantified, as the new computer tracking system allows a numerical 
assessment of each member's compliance with the case handling goals noted below. See infra 
note 258. Quality is harder to assess; the Deputy Chair samples the decisional documents of each 
member and judges them for conformity to the applicable law, clarity of explanation, and ap-
parent basis upon substantial evidence. The Deputy Chair asserts that he does not take into 
account the frequency with which a member grants or denies review, and he does not calculate 
how often each member allows or denies a claim. Members are then rated on a five point scale: 
unsatisfactory, minimally satisfactory, fully satisfactory, exemplary, and outstanding. In a typi-
cal year perhaps two-thirds of the members are rated "exemplary" and the rest "fully satisfac-
tory." Performance evaluations affect members' eligibility for merit pay increases, as well as 
end-of-year bonuses, and can have a substantial financial impact. 
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ported that no associate commissioner has ever tried to intervene in 
the work of the Appeals Council by pressuring members to deny or 
allow more claims in general or any claim in particular. 218 
Several other observers agree that, even without formal guarantees, 
members of the Appeals Council enjoy a high degree of de facto pro-
tection, and no instances of abusive political pressure have come to 
light. Some have expressed concern, however, that SSA policymakers 
nevertheless are able to create an adjudicative climate that subtly and 
indirectly inclines the Appeals Council toward more or fewer 
awards,219 noting that the Appeals Council always reflects, to some 
extent, the interests and style of the OHA Associate Commissioner. 
Some have expressed the view that the Appeals Council is still per-
ceived in some quarters as an even more partisan "arm of the Secre-
tary." 
The members of the Appeals Council are organized into four geo-
graphic groups, each with responsibility for all cases arising in three 
designated judicial circuits. 220 Within each geographic group, the 
members divide the cases randomly and equally. For example, mem-
ber William Taylor is ordinarily assigned one quarter of all the cases 
from the first, second, and eleventh circuits; he receives all of those 
cases in which the last three digits of the claimant's Social Security 
number are 500 through 749.221 This means, in general, that each 
218. In principle, a member of the Appeals Council could be subject to discipline, including 
poor performance evaluation or reduced pay, for failure to adhere to the Secretary's policies. 
ALJs, on the other hand, are subject to discipline only through the more cumbersome process of 
the Merit Systems Protection Board, which, as a practical matter, provides a high degree of 
insulation. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1982). 
219. It is difficult to test empirically the existence and strength of any SSA-imposed adjudi-
cative climate, because the statutory role-and consequently the caseload and the results of the 
Appeals Council-have been so different during the Reagan administration from the Carter ad-
ministration. The entire disability system, moreover, has undergone so many changes that it is 
impossible to identify any stable baseline from which to make comparative judgments. 
In a survey of the SSA's ALJs, however, 70.1D7o (339 of 484 respondents) agreed with the 
statement that "[t)acit agency pressure is placed upon the SSA's ALJs to hand down fewer 
'reversals' during times of national governmental economic retrenchment." D. CoFER, supra 
note 5, at 211, 223. On the other hand, members of the Appeals Council deny feeling any direct 
or indirect pressure on cases, but one member told us that obviously members can "see which 
way the wind blows." 
The Appeals Council does not ordinarily keep statistics that note the various members' respec-
tive award rates, and there seems to be no general awareness of which members are relatively 
"tough" or "generous." Members do seem to know, however, which other ones are more likely 
to take a generally skeptical or a sympathetic approach to selected types of cases. 
220. See Chart 2, infra page 321. 
221. One purpose of the geographic groupings is to provide stability and consistency, ena-
bling each member to learn the personalities, strengths, and idiosyncracies of a particular set of 
ALJs, district courts, OAO analysts, and others. When the geographic groupings are shifted to 
equalize the number of cases assigned to each member, as they were in June 1987, the sense of 
continuity is disrupted. 
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member receives two or three dozen new cases on a typical work 
day.222 
4. Staff 
Each member of the Appeals Council has an administrative assis-
tant who performs clerical functions. In addition, an office manager 
and other staff serve the Appeals Council as a whole. The main sup-
port, however, comes from the Office of Appeals Operations (OAO), 
a companion unit within the Office of Hearings and Appeals. OAO is 
housed in Arlington, Virginia, with most staff members working in 
the same complex, though not necessarily in the same building as the 
Appeals Council itself.223 
OAO is divided into five case-handling divisions224 and then into 
thirty-two branches, each responsible for cases coming from a defined 
geographic location.225 OAO houses some 320 analysts. These analysts 
perform the primary review function and make recommendations that 
the Appeals Council members accept in the vast majority of instances. 
OAO analysts are usually non-lawyers, compensated at GS 11-13 
levels. Most have backgrounds of prior employment within the SSA as 
222. The workload of the Appeals Council fluctuates dramatically. Statistics for individual 
members' workloads have only recently been maintained by computer, so the figures are uncer-
tain. Members reported that caseloads ran approximately 300 cases per member during February 
1987, rising to almost 600 cases per member by May 1987. 
223. A proposal has been presented to consolidate into one building all the OHA units, 
which are currently dispersed among five buildings. lf the plan is approved and funded by the 
Office of Management and Budget, the reshuffling will occur in approximately two years. 
224. Divisions I, II, and III handle RSDHI and SSI disability appeals where the primary 
issue is the claimant's medical eligibility. Division III also handles health insurance issues. Divi-
sion IV handles the RSDHI and SSI appeals where the issue is other than medical, such as 
relationship or dependency for RSDHI claims, or income or resources for SSI claims. Division 
V, the Division of Civil Actions, is responsible for all cases in which the claimant has filed a 
complaint in federal court after an adverse decision by the Appeals Council. The OAO is now 
experimenting with a system of "modules," in which the branch which handled the case initially 
will maintain responsibility over it even after the case leaves the Appeals Council and is filed in 
federal court, instead of automatically transferring all those cases to the Division of Civil Ac-
tions. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 18 (Sept. 30, 1986). A Division of Support Services, with four 
branches, provides varying types of assistance to the case handling division of the OAO. 
225. For example, Branch 18 (within Division III) is responsible for all appeals from the 
state of Alabama. A branch may handle one or a few states (or, in states which produce a large 
number of claims, a portion of a state). 
A branch is the basic work group for the analysts. Consultations or transfers with analysts in 
other branches are somewhat unusual. However, if one branch is excessively burdened with 
work, some of its overflow may be shifted to other branches. 
Currently, the OAO branches do not parallel the Appeals Council members' four geographic 
groupings. Thus, a particular analyst might send files to several different members, and a partic-
ular member might receive files from 30 or more different analysts. OHA is now in the process 
of revising this structure, in order to provide greater familiarity and continuity. 
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· claims representatives in a district office, as DDS employees, or as 
examiners from the Office of Disability Operations. 226 Normally, ana-
lysts perform only a paper review and have no personal contact with 
the ALJ, the claimant, or a representative. An OAO analyst typically 
reviews approximately twenty-five cases per month, although some 
handle twice that many, and the competitive selection process for pro-
motion to GS-13 tends to emphasize the volume of cases produced. 227 
To assess analysts' productivity, each type of case is assigned a 
Standard Time Value (STV), taking into account its complexity and 
the variety of tasks it will require. For example, a dismissal of a re-
quest-for-review228 is assessed as requiring three hours of analyst 
work; processing a denial requires 3.25 hours; and reversing an ALJ 
decision requires five hours. Among the more time-consuming func-
tions, processing a supplementary review case is ranked at eight hours 
and working through an initial action on a court remand is graded at 
six hours. These standard time values were scheduled for in-depth re-
view and revalidation at the time of our original study. 229 
The purpose of grading analysts according to STV s (rather than 
simply counting the number of cases on a one-for-one basis) is to pre-
vent the emergence of perverse incentives that might incline analysts 
to improve their productivity ratings by tilting in the direction of pre-
ferring quicker types of case actions, which are usually adverse to the 
claimant. 
OAO production goals establish four levels of performance for the 
analysts, and promotion possibilities are largely governed by these 
measures of output. The numerical scoring concentrates on quantity; 
no objective measurement of the quality of the analyst's work and no 
numerical scoring of accuracy exist. 230 Quality of an analyst's work is, 
226. Analysts are selected by an intensely competitive merit selection process. Because an 
analyst's job would be a promotion for many SSA employees, when OAO posts an announce-
ment for 30 to 40 new positions, it can expect approximately 1200 applications. 
Most OAO analysts have five years of prior experience within the SSA. Approximately 40% 
are women and 200fo minority. 
A new analyst receives four weeks of classroom training regarding the medical problems of the 
human body, the SSA appeals process, and the documentation of a disability case file. Training 
Program: Hearings and Appeals Analysts (Feb. 14 - Mar. 9, 1983). Each new analyst is also 
assigned a senior analyst mentor or reviewer who provides on-the-job training and feedback. The 
senior analyst provides feedback on all of the new analyst's cases for three months, and reviews 
all work on court cases for a further six months. 
227. Analysts' promotions from OS-II to GS-12 are non-competitive and relatively routine. 
Promotion to GS-13 and the status of "senior analyst," however, is quite competitive. 
228. See infra text accompanying notes 234-47 (discussing request-for-review). 
229. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND INNOVATION, OFFICE OF APPEALS 
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT 23 (1986) (hereinafter OMAPI REPORT). 
230. See OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR HEARINGS AND 
APPEALS ANALYST (1983). 
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however, assessed more subjectively and is a factor in evaluation for 
promotion. 
The Office of Appraisal does perform some quality assurance re-
view of the work of analysts, and OAO branch chiefs and Appeals 
Council members are in a position to review at least some of the prod-
ucts of the analysts they oversee. In FY 1986, the Office of Appraisal 
sampled 2140 analyst recommendations and found they contained the 
correct substantive decision 960Jo of the time.231 
In addition to OAO's analysts, Appeals Council members have ac-
cess to a small Medical Support Staff composed of three full-time 
physicians and a few dozen part-time consulting specialists. This staff 
is employed by the Appeals Council to inspect files when some aspect 
of the medical record is unclear. 232 Additionally, a one-person Voca-
tional Staff is responsible for hiring vocational experts and coordinat-
ing their activities in the field. 
5. Appeals Council Caseload-Types of Cases 
The Appeals Council deals with claims in three different settings: at 
the "review level," immediately after the ALJ tier; in a "new court 
filing," after a denied claimant has initiated a civil action in federal 
district court; and for "court decisions," after a district judge has is-
sued a final decision or has returned the case to the SSA with orders 
for a new hearing or other administrative processing. 233 
231. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 8 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
232. OH.A HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-37-10. The Medical Support Staff is used pri-
marily where new evidence is presented to the Appeals Council or where the ALJ did not under-
stand the medical record. If the opinion of the medical staff is relied upon by the Appeals 
Council for its decision, a copy of the medical staff opinion should be provided to the claimant 
for comment, and it is to be entered into the administrative record. Association of Admin. Law 
Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1139 (D.D.C. 1984). 
233. The volume of activity in each of these three categories is indicated by the following 
OHA estimates of workload for the Office of Appeals Operations: 
Receipts Dispositions 
Review level cases 
FY 1986 51,100 52,000 
1987 73,500 70,500 
1988 81,500 79,500 
New court cases 
FY 1986 11,850 II ,860 
1987 15,850 15,850 
1988 17,350 17,350 
Court remand cases 
FY 1986 18,400 7,250 
1987 10,700 20,350 
1988 10,200 13,750 
(Review level figures exclude Bellmon cases) OMAPI REPORT, supra note 229, at 24. 
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a. Review Level Cases 
Review level cases fall into two primary categories: "requests-for-
review'' in which a claimant denied by the ALJ seeks reversal by the 
Appeals Council and "own-motion review" in which the Appeals 
Council reviews cases in the absence of any claimant appeal. 
1. Request-for-Review. A claimant who is denied in whole or in 
part234 at the ALJ stage may request review by the Appeals Coun-
cil. 235 This request may be initiated by an SSA form or another writ-
ten statement. 236 A brief or a letter of contentions stating specific 
objections and citing arguments for reversal may be filed simultane-
ously or later. 237 Current regulations do not afford the claimant a 
"right" to Appeals Council review; 238 the claimant merely makes a 
request, which the Appeals Council may dispose of in several 
ways.239 
The Appeals Council has three options upon receiving a case: dis-
miss it, deny review, or grant review. 240 The Appeals Council will 
dismiss a case if the request is filed late and no extension has been 
granted, or if the claimant later requests dismissal. 241 The Council 
234. A partially favorable decision may be issued, for example, when the ALJ determines 
that the claimant is disabled, but that the disability commenced at a later date than the claim-
ant asserts; or, for a "closed period" case, that the disability terminated at an earlier date 
than the claimant asserts. Another type of partially favorable decision is one in which an ALJ 
finds the claimant disabled and financially eligible for one program (e.g., SSI) but not finan-
cially eligible for the other. 
235. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (1986). 
236. A claimant filing a request for Appeals Council review of an ALJ's decision is enti-
tled to a copy of all pertinent documents in the case file, a transcript of the tape recording of 
the ALJ hearing, and a period of time to comment. /d. §§ 404.974, 416.1470. 
237. /d.§§ 404.968, .975; 416.1468, .1475. 
238. /d. §§ 404.970, 416.1470. 
239. The vocabulary of Appeals Council activities can be confusing. When a claimant "re-
quests review," the Appeals Council investigates the file to determine whether the case should 
be considered for possible changes. This screening involves examining the complete file, read-
ing all the exhibits, and sometimes playing a portion of the tape recording of the hearing. This 
process, however, is not termed "review" -that label is reserved for the action of the Appeals 
Council after it has decided to accept the case. 
240. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (1986). Technically, the term "grant review" is 
overly broad here. The Appeals Council "grants" a claimant's request-for-review, but it 
"takes" review of Bellmon cases on its own motion. See infra text accompanying notes 281-
86. For convenience, "grants" is generally used in this section to refer to both types of ac-
tions. For an illustration of the review-level process, see Chart 3, infra page 322. 
241. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.971, 416.1471 (1986). A claimant may request dismissal of the ap-
peal upon second thoughts about the strategic desirability of appealing adverse portions of a 
partially favorable ALJ decision, when the Appeals Council might reverse the favorable por-
tions. 
One court has ruled that where a claimant requests review of a partially favorable ALJ 
decision, the Appeals Council may not disturb the favorable portions unless it has taken own· 
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will deny review if it determines that the ALJ's decision and order 
are correct. It will grant review if a defect appears in the ALJ's 
work. 242 
If review is granted, the Appeals Council has four options: re-
verse, remand, modify, or affirm. 243 A reversal is used to alter the 
ALJ's decision when the ALJ has done an adequate job in develop-
ing the factual record but has misstated or misapplied the law, and 
the Appeals Council needs no further fact finding in order to make a 
legally correct decision. A remand sends the case back to the ALJ244 
for an entirely new hearing, for the collection of additional evidence, 
or for the rewriting of an opinion. 245 (An ALJ, however, may protest 
the remand.)246 The Appeals Council may modify an ALJ order by 
motion review of the case within the 60-day period. Powell v. Heckler, 783 F .2d 396 (3d Cir.), 
amended opinion, 789 F.2d 176 (3rd Cir. 1986). Contra Delong v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 266 (7th 
Cir. 1985). 
242. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, 416.1470 (1986). In FY 1986, the Appeals Council disposed of 
44,621 cases; of these, it dismissed 5273 (11.80fo), denied review in 28,906 (64.8%), and 
granted review in 10,442 (23.4%). See OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
243. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.979,416.1479 (1986). 
244. The Council has three main options for remanding cases to an ALJ: (I) remand to 
the ALJ who heard the case initially, on the principle of judicial economy, because an ALJ 
familiar with the case may require less time to correct it, and on the principle that the ALJ 
who made the error should have the responsibility for, and can directly learn by, correcting 
the mistake; (2) remand to a different ALJ, on the principle that the original ALJ may have a 
fixed impression about the case and be less objective; or (3) rotate remands among the ALJs 
in the local office without regard to whether a particular ALJ had previously been involved. 
Most recently, the SSA has returned to the general practice of assigning a remanded case to 
the ALJ who issued the original decision, unless (a) unfairness has been alleged at the first 
hearing; (b) the Appeals Council has some special reason to specify that a new ALJ should be 
used; or (c) administrative factors in the local office make it more convenient or efficient to 
designate a new ALJ. 
245. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.979, 416.1477 (1986). Recently, the Appeals Council departed from 
its prior "harmless error" policy by granting review over more ALJ decisions in which the 
correct outcome was reached, but the hearing process or the written opinion was flawed. 8 
Soc. SECURITY F. I (Feb. 1986). In such cases the Council rewrites the decision itself or re-
mands to the originating ALJ with instructions, not necessarily to change the result, but to 
write a better opinion. It is reasoned that a longer, more detailed ALJ opinion will be more 
informative to the claimant and more defensible in court. Memorandum from Frank V. 
Smith, III, Assoc. Comm'r of OHA, on "Circuit Court Case Study-Action" (June 17, 1986) 
(advising ALJs and Appeals Council members on the results of a study of 800 circuit court 
decisions, reflecting judicial policies and preferences); OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 6 (Sept. 30, 
1986). 
In some instances, the Appeals Council has effectively rewritten ALJ decisions, bolstering 
the expressed rationale for a denial and putting the strongest face on a case that may go to 
court. Memorandum from Edwin Semans, Jr., Director of OAO (Jan. 30, 1986); S.S.R. 82-13 
(Cum. Ed. 1982); Note from Edwin Semans, Jr., to Executive Secretariat (Dec. 30, 1986) 
(describing how the Appeals Council frequently remands cases to ALJs to correct errors, even 
when the ultimate decision to deny benefits is not disturbed and how the Appeals Council also 
frequently rewrites the decision) 
246. An ALJ may protest a remand decision by complaining to the Appeals Council (or to 
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altering part of the decision or opm10n without a remand. An af-
firmance leaves the ALJ's decision intact, reflecting a conclusion 
that the issues prompting the Appeals Council to grant review have 
now been resolved and no correction is necessary. 247 
2. "Own-Motion" Review. The Appeals Council also considers a 
number of cases on its "own motion. " 248 Own-motion review has a 
checkered history. Before 1975, the Appeals Council staff reviewed 
all ALJ awards and most denials. 249 From 1975 to 1980, as caseloads 
rose, the Appeals Council stopped taking own-motion cases and 
heard only request-for-review cases.250 Since 1980, the Bellmen 
Amendment25 ' has again required the Appeals Council to take a sub-
stantial number of own-motion review cases. 
the Associate Commissioner for OHA) that the remand is unnecessary, its terms are unclear, 
etc. If this protest is initially made informally or orally (e.g., in a telephone call), the Appeals 
Council practice is to suggest that the ALJ file a motion for clarification of the remand order, 
with a copy to the claimant. The issue may then be dealt with on the record, rather than ex 
parte. ALJs rarely proceed with this formal process. 
247. In FY 1986, the Appeals Council granted review in 10,442 cases. It reversed the ALJ 
in 2434 (23.3%), remanded 6782 (650Jo), and affirmed 1226 (11.7%). When compared to the 
total number of cases appealed (44,621 in FY 1986), rather than to the number of cases actu-
ally reviewed, only 5.5% were reversed, 15.2% were remanded, and 2.5% were affirmed. 
OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
248. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.969,416.1469 (1986). 
249. Own-motion review was held to a strict standard and could overturn an ALJ's award 
only in instances of "gross error." The Appeals Council reversed only 1% of the ALJ disabil-
ity awards in 1963, and 1.3% in 1964. Own-motion reversals in non-disability cases were con-
siderably more common, largely because the eligibility criteria there were more objective and a 
"gross error" deviation would be more evident; the disability standards were sufficiently sub-
jective that an award would be upheld, even if the Appeals Council deemed it somewhat erro-
neous. Memorandum from Joseph E. McElvany, Director, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, 
to Robert M. Ball, SSA Commissioner (Nov. 17, 1964). 
250. As requests for ALJ hearings mushroomed in 1975-1980, analysts from the OAO who 
ordinarily assisted the Appeals Council were dispatched to hearing offices around the country 
to assist ALJs in conducting hearings and writing opinions. This stopgap measure ameliorated 
the pressures on ALJs, but deprived the Appeals Council of the ability to consider own-mo-
tion cases. When own-motion review was not reinstated administratively by 1979, the Con-
gress required it in 1980. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 154, at 10. 
251. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94 
Stat. 441 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1982)) (hereinafter Disability Amendments of 1980]. 
In 1980, Congress was concerned about what it perceived as a too-generous application of 
disability standards, particularly by ALJs. At the instigation of Senator Bellmon, Congress 
enhanced quality control and instructed the Appeals Council to create a more balanced over-
sight structure for ALJs by reviewing both ALJ awards and denials. 
The statute did not require the Appeals Council to review a particular number of ALJ 
awards but merely to consider taking them for a review. Thus, a case randomly selected for 
own-motion review may be disposed of by an OAO analyst rather than forwarded to a Coun-
cil member if the case contained no errors. Request-for-review cases, on the other hand, must 
be seen by at least one member, even if the analyst finds no error. R. FRANCIS, SoCIAL SEcu-
RITY DISABILITY CLAIMS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 9:03 (1983). 
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The Appeals Council now receives for own-motion consideration a 
randomly selected sample of 10% to 1507o 252 of ALJ awards-ap-
proximately 300 to 400 cases per month. Mailroom clerks in the Of-
fice of Disability Operations253 (ODO) select the cases according to 
Social Security numbers and forward the files to the Appeals Council 
before the ALJ's award is effectuated. 254 The Appeals Council has 
sixty days from the date of the ALJ's decision to decide whether to 
take own-motion review. 255 Once a substantial portion of the Ap-
peals Council's docket, own-motion cases have trickled off to very 
low levels. In May 1987, for example, the Appeals Council took re-
view of only fifty-nine such cases and reversed only· twenty-three of 
those. 256 
A special kind of Bellmon Review that proved particularly contro-
versial was "targeted" review, in which ALJs were selected for Ap-
peals Council scrutiny based upon their unusually high award rates 
or unusually low productivity. Many ALJs interpreted such targeting 
as an assault on their judicial independence and as an attempt to 
252. The Bellmon Amendment did not specify a selection routine for own-motion review. 
The SSA selected the figure of 150Jo for random sampling, and intended to take the review 
level up to 25% later. The actual percentage of cases taken, however, has been lower: 12.1% 
(5736 ALJ allowances) in FY 1986; 14.4% (14,564 cases) in FY 1984. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 
8 (Sept. 30, 1986); OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 4 (Sept. 30, 1984). In February 1987, the figure 
was further reduced by the Associate Commissioner to 10% due to Appeals Council workload 
considerations. 
253. The ODO is a large bureaucratic unit, located near the Baltimore SSA headquarters, 
which serves as a processing center for "effectuating" (i.e., calculating the amount of the 
award and issuing the checks) in RSDHI disability cases in which the claimant is age 58 or 
younger. (This accounts for 80% of all RSDHI disability claims.) 
254. The ALJ's "Notice of Favorable Decision" advises a claimant that the Appeals 
Council may possibly take own-motion review of the case. A claimant is not notified when the 
case has been included in the sample of cases forwarded to the Appeals Council by the 000. 
The claimant is notified only if the Appeals Council elects to grant review of the case. 
In a request-for-review case, the claimant is not notified that the Appeals Council has de-
cided to grant review; the first reply the claimant receives is the notification of the Appeals 
Council's decision to reverse, remand, modify or affirm. 
In an own-motion situation, the claimant is similarly not notified about the Appeals Coun-
cil decision whether to review the case: if review is denied, the file is forwarded for effectua-
tion, and the claimant may never realize that the case had been considered for review. If the 
Appeals Council takes review, and decides to remand the case to the ALJ, the claimant's first 
notification will be a copy of the remand order. If the Appeals Council takes review with the 
intention of modifying or reversing a favorable ALJ decision, it mails to the claimant a notice 
of its proposed disposition, and affords the claimant 20 days to comment. Thereafter, the 
claimant receives a copy of the Appeals Council's final decision. 
255. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.969, 416.1469 (1986). If the Appeals Council does not take own-
motion review of the case, it is returned to the ODO for effectuation. This detour may delay a 
case for three to five weeks. When the case is returned to the ODO, its effectuation is expe-
dited so that payment to the claimant is delayed as little as possible. 
256. OHA KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS 10 (May 1987). 
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pressure them into denying more claims. 257 After 1984, "targeting" 
was eliminated. 258 
A third category of own-motion review is similar to targeted re-
view, but serves a less controversial function. Under it, the Appeals 
Council reviews most or all of the decisions by a ne~ ALJ for consis-
tency with SSA rules and procedures. 259 This category of own-motion 
review long pre-dates the Bellman Amendment. The Chief ALJ may 
prolong or shorten the usual six-month period of review. 
A fourth type of own-motion review involves "protests," which 
are assertions by the ODO or another processing center that an ALJ 
257. The Appeals Council was not involved in the selection of ALJs to target. The Deputy 
Chair deliberately recused himself from those deliberations, to avoid a situation in which the 
Appeals Council would help single out ALJs for review and then conduct the review itself. 
Symposium on Federal Disability Programs, Cosponsored by ACUS, the ABA Commission 
on the Legal Problems of the Elderly, ABA Administrative Law Section, Case Western Re-
serve Law School and the Cleveland Foundation 269 (Oct. 11-12, 1985) (unofficial transcript) 
[hereinafter Cleveland Transcript] (comments by Burton Berkley, Deputy Chair of Appeals 
Council). 
258. The initial Bellmon Review implementation plans called for review of all allowances 
by any ALJ who granted benefits 700Jo of the time or more. See Disability Amendments of 
1980, supra note 251. Entire hearing offices with allowance rates of 74% or more would also 
be fully reviewed. Later, ALJ s were targeted according to the frequencies with which the Ap-
peals Council granted own-motion review of their cases; a targeted ALJ could be reviewed 
100%, 75%, 50%, or 25% of the time. An ALJ could be removed from the target list when 
only 5% of the ALJ's cases resulted in a grant of review by the Appeals Council. See Social 
Security Disability Reviews: The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Government 
Affairs, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 14-42 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearing] (testimony of Associate 
Commissioner Louis Hays). 
The operation of the Bellmon Review program was contested in Association of Admin. Law 
Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.I984), in which Judge Joyce Hens Green held 
that the program "was of dubious legality" and tended to produce improper pressure to issue 
fewer allowance decisions, but that the plaintiff organization was not entitled to relief in light 
of defendant's later modification of the program and an absence of specific harm suffered. 
Id. at 1141-43. 
On June 21, 1984, the Associate Commissioner for the OHA discontinued the targeted ALJ 
portion (by then, referred to as the "selected ALJ" portion) of Bellmon Review, stating that 
the program had achieved its objective of narrowing the difference in own-motion rates (the 
frequencies with which the Appeals Council acted to correct the ALJ decision) between the 
targeted judges and the national random sample. Memorandum from Frank V. Smith III, to 
all Administrative Law Judges (June 21, 1984). 
In 1987, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the standards for conducting 
targeted review were substantive rules (not mere interpretive statements, as the SSA had ar-
gued) and were therefore invalid because they failed to comply with APA rulemaking proce-
dures. Reinstatement of benefits was therefore ordered for claimants who lost when a targeted 
ALI's award was reversed by the Appeals Council. See W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
259. For many people, the targeting program was synonymous with the phrase "Bellmon 
Review," but the SSA considers both targeted and randomly-selected own-motion review to 
be "Bellmon Review." 
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decision could not be implemented because of a technical error (e.g., 
lack of RSDHI coverage or failure to incorporate the five-month 
waiting period). The 000 and other SSA components have also 
made an increasing number of "substantive" protests in cases where 
the ALJ's award js challenged as factually or legally incorrect. 260 In 
the past, these protests were rare, but they have increased to approx-
imately 100 to 150 cases per month. 
A final category of own-motion review cases arose from the-
Government Representation Project in effect from 1983 to 1986.261 
Several local hearing offices experimented with having a government 
attorney develop a case as an adversary to the claimant, argue at the 
hearing, and cross-examine the claimant's witnesses. 262 The govern-
ment representatives could not formally "appeal" a case but did 
260. The ODO and other SSA components detect errors of three basic types. In one, 
newly-received evidence that was not available to the prior decisionmaker (ALJ or Appeals 
Council) may suggest that the decision should be reviewed. (For example, a new W-2 form 
may indicate that the claimant has recently performed substantial gainful activity of which the 
ALJ was unaware.) 
The second type of error may be detected when the ODO or processing center's claims au-
thorizer (an expert in the non-medical aspects of disability cases) begins calculating the bene-
fits due under an ALJ award. The claims authorizer picks key dates (onset of disability, 
application, expiration of insured status, etc.) from the ALJ's decision, and may detect incon-
sistencies, omissions, or simple typographical errors. If this error is confirmed by a supervi-
sor, a one- or two-page protest memorandum will be forwarded with the file to the Appeals 
Council. 
The third type of error is uncovered when the claims authorizer suspects a defect in the 
ALJ's medical assessment. (A "reject criteria list" identifies types of cases where errors are 
more likely.) The file is forwarded to a disability examiner or a disability specialist who may 
identify anomalies in the ALJ's consideration of the medical record. If so, a protest memo-
randum is prepared, bringing the issue to the attention of the Appeals Council. 
ODO prepares approximately forty such memoranda per month, about half based on finan-
cial issues and half on medical criteria. Other effectuating components also identify similar 
errors, and it appears that an increasing number of these focus on the medical, rather than 
"technical," aspects of the disability. Standard procedures call for all these matters to be 
directed to the Appeals Council for correction. Occasionally, when the error appears to be 
simply typographical, the claims authorizer may telephone the ALJ to suggest issuing a cor-
rected decision. 
If the protest concerns only the onset date and the size of the claimant's initial lump-sum 
payment, the effectuating office will begin payment of the current monthly benefits portion of 
the ALJ's award and notify the claimant that the retroactive amount is being reviewed. Simi-
larly, in an "old" case (i.e., when the ODO's workload prevents it from delivering a protest 
to the Appeals Council within forty-five days of the ALJ's decision), partial effectuation will 
begin. Almost all of the ODO's protests are reviewed by the Appeals Council. The ODO also 
plays a similar role in reviewing and protesting Appeals Council awards. Errors at this stage 
are less frequent, generating perhaps 20 protests per year. 
261. See 47 Fed. Reg. 36,123 (1982); 52 Fed. Reg. 4004 (1987). 
262. 47 Fed. Reg. 36,117 (1982); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.965, 416.1465 (1986); supra 
text accompanying note 132. 
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have authority to "suggest" that an award decision should come to 
the attention of the Appeals Council. 263 
3. Standard of Review. Until 1976, the Appeals Council conducted 
essentially a de novo review of the ALJ's work, 264 but internal 
modifications265 made the Appeals Council more of an appellate 
body. Current regulations specify five grounds upon which the Ap-
peals Council may grant review of a case:266 (1) abuse of discretion 
by the ALJ, (2) error of law, (3) lack of substantial evidence, 267 (4) 
existence of a broad policy or procedural issue that may affect the 
general public interest, 268 or (5) presentation of new and material evi-
dence.269 Although the Appeals Council does not maintain statistics 
on these five bases for review, assertions of "lack of substantial evi-
dence to support the ALJ's decision," and "presentation of new and 
material evidence" are probably the most frequently cited. 270 
263. The government representative would transmit the file to the OAO with a detailed 
memorandum explaining why the Appeals Council should consider the case. Although the 
Appeals Council was not required to accept the government representative's suggestion, it did 
frequently take own-motion review in that situation. 
264. The departure from de novo review in RSDHI disability cases was made pursuant to 
a regulation published at 41 Fed. Reg. 51,588 (1976). The SSI disability program had never 
been the subject of de novo review at the Appeals Council level. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,977 (1974). 
265. The 1976 change was instigated by an attempt to reduce the workload of the Appeals 
Council in order to free the OAO analysts and others who could be dispatched to various local 
hearing offices to assist ALJs with their backlog of cases. 
266. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, 416.1470 (1986). 
267. The "substantial evidence" test is also employed in federal court review. E.g., Ri-
chardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). Controversy exists, however, on whether the district 
judge is to look for substantial evidence to support the decision of the Appeals Council or of 
the ALJ. Where the Appeals Council reverses the ALJ on a borderline case, substantial evi-
dence may sustain either a denial or an award. See Parris v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 
1984) (whether decision of Appeals Council, not decision of ALJ, is supported by substantial 
evidence); see also Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917 (7th Cir. 1986); Mullen v. aowen, 800 F.2d 
535 (6th Cir. 1986); Fierro v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1986); Parker v. Reekier, 763 
F.2d 1363 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 774 F.2d 428 (llth Cir, 1985), en 
bane decision issued sub nom. Parker v. aowen, 788 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1986). The ALJ's 
·findings of fact remain highly relevant to the court's scrutiny of the "substantial evidence" 
supporting the decision of the Appeals Council. 
In practice, however, reviewing courts typically devote the bulk of their attention to a re-
view of the ALJ's decision and the evidence adduced in connection with the hearing. The 
work of the Appeals Council, which constitutes the final action of the Secretary, usually re-
ceives far less scrutiny. 
268. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(a), 416.1470(a) (1986). 
269. /d. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b). To qualify as "material" under current Appeals 
Council procedures, the evidence must relate to the time period covered by the ALJ's deci-
sion. ld. 
270. Claimants also frequently allege unfairness at the hearing, citing the ALJ's behavior 
or apparent attitude. Unfairness may be evidenced on the hearing record, or it may require 
additional investigation. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-40-21. 
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The extent to which the Appeals Council is constrained by the 
grounds for review set forth in the regulations is controversial. It is 
unclear whether those five are the only grounds under which the Ap~ 
peals Council may grant review or whether the list is simply illustra~ 
tive, allowing review for unstated reasons. To date, circuit courts 
have granted the Appeals Council the broader power to take cases 
for diverse reasons, rather than confining it to the published list. 271 
4. New Evidence. The administrative evidentiary record in a disa~ 
bility case is closed after the ALJ's decision. 272 This rule was enacted 
by statute in 1980 for RSDHI cases273 and by regulation in 1986 for 
SSI and concurrent claims.274 This means that the Appeals Council 
will consider evidence that was not presented to the ALJ only if the 
evidence is new and material and relates to the time period that the 
ALJ considered. 
Notwithstanding this rule, receipt of additional evidence by the 
Appeals Council, before or after the decision to grant review of the 
case, has been problematic. 275 Generally, new evidence may be con~ 
sidered in three instances. First, if a claimant who appeared pro se 
before the ALJ secures representation at the Appeals Council stage, 
new evidence discovered by the representative may be considered. 276 
Second, a recent medical review or treatment secured by the claimant 
in the interval between the ALJ hearing and the Appeals Council re~ 
view may be considered if it has a bearing upon the assessment of the 
impairment. 277 Finally, copies of needed medical records may be con~ 
sidered if they were unavailable at the ALJ hearing due to a physi~ 
dan's or hospital's failure to respond to a request for the records. 278 
If the new evidence pertains solely to a condition that has arisen or 
271. See, e.g., Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917 (7th Cir. 1986); Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 
1512 (lith Cir. 1986); Razey v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1986). 
272. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b), 52 Fed. Reg. 4004 (1987). The ALJ may close 
the record at the conclusion of the hearing or may keep it open for a specified period of time 
to receive a claimant's brief, late documents, or the results of a post-hearing consultative 
examination. R. FRANCIS, supra note 251, at§ 8:39. 
273. 42 u.s.c. § 4020)(2) (1982). 
274. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, .976, 416.1470, .1476 (1987). 
275. !d.§§ 404.976,416.1476 (1986). 
276. /d. §§ 404.968, 416.1468(a). 
277. !d. §§ 404.976, 416.1476. 
278. There is a widespread, although undocumented, suspicion that some unethical claim-
ants' representatives may deliberately withhold important evidence from the DDS and ALJ 
phases and present it for the first time to the Appeals Council or in federal court. If this 
evidence results in a finding of disability, its late submission effectively means delay of the 
favorable decision. This delay substantially increases the claimant's eventual lump-sum of ret-
roactive benefits, and the attorney's fees are typically calculated as 250Jo of this past-due 
amount. 
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worsened since the ALJ hearing,279 the Appeals Council will gener-
ally not evaluate it, but will return the evidence to the claimant with 
a comment that the documents may be relevant to a new application 
for benefits, should the pending one be denied. 280 
5. Reopening ALl Decisions. Related to the evidence issue is the 
controversy over "reopening" cases. Regulations provide that disa-
bility decisions may be reopened and revised: (1) within twelve 
months, for any reason; (2) within four years, for good cause (e.g., 
new evidence, discovery of a clerical error); or (3) at any time, for a 
variety of reasons, including fraud and gross error. 281 
The Appeals Council has frequently exercised its reopening power 
in "protest" situations where the case was not randomly selected for 
standard own-motion review and the sixty-day own-motion period 
has expired, but the processing center discovered some technical de-
fect inhibiting effectuation of the ALJ's award. The case is then re-
turned to the Appeals Council for reopening to correct the error. 282 
279. It is often very difficult to determine whether new evidence relates only to the period 
after the ALJ's decision or whether it also supports inferences about the claimant's condition 
during the period covered by the current application. The Appeals Council considers itself 
relatively expansive in its willingness to receive new evidence, having concluded that if it re-
fuses to accept the new evidence and the claimant then files a civil action, the federal court is 
likely to view the evidence more sympathetically and will order a remand for its receipt. See 
Weinstein, supra note 95, at 917 ("[w]hen the new evidence is highly persuasive, the good 
cause standard [for a remand from the district court to the Appeals Council] is apt to prove 
highly malleable."); OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-38-188. Many claimants' repre-
sentatives, however, report that the Appeals Council has not been especially liberal in consid-
ering new evidence and that recourse to the courts is frequently required. 
280. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.976(b), 416.1476(b) (1986). A new application for benefits may be 
filed even before the old one is finally adjudicated. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 241. To the 
extent that the two relate to the same time period, however, denial of the first claim will be 
conclusive unless it is reopened. /d. 
A second application that relates to a different time period may be pursued at any time. For 
example, an SSI claimant may file an application in 1984 and appeal its denial while simulta-
neously filing a new application in 1986. In effect, the claimant is arguing in the alternative 
that the onset date of disability was in 1984 and, if the SSA does not accept that argument, 
that the condition further deteriorated so that by 1986 it became disabling. However, if the 
new claim is allowed by a DDS or ALJ while the old claim is pending in court, a confusing 
contradiction may arise within the SSA about the onset date of disability. 
Filing a second application after the first has been denied is not a panacea for the claimant. 
An SSI claimant who pursues this course would lose a substantial retroactive award for the 
period covered by the first application but prior to the second. A RSDHI disability claimant 
could be even more disadvantaged because if the claimant's insurance coverage lapses during 
the interval, the second (and any subsequent) application will be denied on the basis of finan-
cial ineligibility, regardless of any deterioration in medical condition. 
281. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987 to .996, 416.1487 to .1494 (1986). Reopening an SSI case "for 
good cause" is limited to the first two years after the decision, instead of four years as in 
RSDHI disability cases. /d. § 416.1488(b). 
282. This reopening could be beneficial or detrimental to the claimant. If the ALJ's deci-
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The Appeals Council has also relied upon the reopening provisions 
to consider a case that would have been selected for own-motion re-
view but was not, because the bureaucracy moved so slowly that the 
sixty-day limit for own-motion review had expired.283 In this more 
controversial context, the reopening provisions greatly enlarge the 
Appeals Council's opportunity to reverse an ALJ's award and delay 
th~ finality of the administrative process. 284 In response to claimants' 
complaints about this expansive application of reopening power, the 
First Circuit Court has held that the first category of grounds for 
reopening (reopening for any reason within twelve months of the 
prior determination) may be exercised only by a claimant, not by the 
Appeals Council. 285 The Eleventh Circuit has authorized govern-
mental use of these grounds for reopening, but only by the original 
decisionmaker, so only the ALJ could reopen an award. 286 
6. Processing Time. The time required for Appeals Council case 
handling varies enormously, depending upon the action taken and 
the size of the Appeals Council's current workload. Although the 
Appeals Council has adopted internal goals for processing time, 287 
sion overlooked a technical requirement (e.g., onset date before the expiration of insured 
status), correction of it could increase or decrease the size of the award. Sometimes mere 
typographical errors may be corrected via a telephone call from the OAO analyst to the ALJ, 
who issues a corrected decision. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-42. An ALJ who 
awards substantial retroactive RSDHI disability benefits may omit the technical step of re-
opening and redetermining the claimant's prior adverse, but unappealed, decision on a previ-
ous application. Until it is reopened, a prior decision may stand as a res judicata bar to 
payment of benefits for the time period it covers. R. FRANCIS, supra note 25 I, at §§ 6.20, 
8.13. The SSA program service center might discover this problem in effectuating the ALJ's 
award, and forward the file to the Appeals Council for resolution. 
283. Wilson, Procedural Challenges to Social Security Appeals Council Practices, 20 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 937 (Dec. 1986). 
284. Id. 
285. McCuin v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 161 (1st Cir. 1987). Contra Munsinger v. Schweiker, 709. 
F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1983). 
286. Butterworth v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1379 (lith Cir. 1986). 
287. The internal Appeals Council and OHA processing time goals and performances are 
as follows: 
On request-for-review cases, the goal is to dispose of all cases within 90 days, measured 
from the filing of a request for review until the Appeals Council issues its decision.· As of May 
1987, the average was actually 96 days, of which 90 days were attributable to OAO and 6 days 
to the Appeals Council. If a request-for-review case comes into the Appeals Council from 
OAO within 85 days, the members are supposed to dispose of it before the 90th day; they are 
rated for merit pay purposes on their ability to do so. 
In an own-motion case, the Appeals Council is supposed to decide whether to grant review 
before the 60-day Bellmon period expires. This deadline is almost always met; if not, the 
"reopening" provisions have been exercised. Effective July 2, 1987, the Appeals Council has 
determined that the reopening regulations will not be used to take jurisdiction over an old 
Bellm on case. After the decision to grant review, the Appeals Council may take an additional 
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and although it regularly monitors conformity to these standards, 
numerous complaints about cases languishing for months have led to 
proposals for review deadlines of sixty or ninety days. 288 
7. Progression of a Typical Case. When a case is delivered to the 
Appeals Council, either on the Claimant's request for review or 
through own-motion review, the file is routed to tlie appropriate 
branch of the Office of Appeals Operations (OAO). There, it is ran-
domly assigned to an analyst who must complete work on it within 
ten days. 
The analyst reviews the entire file, including the ALJ's decision. A 
tape recording of the hearing is included with the file and the analyst 
must listen to the tape if: (a) the analyst recommends taking own-
motion review, (b) an allegation of an unfair hearing has been 
raised, or (c) a medical or vocational expert has given testimony. 289 
The analyst therefore listens to the tape in perhaps fifteen to twenty 
percent of the cases. The analyst then prepares a report summarizing 
the file, highlighting key issues, and recommending a course of ac-
tion for the Appeals Council. 
In request-for-review cases, the analyst completes a three-page 
"face sheet" form, checking appropriate boxes and filling in blanks 
90 days to decide how to dispose of the case. 
In court cases, an answer (together with transcript) is to be filed within 60 days of service of 
the complaint. This is now successfully accomplished 950Jo of the time. 
When a case is remanded from a court, OHA's goal is a processing time of 42 days before 
the case is remanded back to the ALJ. The current performance average is approximately 30 
days. 
The goal for Appeals Council action on an ALJ's recommended decision in a court remand 
case is 45 days. Actual performance in this area has been 84-90 days. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 331-33. 
"Aged" cases (over 150 days) are flagged for special handling, and members are supposed 
to dispose of them first, within 7 days of receipt. 
Every case, regardless of other considerations, is to be resolved within 60 days of arrival at 
the Appeals Council. 
288. 1986 Hearing, supra note 3, at 77 (testimony of Associate Commissioner Frank 
Smith). In 1985, average processing time in request-for-review cases was 116 days, id., but as 
. of May 1987 it had decreased to 96 days. OHA KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS 13 (May 1987). In 
own-motion cases, the average processing times are 138 days in OAO and 4 days in the Ap-
peals Council, for a total of 142 days. /d. 
289. In a request-for-review case, the analyst must listen to the testimony of the medical 
advisor or vocational expert to determine whether the ALJ's decision to deny benefits was 
based on substantial evidence. The analyst ordinarily does not replay the claimant's testimony 
(the Appeals Council is unlikely to reverse an ALJ's decision not to credit the claimant's 
testimony) but does need to double-check the sufficiency of the record supporting denial. 
In some instances, however, the SSA has discovered, after the case has gone to court, that 
the hearing tape is inaudible and no transcript can be prepared. There may be benign explana-
tions for this, but sometimes it means simply that the analyst has not iistened to the tape as 
required, and the member has not detected the omission. 
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to reflect the salient characteristics of the claim and its handling by 
the ALJ. 290 The analyst may also choose to write a one- or two-page 
statement describing the case further and justifying a recommenda-
tion in greater detail. 291 The analyst then drafts a proposed decision 
and appropriate notification letters to the claimant. An analyst 
might spend a total of three or four hours on a case file, although 
the amount of time varies widely among analysts and cases. 292 
In own-motion cases, analysts follow essentially the same proce-
dure, except that where the analyst determines that own-motion re-
view should not be taken, the face sheet is only one page. 293 If the 
analyst concludes that own-motion review is inappropriate, the case 
is not reviewed by the Appeals Council; instead, it is forwarded for 
effectuation of the ALJ's award. 
When an analyst completes the report on a case, the file is deliv-
ered from the OAO to a member of the Appeals Council. If the ana-
lyst has recommended denying the requested review, then only one 
member will be assigned to the case.294 If that member concurs in a 
denial, the file is returned to staff who mail the denial notice to the 
claimant. The file is then held in the originating OAO branch for 120 
days in case the claimant files a civil action in federal court. If the 
290. The face sheet asks, inter alia, which ALJ handled the case, whether the claimant is 
represented by counsel, what the basis was for any unfavorable aspect of the decision, 
whether the ALJ correctly assessed the claimant's residual functional capacity and other voca-
tional issues, and what legal basis the analyst identifies to support the recommendation. 
The face sheet does not call for a narrative of the case or the arguments of counsel; these 
are available in the ALJ's decision document or in a brief. 
Some claimants' representatives have begun routinely requesting a copy of the analyst's 
work under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). SSA 
policy is that the analyst's notes and the notes exchanged between members of the Appeals 
Council in reviewing a file are to be released to the claimant upon request. 
291. Analysts, who do not have much time for writing the narratives, are evaluated by the 
OAO more on the volume, rather than on the quality, of their work. Members of the Appeals 
Council, however, frequently appreciate the greater insights contained in the written state-
ment, rather than the multiple-choice form. Thus, an analyst may be serving two masters, 
serving simultaneously as an assistant to a member of the Appeals Council and as a staff 
member of the OAO branch. 
292. Some analysts regularly complete two to three times as many cases per month as oth-
ers do. Cases in which the analyst intends to recommend a grant of review usually require a 
narrative and take longer than cases where review should be denied. One analyst estimated 
that processing a standard denial might take from 30 to 45 minutes, whereas a recommenda-
tion in favor of granting review might take from two to three hours. Denying review where 
new evidence had been submitted after the ALJ's decision might also require more time. 
293. The own-motion face sheet or "effectuation sheet" omits all of the demographic 
data of the longer form, and requires that the analyst only check the correctness of the ALJ's 
conclusions. If the analyst decides that own-motion review should be taken, a more detailed 
form is used. 
294. 20 C.F.R. § 422.205(c) (1986); see Chart 3, infra page 322; see also R. FRANCIS, supra 
note 251, at§ 9.03. 
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claimant does not initiate a civil action, the file is deposited for long-
term storage at a federal records center. 
If the analyst recommends review and the member agrees-or if 
the analyst recommends denying review but the member disagrees-
the case is seen by two members. 295 The first reviews the file and 
sends it to the second member with a note about the proposed out-
come. The second member conducts a similar evaluation. 296 If the 
members agree, their decision is final. If the members do not agree, 
they meet to discuss the case. 297 If the disagreement persists, the Dep-
uty Chair of the Appeals Council (or a designee) reads the file and 
resolves the matter. 298 This tie-breaking procedure is followed per-
haps twenty to forty times per month. 
If the members decide to remand the case, the file is mailed with 
appropriate instructions to the local hearing office. 299 If the Council 
decides to reverse an ALJ's denial and pay the claim, the file is 
mailed to the appropriate processing center for effectuation. If the 
members decide to grant review, but do not elect to issue a fully fa-
vorable decision immediately (e.g., to hold the case pending further 
development, or grant only a portion of the benefits) the claimant is 
295. 20 C.F.R. § 422.205(b) (1986). In principle, the members, not the analysts, decide 
whether to grant the claimant's request for review. Thus, it is up to the first member to deter-
mine whether the case should be seen by a second member, regardless of the analyst's recom-
mendation. The exception to this principle is own-motion cases where, if the analyst 
recommends taking review, the case is seen by two members, even if the first member disa-
grees with the analyst's recommendation. 
The method for assigning the two members to a case has become very complex. Formerly, 
the first member could "shop around" for another member who might be inclined to take a 
similar position. The old system also afforded discretion to office staff in allocating case-
loads. 
Now the selection is done randomly, according to the claimant's Social Security number. 
The first member is designated from within the appropriate geographic grouping, based on an 
even division of numbers among the four to six members of the group. The second member is 
selected by allocating cases among all the members (i.e., not just those in the same geographic 
group) according to the sixth, seventh and eighth digits of the claimant's Social Security num-
ber. 
These patterns, however, are not rigidly applied. Whenever a member is absent from the 
office, the computer distributes the caseload for that day among the available alternates. 
296. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-38. Some members, when assigned to a case as 
a second member, consider themselves responsible for undertaking a de novo review of the 
case, with a level of scrutiny equal to that of the first member. Others approach such a case 
with a presumption toward agreeing with the first member's preferences if possible. 
297. Most differences between team members are quickly resolved in this fashion, with 
informal conversations identifying and resolving differences. 
298. 20 C.F.R. § 422.205(b) (1986). Regulations permit the Appeals Council to consider a 
case en bane (i.e., with five or more members participating). Id. § 422.205(e). However, this 
procedure has been implemented on only one occasion in the past several years, regarding a 
non-disability question of SSI. 
299. /d. §§ 404.977(e), 416.1477(e). 
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notified and afforded twenty days to comment. 300 The file is returned 
to the OAO branch to await receipt of the additional information or 
argumentation. When completed, the file ultimately returns to the 
same analyst, and to the same two members who saw it the first time 
around, for a final decision. 
Regulations permit oral argument before the Appeals Council, 301 
but this practice has atrophied because of transportation costs and 
time concerns.302 In the past several years the Appeals Council has 
heard oral argument in only a half-dozen Social Security cases, none 
involving disability. 303 Appeals Council action is thus entirely a paper 
review. 304 
An Appeals Council decision is supposed to be written to conform 
in substance to the standards governing ALJ opinions. 305 The Ap-
peals Council is required to explain the evidence relied upon, the 
central legal authority, and, if the Appeals Council overturns a find-
ing by an ALJ, 306 the considerations that led to the outcome. 307 Dur-
300. !d. §§ 404.977(d), 416.1477(d). 
301. !d. §§ 404.976(c), 416.1476(c). 
302. For an oral argument, the SSA would either pay for Appeals Council members to 
travel to the claimant's place of residence or pay the claimant's expenses for coming to Ar-
lington, Virginia. !d. §§ 404.999(a) to .999(d), 416.1495 to .1499. Oral argument requires a 
panel of at least three members. ld. § 422.205(b). 
303. To warrant oral argument, there must be a significant issue of law or policy within 
the competence of the Appeals Council. !d. §§ 404.976(c), 416.1476(c). 
304. It is striking how frequently claimants and their representatives report that they have 
never had any contact with Appeals Council members or OAO analysts while cases are pend-
ing before the Appeals Council. Many express considerable frustration at the inability to en-
gage the decisionmakers, or even to contact them by telephone. They say they have even 
experienced great difficulty in locating the responsible officials to check the status and future 
timetable of a case; they unanimously report to us an image of the Appeals Council as a 
hidden, isolated institution that is unresponsive to outside inquiry. See also R. FRANCIS, supra 
note 251, at§ 9.13. 
305. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.953,416.1453 (1986). 
306. Appeals Council members agree with the analysts' recommendations regarding the 
ultimate outcome of the case in a very high percentage of claims. Interestingly, however, the 
exact percentage of such agreements is unclear. 
OAO analysts reported to us that members accepted their recommendations as often as 98"7o 
of the time, while members said they rejected analysts' conclusions 10 to 20"7o of the time. We 
are not certain why there was such a wide difference in perceptions: perhaps we interviewed 
unrepresentative individuals from each group (unusually able analysts, unusually idiosyncratic 
members); perhaps each group's professional self image encourages it to promote its own per-
spective (e.g., analysts stress agreement, to demonstrate that they are serving the members 
well, while members stress disagreement, to underscore the Appeals Council's independence, 
as an organization not "captured" by its stafO. 
A similar disparity arose when we asked how often "write-backs" occur (i.e., instances 
where a member returns the file to the analyst for correcting a decisional document or letter, 
even though the ultimate outcome of the case was not being changed). Analysts said this oc-
cured in perhaps IO"lo of the cases; members estimated 20 to 35"7o. 
307. E.g., Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512 (lith Cir. 1986); Beavers v. Secretary, 577 
F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1978); Combs v. Weinberger, 501 F.2d 1361 (4th Cir. 1974); Bohr v. 
Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
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ing the past two years, the Appeals Council has attempted to 
improve the caliber of its opinions, making them more responsive to 
the evidence and to the claimant's contentions. Notices about denials 
of review are still composed largely of "boilerplate" language, but 
Appeals Council decisions on the merits are expected to be more in-
dividualized. 308 
An Appeals Council member, like all other decisionmakers within 
the SSA claims system, must cope with the pressures of the caseload. 
Recent caseloads have reached 500 cases per member per month; this 
means that each member receives two or three dozen cases per day. 309 
A member, therefore, typically spends only ten to fifteen minutes 
reviewing an average case. Agreement with an analyst's recommen-
dation to deny review is often very quick, while decisions to grant 
review may take much longer. Council members virtually never listen 
to the tape recording of the hearing;310 instead, they usually review 
the analyst's report, read the ALJ's decision, and examine the rest of 
the file to decide whether the analyst's recommendation is correct. 311 
A case might stay on a member's desk from a few days to a few 
weeks. 312 
308. See OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-38-18 B-4. Claimants and their representa-
tives, however, report that Appeals Council decisions occasionally still appear to be boiler-
plate, and that even when a degree of individualization has been undertaken, the opinions are 
still conclusory, incomplete, and not fully comprehensible. 
ALJ opinions, too, have been criticized as relying too heavily upon standardized boilerplate 
and rote recital of medical history, without sufficient analysis or elaboration of rationale. 
Heaney, supra note 96, at II. 
309. It is difficult to compute a meaningful statistic for how many cases an Appeals Coun-
cil member might work on in a month, because it is debatable what should count as a separate 
case when the same file is worked on more than one occasion, and by more than one member. 
One member explained that, although the Appeals Council statistics might report an average 
of only 500 cases per month, the true figure would be 750 to 800 cases per month if one 
included cases worked by two members. 
310. Hearings before Social Security ALJs are not routinely transcribed, unless the case 
goes to court; therefore, the only way to access the record of events before the ALJ is to listen 
to the tape recording. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-43. Members may do so, but 
only in rare instances do they take the time. Typical was one member's report that she had 
listened to a hearing tape only three times in six years, on cases where the claimant alleged 
that the ALJ's tone and manner had created an unfair hearing environment. 
Moreover, ALJs are now using new four-track recorders, but the Appeals Council members 
still have only older two-track machines; thus, members are not able to play hearings without 
sending them back for conversion. 
In a close case, a member might send the file back to the OAO with instructions to the 
analyst to listen to the tape again and prepare a better abstract. 
311. A member might telephone the analyst to have a more detailed conversation about a 
particular case. These consultations are rare, however, because a substantial amount of time 
might elapse between the analyst's and the member's respective reviews of the file; the analyst 
will have forgotten details by then. 
312. The high volume of cases is in striking contrast to the number handled elsewhere. For 
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b. New Court Filings 
The Appeals Council decision constitutes a final action by the Sec-
retary of HHS.313 At this point, the claimant has exhausted available 
administrative remedies and may file a civil complaint in federal dis-
trict court. 314 
When a claimant initiates a civil action, 315 the HHS Office of Gen-
eral Counsel exercises the lead responsibility for managing the gov-
ernment's role in the litigation, but the Appeals Council may have a 
major involvement, too. First, the OAO Division of Civil Actions 
(DCA) obtains the claims file from the OAO branch that initially 
handled the case. 316 A DCA analyst determines whether the court 
complaint was timely, 317 arranges for transcription of the tape re-
example, while an SSA ALJ might average 30 cases per month, ALJs in other agencies carry 
caseloads of less than one-tenth that size. 1983 ACUS REPORT, supra note 2, passim. 
In our observation, members of the Appeals Council are snowed under with files. Every 
member's office is jammed with case files stacked on every available flat surface, and huge 
laundry hampers full of case files are waiting in the corridors. Whenever we entered a mem-
ber's office for an interview, a familiar routine transpired: the member would lift a stack of 
files off the couch to clear a place for us to sit and then look helplessly around the office for 
an empty spot to deposit them. 
Other observers have noted the huge stacks of files within OHA: 
Space constraints were evident in each component in the various buildings. Folders 
were lying in neat piles on the floor in aisles in the different sections of the D&F 
[Docket and Files] Branch. In DCA [Division of Civil Actions], hampers filled with 
folders sat in the corridors while other folders rested on the floor in large piles 
blocking an aisle awaiting placement on shelves in a holding area. Elsewhere, large 
numbers of full folder boxes were lying on the floor wherever space was available 
while waiting to be shipped to the Glebe Building. 
Process Review and Engineering Branch, Div. of Management Studies and Analysis, Office of 
Management Planning and Analysis; Office of Management, Budget and Personnel, Review 
of Folder Movement in the Office of Hearings and Appeals 4 (Apr. 1984) [hereinafter Review 
of Folder Movement]. 
313. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 55. For an illustration of the case-flow process, 
see Chart 4, infra page 323. 
314. /d. 
315. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1987). 
316. The Division of Civil Actions (DCA) of the OAO is separated into seven geographic 
branches. Each DCA branch is responsible for all cases in its area that proceed to federal 
court (except for a few experimental modules in other OAO divisions). Recently proposals 
have been made to move the DCA out of the OAO and make it a litigation unit within the 
Office of the Associate Commissioner. 
The SSA has experienced a substantial problem with lost or misplaced case files, delaying its 
response to new court filings in a number of instances. Sometimes the file is truly lost and 
must be reconstructed from other sources. More often, however, a failure occurs in the system 
for storing cases within the OHA and tracking their movement from one office to the next. 
Review of Folder Movement, supra note 312, passim. 
317. If the court complaint is not timely (i.e., it was filed more than sixty days after re-
ceipt of the Appeals Council's denial, and no additional time had been requested), the DCA 
analyst may seek a court dismissal by preparing an affidavit of the Branch Chief, stating that 
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cording of the ALJ hearing, 318 and helps assemble a completed file. 
If new evidence was submitted after the Appeals Council's first 
consideration of the case but before the filing of the court com-
plaint, the DCA analyst makes a recommendation as to whether the 
Council's original decision should be reversed in light of the new evi-
dence. 319 If new evidence does not effect a reversal, the case proceeds 
in court. 320 
The attorney for the government (an HHS regional attorney321 or 
local U.S. attorney) may then ask the Appeals Council to conduct a 
"supplemental review." This may occur when the litigator concludes 
the file reflects untimely filing. This type of case action is not reviewed by any member of the 
Appeals Council. 
The Appeals Council has the authority to extend the sixty day period for filing a court 
complaint, if the claimant so requests in writing and demonstrates good cause for the addi-
tional time. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.982, 416.1482 (1986). The current practice is liberal with respect 
to requests for extensions. An analyst may grant up to an additional sixty days without a 
member's approval. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-68-10. 
318. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.974, 416.1474 (1986). Transcription service is usually provided by 
private consultants, who have not always been reliable. The Contracts Staff of the OAO tran-
scribes tapes when time is insufficient for sending it to an outside contractor, or where the 
contractor has already returned a transcript with an indication that much of it is inaudible. 
SSA has also experienced frequent, severe problems with the quality of the tape recordings of 
ALJ hearings. If the tape is inaudible, no transcript can be prepared, the case cannot be de-
fended in court, and a new hearing is ordinarily required. SSA recently purchased a fleet of 
new high-quality four-track tape recorders for all ALJs in an attempt to rectify this problem. 
A recent study by the Office of Audit of the HHS Inspector General revealed that major 
problems arose with the audibility, storage, and retrieval system for tape recordings of ALJ 
hearings, and that the recent automated upgrading of that system had been disastrously inef-
fective. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Social Security Admin., Office of Inspector 
General, Office of Audit, REVIEW OF OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS AUTOMATED MASS 
STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM (1984). 
319. SeeR. FRANCIS, supra note 251, at§ 10.06. 
320. A transcript and answer must be filed within sixty days of the complaint. Only a few 
years ago, the SSA was missing this deadline as often as 9007o of the time, and contempt 
citations from district courts were common. In response, the HHS Office of General Counsel 
moved some attorneys and reprographics staff from Baltimore to Arlington, Virginia, to work 
more closely with OHA. At the same time, OHA file and tape storage systems were improved. 
Now approximately 95% of the answers and transcripts are filed on time. OHA OPERATIONAL 
REP. 18 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
321. A "Regional Chief Counsel" is HHS's chief litigator in each of the several regional 
offices around the country and is primarily responsible for handling all of that region's de-
partmental litigation, of which SSA disability cases constitute the overwhelming majority. 
Some regional attorneys are designated as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and all interact 
closely with the Department of Justice litigation staff. 
The Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
especially that segment of OGC that serves as chief counsel to the SSA, also handles some of 
the disability litigation. The Baltimore headquarters staff is most likely to become involved in 
major test cases, class actions or appellate level work, where the Department of Justice's Of-
fice of the Solicitor General may also participate. 
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that the case is indefensible in court, 322 even if it was correctly denied 
under SSA standards. The litigator may thus recommend that the 
agency take back the case on a Secretary's motion for remand to pay 
the claim, bolster the evidentiary record, or enhance the written ra-
tionale for denial. 
In a supplemental review case, the Appeals Council follows an ex-
pedited procedure in order to respond in a timely fashion to the de-
mands of the court's calendar. The litigating attorney sends a 
memorandum to the Appeals Council outlining defects in the case, 
the difficulties in defending it, and the reasons for a possible re-
mand. The memorandum and case file are returned to the DCA ana-
lyst, who prepares an oral presentation for a panel of two Appeals 
Council members, 323 usually including one who participated in the 
initial review. These two members choose either to seek a remand 
from the court or to insist on defending the case.324 This type of 
panel review occurs quite frequently, perhaps thirty to forty times 
322. The SSA used to win the overwhelming majority of its federal court cases. In both 
1978 and 1979, the SSA was affirmed 870Jo of the time and reversed only 13% of the time. The 
SSA's winning percentage began to fall in 1980, dropping to as low as 43% in 1984, before 
recovering to 54% in 1985 and 62% in 1986. (Figures do not include remands.) Gonya, supra 
note 152, at 2. As recently as 1983, some observers noted that federal court decisions generally 
upheld SSA's management practices and "also reflect a high degree of judicial confidence in 
the competence of the SSA." Liebman, supra note 21, at 1960. For additional information, 
see the SSA videotape Bradley Speaks (1987) (remarks by OHA Associate Commissioner Ei-
leen Bradley saying "we can't be that bad" [as court loss statistics would suggest] and asking 
why SSA cases are overturned so often). 
323. The analyst may also need to undertake some legal research, and will typically pre-
pare a short "panel memorandum," highlighting key facts and attaching salient exhibits. 
From the time of receipt of a telecopied version of the regional attorney's memorandum, 
OAO and the Appeals Council have five days in which to respond. 
324. In one sense, a panel's decision to take a case back for further administrative action 
is an admission that the Appeals Council erred in denying review (or in denying benefits) the 
first time. In another sense, however, a voluntary remand might not be a confession of error; 
new evidence might have been provided that alters the nature of the case. 
Even more significantly, the supplemental review in effect adds a possible new criterion for 
an award of disability benefits: the indefensibility of the case in court. This is the first time in 
the administrative ladder that this factor has been explicitly addressed, and it introduces a set 
of considerations independent from the medical and vocational factors of the listings or grids. 
This factor of practical litigation policy is otherwise strikingly absent in the SSA claims 
adjudicative hierarchy. Most other government agencies have, and regularly utilize, the au-
thority to settle or compromise cases, or to elect not to prosecute a matter for tactical reasons. 
SSA exercises a comparable power only very late in the process-after administrative remedies 
have been exhausted and a federal court case has been filed. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra 
note 134, at 131-32. The SSA flexibility, moreover, is not really a power to settle or compro-
mise a claim-only rarely is there a discrete issue (such as onset or termination date of disabil-
ity) over which bargaining is possible. More typically, SSA is able to exercise only the 
discretion to abandon its position and pay the claim entirely. 
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per week, with a typical panel meeting lasting from fifteen to thirty 
minutes. 325 
If the panel decides that the case should be pursued in court but 
the litigating attorney still believes that a remand is more appropri-
ate, the attorney may request an additional review before a "super-
panel." This panel is composed of one member from the original 
panel, the Deputy Chair of the Appeals Council, and a third member 
designated by the Deputy Chair. 326 
Similar procedures are followed for the analyst's oral presenta-
tion. A super-panel is quite rare, occurring only sixty-nine times in 
the two years following the procedure's inauguration. 327 An Appeals 
Council super-panel has resisted the regional attorney's urging for a 
remand on only ten occasions. 328 
c. Court Decisions 
The Appeals Council does not regularly monitor a disability case 
after it goes to court. In fact, the Appeals Council is not directly 
notified of the courts' decisions, and members learn of the outcome 
in most cases only haphazardly, if at all. Even if a case is remanded 
325. In 830Jo of the 1507 cases brought for supplemental review during 1985 and the first 
half of 1986, the Appeals Council panel agreed upon a remand. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 8 
(Sept. 30, 1986). 
326. SSA regional attorneys vary widely in their use of protests to Appeals Council panels 
and super-panels and in the vigor with which they assert the SSA position in court. Sometimes 
a regional attorney will not even file a brief, irritating members of the Appeals Council who 
feel that their position has been undercut. Weinstein, supra note 95, at 926. 
Similar tensions occasionally arise with respect to appeals of cases lost in the district court. 
Regional attorneys or Department of Justice litigators have not always been as keen as Ap-
peals Council members on fighting to sustain SSA positions. The attorneys, on the other 
hand, may feel that the SSA is at fault for failing to appreciate the difficulty and the growing 
professional responsibility considerations of pursuing an unjustified case. Id. 
327. Prior to the institution of the super-panel procedures, a regional attorney disap-
pointed by a panel's decision to pursue the claim could protest directly to the Deputy Chair of 
the Appeals Council and ultimately to the Associate Commissioner for OHA or to the SSA 
Chief Counsel. 
Some favor a return to that system, based on the judgment that super-panels consume a 
substantial amount of members' and analysts' time, especially since the Deputy Chair (who 
sits on all super-panels and appoints one of the other members) is likely to have the last word 
on remand anyway. 
328. Under the 1980 amendments, the Secretary must show "good cause" to support a 
remand order. Disability Amendments of 1980, supra note 251. A claimant's attorney might 
resist a remand, concluding that the SSA would use the additional processing time only to 
bolster its weak case. Nevertheless, the Secretary's motion for remand is almost invariably 
granted. But see Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (denying Secretary's 
motion for remand where good cause was not shown and it appeared the government was 
seeking a remand merely to delay the case). 
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from the court to the Appeals Council, the individual members who 
worked the case initially receive little personal feedback. 329 
The Appeals Council may play a major role in a case remanded by 
a federal court with instructions to conduct a new hearing or to com-
pile new evidence. If the court's directive is sufficiently clear, the 
Council uses a "fast track" procedure, and the file goes directly to 
the appropriate local hearing office so that an ALJ may carry out 
the court's orders. In other instances, the Appeals Council will sup-
plement the court's remand order with interpretation or additional 
guidance before sending the case to an ALJ. 330 
In a case remanded from a court, the ALJ does not issue a final 
decision as would be done in the usual adjudication. 331 Instead, the 
ALJ prepares a "recommended decision," which is forwarded to the 
Appeals Council. A copy of the recommendation is also provided to 
the claimant, who has an opportunity to respond before the Appeals 
Council considers it. The Appeals Council may then adopt or modify 
the recommendation. 332 Rarely, the Council may reremand a case for 
329. Because Appeals Council members deal with so many cases, they retain little special 
interest or curiosity about those that might be resolved months or years later in court. Mem-
bers also believe that often little can be learned from reviewing court actions: if the district 
court judge is simply re-weighing the administrative findings of fact, there is nothing of an 
important precedential nature in the feedback. For an illustration of procedures following 
remand, see Chart 5, infra page 324. 
In 1987 the SSA recently created a Litigation Strategy Task Force to review SSA litigation 
policies and procedures and make recommendations regarding improvements. The Associate 
Commissioner for the OHA chairs the Task Force, and three Appeals Council members serve 
on it. Memorandum from Eileen Bradley (Sept. 14, 1987). 
330. The reliance upon "fast track" remands has resulted in some controversy. It is un-
doubtedly quicker to forward a court order to the ALJ directly, without occupying the inter-
vening time and attention of an Appeals Council member, and OAO analysts have sometimes 
been given the authority to make the decision whether to use this fast track. Some people, 
however, feel that analysts are not always able to discern the cases that require additional 
Appeals Council commentary or instruction before release to the ALJ. Some members there-
fore prefer that the Council see all remand orders, even those that will clearly not require any 
elaboration beyond the "short form" that an analyst would use. 
Where the Appeals Council does elaborate on the court's remand order it typically does so 
to resolve an apparent conflict between the order and a Social Security Ruling or to instruct 
the ALJ to update the medical evidence in the record. The Appeals Council may also seek an 
appeal, a reargument, or a clarification of the court's remand order, but it does so only 
rarely. 
The historical record reveals wide variation on whether court remands are processed by the 
Appeals Council itself, or are referred to ALJs. For example, in FY 1965, 13.20Jo of the court 
remands were retained by the Appeals Council and were never further remanded to an ALJ; 
comparable figures for other years are: FY 1966, 26.6%; FY 1967, 47.4%; FY 1968, 23.3%; 
FY 1969, 16.9%; FY 1970, 36.5%; and FY 1971, 43.5%. DEP'T OF HEW, BRIEFING PAMPHLET 
FOR THE BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 24 (June 30, 1971). 
331. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.983,416.1483 (1986). 
332. /d. §§ 404.977, 416.1477. The SSA is interested in expediting this process, and has 
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further work by the ALJ. The final decision is sent out over the sig-
nature of two Council members. 333 
In evaluating these recommended decisions, the Appeals Council 
does not follow the "substantial evidence" test used in evaluating 
ordinary ALJ decisions; instead, the Appeals Council relies on some-
thing akin to a "preponderance of the evidence" test, and is more 
willing to revise an ALJ's work. OAO analysts and Appeals Council 
members typically devote much more time and attention to review of 
an ALJ's recommended decision in a remand case than they would 
to an ALJ's final decision in a standard "review level" case. 
The Appeals Council is also occasionally involved in SSA actions 
following a court decision, and may be consulted about the feasibil-
ity of appealing an adverse decision or of seeking clarification of its 
terms. These litigation decisions involve many other components of 
the SSA, as well as litigators from the Departments of Justice and 
HHS. 
6. Other Appeals Council Functions 
In addition to reviewing disability cases, the Appeals Council per-
forms a variety of other functions. For example, it hears a small 
number of nondisability cases (e.g., survivor's claims where the rela-
tionship is contested, and Medicare services providers' claims). 334 
Although the vast bulk of Appeals Council decisions are fact-
based, rather than interpretive or policymaking, the Council helps 
formulate SSA policy in several ways. 335 The Council highlights deci-
issued a proposed rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,466 (1987), under which an ALJ could issue a conven-
tional decision, not merely a recommended decision, in remand cases. Instead of automati-
cally coming before the Appeals Council, the case would be subject to request-for-review or 
own-motion review, as are other ALJ decisions. 
333. An ALJ decision in an ordinary case becomes "final" if nothing is done" to review it. 
In a court remand, however, the recommended decision does not become final unless the Ap-
peals Council adopts it. The Appeals Council and DCA devote far more time and attention to 
remanded cases than to others. 
If the Appeals Council is not satisfied with the work of the ALJ, it may order a second 
remand. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 291. In rare cases, even a third remand may be required, 
although internal procedures require the approval of the Director of OAO before an analyst 
recommends a third remand, and the approval of the Deputy Chair before a member orders 
one. 
334. Disability cases account for approximately 950Jo of the Appeals Council's docket. 
Medicare cases are in the process of being transferred to a new cadre of ALJs and a new 
appellate body within the Health Care Financing Administration of HHS. See Kinney, The 
Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time 
of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L. J. 1 (1987). 
335. The position description for a member of the Appeals Council as far back as 1960 
included the role of "participating in the formulation of substantive and procedural policies," 
and "participating in the planning and preparation of all necessary rules and regulations relat-
ing to fair hearings." See C. Horsky & A. Mahin, supra note 196, at 300b. 
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sions that might usefully be converted into Social Security Rulings 
(SSRs), for example, and refers those matters to the Office of Regu-
lations, which prepares SSRs. 336 Deciding the rare case that breaks 
new ground in construing Social Security law in new circumstances is 
another policymaking step. 337 
A third policy-related role is the occasional assigned study, 
through task forces, of the impact of newly proposed disability stan-
dards. When the Office of Management and Budget evaluated regu-
lations for the new mental impairments listings, for example, it 
asked the Appeals Council to examine the possibility that large num-
bers of cases would be decided differently under the new stan-
dards.338 Individual Council members have also participated in SSA 
task forces asked to review and recommend changes in major SSA 
policies such as those involving severity or medical improvements. 
Council members have similarly served on OHA committees study-
ing internal reorganization possibilities. 339 
"Policy" is also made whenever members consult about shared 
problems and reach mutually acceptable solutions that might be ap-
plied in future cases, even if these results do not strictly govern sub-
sequent decisions. 340 
336. New SSRs can come from many sources. One official we interviewed suggested that 
one of the most valuable current functions of the Appeals Council is its occasional role as a 
forum for ALJs and members to identify recurrent problems in implementing SSA policies 
and practices, some of which may be corrected by SSRs. The Appeals Council may also have 
the opportunity to comment on the evolution of other expressions of SSA policy and law, 
such as draft regulations or internal circulars. 
337. For example, in an SSI disability case a few years ago the Appeals Council granted 
review because of a "broad policy or procedural issue that may affect the public generally," 
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(a)(4), 416.1470(a)(4) (1986). In that instance, the Appeals Council de-
cided as a matter of first impression that Bureau of Indian Affairs' payments to a Navajo 
tribal entity, which then passed the funds to a group of approximately 150 individuals, should 
count against the ultimate recipients' SSI income and resource ceilings. 
338. To conduct this study, Appeals Council members examined hundreds of "dead" 
cases (i.e., ones in which mental impairment claims had been raised and ultimately resolved) 
and prepared alternative evaluations, pursuant to the existing and the proposed standards. 
When the study revealed that the new mental impairment listings were unlikely to result in a 
large increase in the number of awards made, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
approved the new regulations. Similarly, members of the Appeals Council devoted a substan-
tial amount of time to participation in the studies culminating in the BELLM ON REPORT, supra 
note 173. 
339. These ad hoc review bodies were chartered in response to public criticisms of particu-
lar SSA policies. The Appeals Council members were asked to participate, based on their 
perspectives as reviewers of a large number of cases, by identifying recurrent issues or prob-
lems. 
340. The full Appeals Council holds monthly meetings, and members may place substan-
tive items of this type on the agenda, but they have rarely done so recently. Informal consulta-
tion among members of a geographic grouping, between the members assigned to a particular 
case or among others, occurs on a daily basis. 
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The Appeals Council previously played a larger role in making 
SSA policy. Council members in earlier years frequently discussed 
substantive policy matters at regular en bane meetings. The Council 
would then vote and record its policy agreements in short minutes 
that were disseminated as guidance within OHA. These minutes were 
not binding on other components of the SSA, but they served as no-
tice within the adjudicatory process on how the Appeals Council 
would handle a particular question, thereby hinting what DDSs and 
ALJs might do in order to have their decisions affirmed. 341 
7. Costs of the Appeals Council 
The more subjective costs and benefits of the Appeals Council are 
reviewed below. Even the calculation of the organization's objective 
financial costs is not straightforward because SSA accounting is not 
ordinarily performed in a fashion that permits separate cost assess-
ments of discrete bureaucratic units. 
At the time of our original report the best information available 
for FY 1987 costs associated with the operation of the Appeals 
Council was: 342 
OAO Salaries and Benefits 
Other OAO Costs 
OAO Subtotal 
Appeals Council 
Salaries and Benefits 
Other Appeals Council Costs 
Appeals Council Subtotal 
Total for OAO and Appeals Council 
$26,570,742 
I ,946,384 
2,805,251 
$ 347,981 
$28,517,126 
3,153,232 
$31,670,358 
II. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL GOALS OF THE APPEALS COUNCIL 
A determination of the Appeals Council's proper role within the 
bureaucracy must begin with an articulation of its organizational 
goals. Goal identification for a subunit of a complex department is 
not easy where many conflicting issues compete for attention. None-
theless, we have identified six related functions that the Appeals 
Council performs or should perform: (1) policy development, (2) im-
341. The OHA Law Reporter is the Office of Hearings and Appeals' quarterly summary 
of selected actions by ALJs, the Appeals Council, and other bodies relevant to the SSA. It still 
contains an entry for a section on Appeals Council minutes in its table of contents, but this 
section has had nothing to report for several successive quarters. 
342. Letter from William Taylor, supra note 155 (based on actual figures through May 
1987 and estimates for the entire year). 
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provement of factual accuracy, (3) assurance of program integrity, 
(4) consistency in decisionmaking, (5) improvement of system-wide 
efficiency, and (6) fostering of greater public acceptance. 
A. Policy Development 
The primary function of most administrative review bodies is par-
ticipation in the development and implementation of agency pol-
icy. 343 Whether this appellate authority resides in the head of the 
agency or in some lesser body, the traditional scheme of administra-
tive law generally places responsibility for generating policy at the 
top of the appellate pyramid. 344 
Policy functions may be executed by precedential case adjudica-
tion, by generating prospective rules, or by a mixture of methods. 345 
Whatever the method, however, it is important that the appellate au-
thority look past case-by-case determinations to extrapolate gener-
ally applicable policy. 346 
The Appeals Council has largely abandoned this traditional 
model. All members of the Appeals Council report that they now 
function almost exclusively as case handlers, not as policymakers. 
They define their role as reviewers of ALJ decisions, processing an 
incessant run of cases and having little time to participate in broader 
343. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1982) ("on appeal from or review of the initial decision, the 
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may 
limit the issues on notice or by rule ... . ");see also ACUS RECOMMENDATION 68-6, DELEGA-
TION OF FINAL DECISIONAL AUTHORITY SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY THE AGENCY 
305.68-6 (1968). 
344. An agency head may, if he deems it proper, reverse the ALJ on any ground so 
long as there is a reasonable basis for the ultimate decision, a requirement that 
would obtain in all events. In reviewing adjudications or in adjudicating matters 
himself, the agency head necessarily is sensitive to the political considerations that 
informed the policy decisions. Indeed, it is his capacity, unique within the agency, 
to evaluate those considerations that prompted the APA's crafters to retain agency 
review of adjudications; wholly independent adjudications, lacking the agency 
head's sensitivity to factors not easily captured in rule form, might produce policies 
at odds with those the agency, acting within its delegated power, seeks to advance. 
1983 ACUS REPORT, supra note 2, at 122; see also J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 126-27, 134-
37. But see Strauss, Rules Adjudication and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Depart-
ment: Reflections on the Interior Department's Administration of the Mining Law, 74 CmuM. 
L. REv. 1231, 1264 (1974). 
345. A hearing officer often makes policy interstitially by helping agency standards evolve 
in individual cases. Nonetheless, the underlying distinction remains: in most agencies, the 
hearing level is for finding facts, while the appellate level is for generating and overseeing 
policy. 
346. See C. KocH, supra note 2, at§§ 6. 73, 9.3. 
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policymaking. 347 SSA leadership officials agree that the Appeals 
Council operation resembles a factory assembly line. 348 The job de-
scription of the Appeals Council as an entity has been defined, for 
practical purposes, as "getting the cases worked," paying attention 
to the particular file in front of the Council at a particular time, 
without much participation in the policy process. 
Why has this transformation occurred? The Appeals Council, af-
ter all, is the only entity within the SSA that regularly reviews cases 
as they leave the administrative levels and again as they are re-
manded by the courts. Why does the Council not use its special per-
spective to contribute more to agency policy? Three reasons are 
apparent. 
First and foremost is the crush of the cases. Over the past several 
years the Appeals Council has been swallowed whole by its docket. 
When 40,000, 60,000 or 80,000 case files per year stack up in the 
Appeals Council mailroom, the entire bureaucracy must be mar-
shalled to process them. When a member of the Appeals Council is 
confronted by thirty cases each day, aware that a failure to dispatch 
any of them means that sixty files will require action tomorrow, 
there is precious little time for reflection, for the pausing from 
chaos, to generate mature policy recommendations. When the Ap-
peals Council is so driven to process its files, it is not surprising that 
all its institutional resources will be. bent to that purpose, and all 
other possible functions will atrophy. 
Second, the Appeals Council's policy function has been degraded 
further by the evolution of alternative mechanisms for creating pol-
icy through rulemaking. 349 The SSA has developed a complex system 
347. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 105. "[T]he [Appeals Council] is not the principal 
policy arm of the (S]ecretary or the [C]ommissioner with respect to the [RSDHI] program." 
!d. Burton Berkley, Deputy Chair of the Appeals Council, stated: "We [the Appeals Council) 
are not a policymaking body. We adjudacate (sic) cases that come along but we adjudacate 
(sic) them in accordance with published policy." Cleveland Transcript, supra note 257, at 271. 
348. As an exception, however, members have occasionally identified areas appropriate 
for future rulemaking, and individual members have been assigned to participate in agency-
wide policy-review bodies. 
349. Rulemaking and adjudicating are partially complementary, partially competing, 
methods of enunciating agency policy. The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative 
Procedure Act (1947), intended to advise agencies on compliance with the APA, observed: 
[T)he entire Act is based on a dichotomy between rule making and adjudication 
.... Rule making is ... essentially legislative in nature, not only because it oper-
ates in the future but also because it is primarily concerned with policy considera-
tions. The object of the rule making proceeding is the implementation or 
prescription of law or policy for the future, rather than the evaluation of a respon-
dent's past conduct. 
/d. at 14. 
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of making policy pronouncements. Formal regulations promulgated 
through APA rulemaking procedures, less weighty interpretive stan-
dards of Social Security Rulings (SSRs), and numerous internal pol-
icy statements, circulars, and manuals demonstrate the SSA's ability 
to make policy without substantial Appeals Council input. 350 Many 
of these various mechanisms are ponderously slow, incomplete, or 
inconsistent, but they show that the SSA has not waited for the Ap-
peals Council to act. The process of policy-generation has had to 
co'ntinue, and SSA has developed systems for propounding policy in 
a variety of forms, even without the usual sort of assistance provided 
by appellate administrative review bodies. 
This process suggests a third factor contributing to the decline of 
the Appeals Council's policy role: geography. Located in Arlington, 
Virginia, and separated from the Baltimore headquarters of the SSA 
and from the Washington, D.C., headquarters of HHS, the Appeals 
Council has been insulated from partisan interference. This distance, 
however, has made communication with the SSA and HHS head-
quarters more difficult. 351 It is simply less convenient to rely upon 
the Appeals Council for policy input when its members are not phys-
ically present in the arena where policy is being made. 
The Appeals Council, therefore, has been almost entirely excluded 
from SSA policymaking, though not through a deliberate ploy of 
power politics. On the contrary, SSA officials revealed in conversa-
tions with the authors that they want and need greater policy input 
from the Appeals Council and that they have been disappointed at 
not hearing more from that source. At the same time, Appeals 
350. It is difficult to achieve a balance among regulations, SSRs, and the less visible policy 
devices. On the one hand, considerations of speed, ease, and flexibility will incline an agency 
toward the less ponderous devices-and the SSA has a particularly tough time producing for-
mal regulations efficiently. On the other hand, the public's right to know about, and to influ-
ence, the content of the standards governing claims adjudication will create pressures to adopt 
the more formal mechanisms. Additionally, the SSA as a public service entity designed to 
implement broad remedial statutes, has a special responsibility to avoid the creation of "secret 
law." 
We note that Congress has pressed the SSA to publish more and to rely less upon internal 
policy pronouncements that are not generally available to the public. See Social Security Disa-
bility Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 10, 98 Stat. 1805 (1984). We also observe 
that the agency seems to be retreating somewhat from reliance upon SSRs. It is beyond the 
scope of this Article, however, to attempt to delineate a proper dividing line between various 
policy tools. 
351. In addition to its physical removal, the OHA has been bureaucratically aloof from 
the rest of the SSA, prizing a direct bureaucratic link to the Commissioner or to the Secretary, 
outside the usual action channels. This, too, supports the aura of independence in adjudica-
tion, but it simultaneously deprives the Appeals Council of a voice in policymaking. 
Even within the OHA, distance is maintained. The Appeals Council is not located within 
the same building as the Associate Commissioner or the Chief ALJ. 
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Council members were generally surprised to learn from us that SSA 
officials would welcome their input on policy. The image emerges of 
a communications conduit between the Appeals Council and the Bal-
timore headquarters that has become clogged by the Appeals Coun-
cil's case responsibilities and has consequently fallen into disuse. 
Until the Appeals Council caseload can be thinned out appreciably, 
there is little hope for reactivation of a policy link between Arlington 
and Baltimore. 
An important ramification of the Appeals Council's case-handling 
role is the question of member accountability. Traditionally, Ap-
peals Council members have been ordinary SSA civil service employ-
ees, evaluated for performance and eligible for merit pay, unlike 
ALJ s, whose independence is secured by AP A protections. 
This structure is based on the legal fiction that the Appeals Coun-
cil acts as the "head of the agency" in the Secretary's stead, to carry 
out policy decisions. Indeed, in many agencies this model of policy 
review by non-APA-protected officials after neutral fact-finding by 
independent ALJs seems to make sense.352 In the context of the SSA, 
however, this legal fiction is a hindrance. The Appeals Council is not 
the "alter ego" of the Secretary; it never meets with the Secretary, 
the Commissioner, or even the Deputy Commissioner. Those offi-
cials have little awareness of or input to the Appeals Council's daily 
work. The Appeals Council does not carry out the will of political 
appointees and members have stressed that they would resent any 
attempt to influence their decisions. The members feel instead that 
they are bound by precisely the same legal standards and policies 
that ALJs follow. 
Moreover, Appeals Council members today enjoy de facto protec-
tion. They are as "accountable" as ALJs, no more or less prone to 
ignore policymakers' direction, and equally subject to agency disci-
pline. 353 Furthermore, the selection process and the qualifications for 
352. "Thus, officials insulated from outside contacts and internal controls might be more 
concerned with the accuracy of ALJs' factual determinations, while policy-sensitive officials 
are more concerned with the effect of ALJs' decisions on particular parties or policies." Allo-
cation of Authority, supra note 2, at 28. 
353. We do not undertake here to assess the extent and effectiveness of the APA protec-
tions accorded to Social Security Administration ALJ s. Some have concluded that the Merit 
Systems Protection Board apparatus is so rigid that effective discipline of aberrant ALJs, even 
for important transgressions, is a practical impossibility. Others have contended that SSA 
actions have, in fact, produced changes in ALJ behaviors, through indirect pressures and the 
creation of a particular "adjudicative climate." In any event, it is clear that the legal protec-
tions-as distinguished from the de facto protections-enjoyed by the ALJs are stronger than 
those accorded to the members of the Appeals Council. 
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membership in the Council more closely resemble those of ALJs 
than those of SSA policymakers. 
This combination of de facto protection but de jure vulnerability 
seems anomalous. If members of the Appeals Council perform es-
sentially ALJ-like functions, and if their mission is strictly case re-
view, then the relationship between ALJ s and the Appeals Council 
should parallel that between federal district courts and circuit courts. 
Equivalent job protection and status for both tiers seem logical. Why 
insist on the maintenance of de facto independence but resist making 
it de jure? On the other hand, if the function of the Appeals Council 
is more policy oriented, why should not members discard their par-
tial and misleading trappings of independence and become frankly 
political? 
This question, too, boils down to the issue of caseload. If the Ap-
peals Council is so burdened that it does little other than review ALJ 
decisions, it seems futile to pretend that the Appeals Council is per-
forming a "Secretarial" function requiring direct accountability. 
That administrative model may be sensible in other agencies where 
the smaller number and greater importance of the cases make inter-
vention by the agency Secretary possible. It is simply not, however, 
an accurate portrait of today's Social Security Administration. 
B. Factual Accuracy in Case Handling 
Inasmuch as the Appeals Council has relinquished a major role in 
formulating agency policy, the next leading or potential goal of an 
appellate review body might concern correct administrative action on 
individual claims. This is, in fact, what members of the Appeals 
Council identify as their current concern: reviewing individual cases 
to catch errors made by ALJs. 
1. Identifying and Measuring Accuracy 
Accuracy in a disability case is extremely difficult to define, let 
alone measure or achieve. No one we spoke with was able to articu-
late a workable definition of "accuracy." Previous studies of and by 
the SSA have similarly foundered upon this point. 354 Lack of an ob-
jective definition has often resulted in conflating this goal with 
other, only slightly less subjective program goals such as "unifor-
mity" or "consistency," which we elaborate below. 
354. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra note 134, at xx ("Investigation of the accuracy of 
the [Bureau of Hearings and Appeals] hearing process ... leads very quickly to the realiza-
tion that there is no accepted external standard for evaluating accuracy."); Allocation of Au-
thority, supra note 2, at 15; D. COFER, supra note 5, at 86. 
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Why is it so difficult to define and measure accuracy? Part of the 
problem lies in the complexity and subjectivity of the underlying var-
iable itself: disability. 355 The human organism is marvelously com-
plex; the impairments that can affect it are diverse and protean. 
Disability, moreover, is not exclusively a medical concept; rather, it 
is a vocational measurement that draws upon variations in economic 
conditions, social mores, and the political climate. 
Rigid rules are neither possible nor desirable in adjudicating disa-
bility cases. They are impossible because of the vast array of circum-
stances to be found in the claims. One ALJ estimated that some 3000 
variables affect disability adjudications and that these variables may 
interact in a nearly infinite variety of combinations. Objectifying the 
correct melding of all these factors would be impossible. 
Even if objectification were possible, excessive reliance upon rigid 
rules would be undesirable for institutions of broad remedial pur-
poses such as the disability program. 356 Even the relatively discrete 
categorizing rules already in the system are not slavishly applied. The 
Listings of Impairments, for example, may be "equaled," rather 
than precisely "met";357 even the "age" category of the grids (which 
is the least susceptible to manipulation) is not to be applied ''me-
chanically in a borderline situation. " 358 
Accuracy, however, is not an empty term; the statutory definition 
of disability must be honored, and SSA regulations attempt to trans-
late it into operational terms. 359 The adjudicatory system is based on 
the idea that only subjective judgment can integrate all the variables 
to give the closest approximation of decisional accuracy. Accuracy, 
therefore, is ''in the eye of the beholder.'' 
2. Some Erroneous Measures of Accuracy 
Lack of a simple definition of "disability" and "accuracy" has 
led to experimentation with substitute standards of accuracy, all of 
which we find deficient. 
355. As noted, the Appeals Council handles other types of cases, but disability appeals 
constitute 9507o of its caseload. Significantly, the other types of cases (where age, survivorship, 
etc., are in issue) pose far fewer concerns over the concept of accuracy. See Kinney, supra 
note 334, at xx. 
356. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). "Rules will not suffice. Rules must be sup-
plemented with discretion .... For many circumstances the mechanical application of a rule 
means injustice; what is needed is individualized justice, that is, justice which to the appropri-
ate extent is tailored to the needs of the individual case.'' /d. at 19. 
357. 20 C.F.R. § 416.911 (1986). 
358. /d. §§ 404.1563, 416.963. In fact, the flexibility contained in many of these provi-
sions is rarely exercised. SSA adjudicators, for example, infrequently take advantage of their 
ability to apply the "age" categories other than mechanically. 
359. See id. § 404.1520. 
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a. The Last Word 
The most commonly used standard of accuracy seems to be that 
whoever speaks last, and effectively affirms or reverses earlier deci-
sionmakers, is deemed to be the most accurate authority. Thus, the 
Appeals Council is said to check the accuracy of ALJ determina-
tions, the various quality assurance reviewers within the SSA evalu-
ate the units they monitor, and federal courts correct administrative 
errors. While we believe these cross-unit variations are significant, 
we do not consider them to be particularly indicative of accuracy, 
for several reasons. 
First, a disability case constantly evolves throughout the review 
ladder. Subject to the rules of evidence, 360 new material may be 
added to the file as the case progresses from DDS to ALJ to the 
Appeals Council and even to federal court. Therefore, subsequent 
authorities may not actually be second-guessing the earlier adjudica-
tors; the case may be different at each step. 
Second, the review process is asymmetric. DDSs typically assess 
paperwork only; ALJs see the claimants face to face and can assess 
their credibility directly. Although the Appeals Council has access to 
the tape recording of the hearing, it has little time to do more than a 
paper review. That different administrative levels make different de-
cisions under these circumstances is not surprising, but it does not 
make sense to conclude one is "more accurate" merely because it 
comes chronologically later. 
Additionally, substantive standards vary with the different review 
levels. The ALJ. hearing is explicitly de novo, 361 and in fact, ALJs 
seem to demonstrate no deference whatsoever to DDS conclusions. 
The Appeals Council and the reviewing courts are supposed to be 
bound by a "substantial evidence" test, 362 yet many contend that the 
next level often simply substitutes its own judgment or personal pref-
erence. That is, Appeals Council members believe that federal court 
reversals are sometimes based more upon sympathy for the claimant 
than on a dispassionate analysis of the evidence supporting the ear-
lier decision. Ironically, ALJ s often feel the same way about the Ap-
peals Council-that its reversals often result from different opinions 
on the merits rather than from a true ''substantial evidence'' assess-
ment,363 
360. See supra text accompanying notes 272-80. 
361. 20 C.P.R.§§ 404.946, 416.1446 (1986). 
362. E.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). 
363. See infra text accompanying notes 452-54. 
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Finally, the reviewers' perspective about accuracy is bound to be 
affected by their familiarity with the cases reviewed. Federal courts, 
for example, see a highly skewed selection: only denials or termina-
tions, and then only when the claimant and a representative can as-
semble a colorable case. Moreover, each federal judge sees only a 
few cases per year, not the vast outpouring of SSA work. The 
courts' perspective thus naturally inclines toward that of a champion 
of the downtrodden faced with a callous bureaucracy. Federal judges 
may not appreciate that court action is itself aberrational: of the an-
nual total of awards made in all disability cases, approximately 79% 
come at the initial level, 80Jo on reconsideration, 120Jo at the ALJ 
stage, and 0.20Jo by the Appeals Council. Courts account for only 
0.40Jo of all awards. 364 
The difficulty of relying upon "who speaks last" as a definition of 
accuracy is underscored by a 1982 study mandated by Congress and 
conducted by the SSA as part of the Bellmon Amendment. 365 For 
this study, 3600 randomly selected ALJ decisions were presented for 
review by three groups: other ALJs, Appeals Council members, and 
quality control monitors for the SSA's Office of Assessment. After 
studying the files, the Appeals Council group reported agreement 
with only 630Jo of the original ALJ awards. The Appeals Council 
also disagreed, however, with 21% of the ALJ denials. 366 Even wider 
disparities were reported among the ALJ and Office of Assessment 
groups, 367 suggesting a conclusion that "accuracy" in decisionmak-
ing, even when review is confined within relatively standardized lim-
its, remains highly subjective. 
b. The Fifty Percent Solution 
If the notion of an ultimate, "superior" arbiter of accuracy is in-
valid, how can one judge the propriety of SSA appeals adjudication? 
Focusing upon crude statistics, as if the reversal rates by themselves 
demonstrate the accuracy of a particular adjudication, is not a valid 
answer. Thus, we reject the notion that the 170Jo allowance rate at 
reconsideration368 and the 5 OJo allowance rate at the Appeals 
CounciP69 are per se too low, and the approximately 500Jo award rate 
at the ALJ370 and federal court stages371 too high. 
364. 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 66, at 69. 
365. BELLMON REPORT, supra note 173, passim. 
366. Id. at ii. 
367. /d. at i. 
368. 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 66, at 41. 
369. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 24 (Sep. 30, 1986). 
370. /d. at 27. 
371. Gonya, supra note 152. 
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Our skepticism about the validity of any crude statistical test for 
accuracy is supported by comparisons with other contexts. Studies of 
general civil litigation have concluded that controversies going to 
court tend over a long run of cases to result in a roughly even split 
between plaintiffs and defendants. 372 Multiple reasons explain this 
500Jo phenomenon, but they center upon the litigants and their attor-
neys symmetrically assessing the costs and benefits of litigation, as 
suggested by evolving precedent. If these observations were applica-
ble to the SSA, then it would be possible to establish plausible statis-
tical benchmarks for appellate reviewers. That is, if litigants 
appealed only the close disability cases to a higher level, then a 50% 
reversal rate at each appeals stage would not be surprising nor indic-
ative of gross error. As the easy cases were weeded out of the system, 
(by paying those obviously disabled and by convincing obvious ineli-
gibles of the futility of further pursuit of the claim) the system would 
continuously pass for appellate review only those cases that were suf-
ficiently close to the dividing line that reasonable adjudication could 
go either way. 373 Our observation of the SSA review tiers, however, 
suggests that it is wrong to assume that only the close cases work 
their way up the appellate hierarchy. 
The "open record" aspect of disability cases, noted above, is one 
of the reasons why this assumption is fallacious. A case may progres-
sively improve with age, as subsequent adjudicators receive new 
data. Second, the factor of litigation costs, which is vital to Priest's 
study of the courts, is distorted in this administrative setting, where 
the costs vary substantially from stage to stage. Filing an initial ap-
plication for disability benefits requires some effort by the claimant, 
and perhaps some badgering of doctors and hospitals to produce 
copies of medical records. Reconsideration, on the other hand, is 
virtually free in most cases; it only requires signing an SSA form. 
The ALJ stage is probably the most costly, involving time, patience, 
and usually the services of an attorney. 374 The next step, presentation 
to the Appeals Council, may require a small amount of the represen-
tative's time, though usually nothing from the claimant. Finally, fil-
ing in federal court is much more difficult and requires a substantial 
372. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. OF LEGAL STUD. I 
(1984); Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985). But see Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985). 
373. J. MASHAW, supra note 154. 
374. Attorneys and other representatives who accept fees for services in disability hearings 
usually do so on a contingency basis, and the claimant does not make any out-of-pocket ex-
penditures that might serve as disincentives to proceed with the case. 
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court fee. An even more important hurdle against a civil action, 
however, is finding an attorney who will take the case pro bono or 
for a contingency fee. The costs and effort involved in discovery, 
preparations, and trial, on the other hand, are far less than in most 
litigation. 
Finally, SSA cases are different from most court cases studied by 
Priest in that the SSA has virtually no authority to compromise or 
settle. Indeed, SSA has little scope for negotiation and must basi-
cally choose to defend its denial of benefits (even if the case against 
paying benefits is uncertain) or abandon its position altogether (even 
if SSA might be sustained in court). 
In short, there is no reason to expect that a 500Jo award rate-or 
any other fixed rate-would be "correct" for SSA disability adjudi-
cations. The formulae that might suggest such an outcome elsewhere 
are not applicable here. The substantial variation in disability award 
rates among the various tiers of review is certainly provocative and 
important, but the statistics themselves cannot be interpreted as con-
clusive measures of accuracy. 
3. The Actual Costs of Inaccurate Decisions 
Even if inaccuracy is difficult to define and measure, we know 
that it exists. Indeed, inaccurate decisions are inevitable in a system 
as large as the SSA. Even if each level of review could avoid substan-
tial error in ninety percent of its cases, hundreds or thousands of 
appeals would still take place. The gross numbers alone suggest the 
importance of identifying errors and deciding who should bear the 
costs. 
In a system where claimants are categorized as either "disabled" 
or "not disabled," two kinds of errors are possible: an eligible 
claimant may be improperly denied benefits, or an ineligible claim-
ant may be wrongly granted benefits. Both types of errors are to be 
avoided, but measures designed to minimize one type of error may 
inadvertently increase the incidence of the other. 
Relevant to the assessment of accuracy is the question of process-
ing costs. The administrative costs of the SSA are substantial, and 
the overhead costs of the disability program are more expensive than 
those of the other components of RSDHI. Even at this level, how-
ever, processing costs remain relatively low. Mashaw points out that 
the cost of benefits is roughly sixty times the cost of adjudicating 
eligibility, 375 suggesting that increases in accuracy are likely to be jus-
tifiable on cost effectiveness grounds. 
375. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 81-82. 
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One side of the coin concerns the errors of "false denials," 
wrongly rejecting truly disabled claimants. Failure to provide disabil-
ity benefits to those entitled to them results in both individual and 
social costs. The first such cost is the failure to support those who 
are incapable of supporting themselves through remunerative activ-
ity. Although some of these claimants may have other resources or 
be eligible for other social welfare programs, for many disabled peo-
ple federal benefits provide the primary bulwark against abject pov-
erty. 
A second cost of erroneous denials is dissatisfaction among the 
needy and deserving, who will feel that the SSA system has failed 
them in a time of great need. Moreover, many claimants are seeking 
RSDHI benefits that they "bought" through compulsory SSA insur-
ance. In essence, those wrongly denied are being deprived of benefits 
they paid for over the years. 
Third, erroneous denials undercut the disability program as an ex-
pression of the generosity and goodwill of the American people. If 
the system is inaccurate and unreliable, the beneficent purposes of 
this social legislation are frustrated, eroding our self-image as a car-
ing community. Finally, erroneous denials also hurt the productive 
members of society by generating insecurity about their fate, should 
disability strike them. Skepticism about an important social institu-
tion such as the SSA will inevitably create widespread dissatisfac-
tion. 
On the other side of the coin are the costs of erroneous awards. 
The most obvious cost of an incorrect determination of eligibility is 
the removal of a potentially productive worker from the work force, 
with consequent losses in tax revenues and GNP. The magnitude of 
the loss is hard to calculate, particularly for an "almost disabled" 
worker. Especially in periods of substantial unemployment, the clai-
mant's lost contribution to the economy may be small. 376 
Removal of a productive person from the work force, however, 
also imposes a hidden, insidious cost upon the recipient of unwar-
376. The SSA does not regularly monitor or compile statistics about claimants who are 
denied or terminated from disability benefits, so it is not possible to estimate how many of 
them may later successfully return to the competitive economy. Anecdotal evidence and a few 
studies, however, suggest that those who consider themselves to be sufficiently disabled that 
they apply for disability benefits are generally unlikely to return to productive work, even if 
their applications for benefits are denied. If they do attempt to work, their wages tend to be 
low and intermittent. See Bound, The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance 
Applicants, Dep't. of Economics, Harvard Univ. (Dec. 1985), reprinted in Nat'! Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 2816 (Jan. 1989); Linden, Delays in Processing Ben-
efits to Disability Claimants, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 357, 365 (1987). 
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ranted disability benefits: it may serve to entrench the person in a 
disability lifestyle, underscoring a self-image of powerlessness that 
can degenerate into a life of despondence, immobility and self pity 
that is far less rewarding than maintenance of even marginal employ-
ment would be. 
Erroneously granted benefits also create public dissatisfaction. 
They tend to bring all of the SSA-indeed, all of the government's 
social programs-into disrepute, undercutting public sympathy for 
assistance programs for the truly needy. Finally, erroneously granted 
benefits impose direct costs upon the intended beneficiaries of the 
system because claimants compete with each other for public funds. 
The greater the aggregate of mistaken awards, the smaller the pool 
available for distribution among the truly disabled. Given a political 
climate inhospitable to proposals to increase the funding of disability 
programs, a mistaken award imposes an opportunity cost of lost op-
tions to pursue other social goals. 
It is important to note that error costs, regarding both false posi-
tives and false negatives, are long-term rather than transitory, be-
cause the SSA system has difficulty in efficiently correcting its 
mistakes. For example, erroneous awards may generally be corrected 
only by a termination action. Massive terminations in the early 1980s 
demonstrated how traumatic that process can be. The revised rules 
regarding "continuing disability reviews" (CDRs) have been greatly 
tempered in response to that experience, and it is possible that the 
new definition of "medical improvement" will make removal from 
the rolls more difficult. Thus, an award of benefits, correct or incor-
rect, tends to be an action with long-term consequences. 
An erroneous denial too is difficult to reverse. Even though an 
improperly denied claimant could file a new application, reapplica-
tions may be viewed with less objectivity. Moreover, unless an adju-
dicator who rules favorably on the later application takes the 
unusual action of reopening and revising the earlier denial, benefits 
will not be paid for the intervening time period.377 In addition, the 
claimant's financial eligibility for RSDHI may expire before the new 
application is filed. To that extent, an erroneous denial carries per-
manent costs. 
4. An Approximation of Accuracy 
The difficulty of defining and measuring accuracy inclines us to-
ward offering a "second-best" solution: skew the likely errors into a 
377. 20 C.P.R.§ 404.987 to .989, 416.1487 to .1493 (1986). 
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relatively tolerable pattern. 378 By "second-best" we do not mean a 
compromise with perfection. Having concluded that perfect accuracy 
is unattainable and that efforts to pursue it directly will result in 
poorer system performance, we suggest a more modest two-pronged 
alternative: (a) that the SSA adjudicatory system be less concerned 
with accuracy in close cases on appeal and more concerned with ac-
curacy in easy cases early in the process; and (b) that the SSA adjudi-
catory system be more concerned with correcting or anticipating 
erroneous denials rather than erroneous awards. 
We derive the first principle-less focus on the marginal cases-
from our conclusion that "accuracy" is most elusive and the costs of 
error are lowest in close cases. Furthermore, greater subjectivity and 
variability among adjudicators are likely to be found in borderline 
cases. Higher levels of the claims review process in these circum-
stances may not so much correct errors made by the lower levels as 
simply substitute judgments based on disagreement with the previous 
decision. Successive review, therefore, does not necessarily improve 
accuracy; rather, it may produce only a series of disagreements as to 
whether the case is marginally on this or that side of a not-so-bright 
line. 
Given the strictness of the statutory disability standard, indivi-
duals even close to meeting the eligibility criteria may have little to 
contribute to the economy. Moreover, the primary cost of erroneous 
denials falls upon an individual least financially able to bear the bur-
den. The primary cost of an erroneous award, on the other hand, 
falls upon an insurance program created precisely to pool risks and 
spread them over all participants in the plan. 
Close cases are not only the most difficult ones, they are the least 
important. An erroneous award of benefits to a claimant who is im-
paired enough to be almost eligible is an inexpensive error. The costs 
of the mistake are likely to be low when the claimant's greatest possi-
ble contribution to the work force would be minimal in any event. 
Similarly, an erroneous denial in a close case, where the claimant is 
only barely eligible, and is almost capable of performing substantial 
gainful activity, is less expensive than in a case of extreme disability, 
where the wrongful withholding of benefits leads to economic depri-
vation of the claimant. 
378. The concept of the "second best" was apparently first developed by R.G. Lipsey and 
K. Lancaster in their studies of macroeconomics and the efforts to attain perfect competition 
in the marketplace. It has been borrowed frequently for application in the analysis of a variety 
of public policy problems. See DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 368 (1984). 
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Although errors in close cases are less socially expensive, they are 
not less time-consuming for the SSA and the claimant. All cases pro-
gress through the same steps on the appellate ladder; cases with bla-
tant errors receive no accelerated treatment. Accurate decisions, 
particularly accurate awards made earlier in the process, would expe-
dite the payment to the claimant and reduce the volume of cases pre-
sented for subsequent review. 
We conclude that a "second-best" solution to the inaccuracy 
problem would place greater emphasis upon early adjudication, espe-
cially where awards can be granted quickly, even at the expense of 
more fine-grained review at later stages. Although later review may 
change the outcome in many cases, close cases generally do not bene-
fit from multiple review. We believe, therefore, that the Appeals 
Council should not screen cases for yet another analysis. That proce-
dure promotes accuracy only slowly and at high cost; more impor-
tantly, it often provides second guessing rather than error 
corrections. Instead, the Appeals Council should devise a system 
that avoids or corrects errors, especially wrongful denials, at the ear-
liest possible point in the system. Improving the accuracy of DDSs 
will require additional resources at the initial stages of case evalua-
tion. We recommend that the Appeals Council establish a primary 
goal of improved accuracy and efficiency in the early stages of case-
work so that fewer errors are passed along to ALJs, the Appeals 
Council, and the federal courts. 
C. Policy Integrity 
The Appeals Council currently attempts to play a major role in 
promoting system-wide uniformity. We have identified two related 
aspects of uniformity: "policy integrity," discussed here, and "con-
sistency," considered below. "Policy integrity," means that the ap-
plicable law is followed by all players in the bureaucracy, and that 
those in authority in SSA are able to carry out their management and 
policymaking functions effectively. 379 
Policy integrity is espicially important for SSA, because the 
sketchy statutory framework for the disability program has resulted 
in an immense need for administrative regulations. Although these 
regulations have a limited scope, elected officials and their designees 
379. See D. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). "Law as integrity asks judges to assume, so 
far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice 
and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases 
that come before them, so that each person's situation is fair and just according to the same 
standards." /d. at 243. 
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enjoy an unusually broad range of discretionary power and policy 
alternatives through which the political element finds legitimate ex-
pression and control. 
One important function of responsible leadership, therefore, is 
maintenance of the system's internal law. The Appeals Council is 
well-situated to play a major role in promoting policy integrity. The 
Appeals Council is the only unit of the SSA that regularly adjudi-
cates a wide variety of cases, including those processed by the admin-
istrative bureaucracy and those remanded from the courts. The 
geographic and bureaucratic diversity of the Appeals Council's cases 
should enable it to assess policy adherence nationally. 
The Appeals Council has been fairly successful in promoting pol-
icy integrity. The current members of the Appeals Council are well-
versed in the applicable laws and SSA policies and they are active in 
implementing them. The Appeals Council also has succeeded in iden-
tifying aberrant case handling and in remanding appropriate cases to 
ALJs or DDSs with correcting instructions. The Appeals Council 
seems comfortable spotting deviations from established law and cor-
recting or remanding for greater compliance. 
In four areas, however, the policy integrity role has experienced 
problems: (1) promulgation of SSA laws; (2) non-acquiescence in 
court rulings; (3) discipline; and (4) balancing flexibility and policy. 
Three of these areas are beyond the scope of this Article, but the 
fourth is fundamental to the structure and operation of the Appeals 
Council. 
1. Promulgation of SSA Laws. The first area concerns the variety 
of procedures for setting forth Social Security law and policy. The 
SSA has relied upon AP A notice and comment rulemaking, informal 
Social Security Rulings (SSRs), internal policy statements, circulars, 
and manuals. 
Regulations, unless deemed arbitrary or improperly promulgated, 
are binding upon all levels of adjudication-including the federal 
courts. 380 SSRs, on the other hand, and, a fortiori, the internal 
guidelines of lesser status and lower visibility, are not open to public 
participation and are not binding upon reviewing courts. Their effi-
cacy within the SSA system remains controversial because SSRs pro-
claim themselves to be binding on all levels of adjudication,381 but 
many ALJs have systematically maintained that they are bound only 
by formal regulations, not unilateral SSRs, 
380. See l H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 3.13 (1985). 
381. S.S.R., Preface (Cum. Ed. 1982). 
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to reconcile this 
difference, or even to recommend practices to circumvent it. The 
balance among factors such as legal dignity, speed, flexibility, pub-
licity, etc., is a difficult one. However, as long as this conflict en-
dures, with ALJs insisting that they may overlook policy documents 
that SSA insists with equal vigor are binding, then the Appeals 
Council's role in ensuring policy integrity inside the Social Security 
system will be incomplete and frequently frustrated. 
2. Non-acquiescence. A similar factor, cited by many observers 
and participants, has been the problematic nature of SSA's approach 
to decisions of the federal circuits. Again, the recent changes in 
SSA's acquiescence practices may have largely mooted this contro-
versy, 382 and it is beyond our mandate to address it directly, but we 
must observe the occasional consternation it has generated inside the 
SSA and the difficulties it has posed for the Appeals Council's at-
tempts to achieve policy integrity. 
Put simply, when the law is in disarray, when the policies of dif-
ferent legal authorities are not well-integrated, then obviously the 
Appeals Council's power to impose order upon the internal mechan-
isms of the bureaucracy will be severely limited. 
3. Discipline. A third problem in implementing policy integrity 
concerns discipline. The SSA's disciplinary authority is starkly lim-
ited. The major sanctions-action against an ALJ through the Merit 
Systems Protection Board or federalizing the functions of a DDS-
are so cumbersome and expensive that they are not effective deter-
rents. 
However, too much SSA authority to discipline lower-level deci-
sionmakers might permit abuse. The independence accorded to ALJ s 
and, to a lesser extent, DDSs, carries both costs and benefits. One 
benefit is opportunity for creativity and autonomy; one cost is re-
duced opportunities for program integrity. Independence, especially 
for ALJs, should be considered a virtue of the system and a price 
worth paying to preserve integrity and a sense of propriety. 
4. Balancing Flexibility and Policy. The virtues of policy integrity 
should not obscure complementary virtues of flexibility and innova-
tion.383 A sound mass-justice process must allow some discretion. 384 
382. SSA and Department of Justice decisions about which cases to appeal, and which to 
accept, however, remain problematic, sustaining many of the same questions and concerns as 
did the prior policy of non-acquiescence. 
383. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 121-22; K. DAVIS, supra note 356, at 17. 
384. C. KocH, supra note 2, at § 9.22[2]. 
282 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:199 
The "street-level bureaucrats"385 or implementing decisionmakers 
need space to make adjustments in the rules and add sensitivity to 
the administrative process. 386 The SSA has provided such space for 
discretion in its rule structure. The key problem lies in defining who 
should be responsible for exercising this discretion, and what role the 
Appeals Council should play in fostering innovation and experimen-
tation. 
Both the DDSs and the ALJs should be allowed more creativity 
and scope for experimentation in organizing and processing the 
cases. At the ALJ stage, highly competent and experienced adjudica-
tors review a large number of cases. They should be granted ade-
quate flexibility in making individualized judgments on cases not 
fully covered by existing rules. Discretion for handling the disability 
caseload in potentially improved ways should be exercised more fre-
quently. 
The function of the Appeals Council here should be twofold. 
First, the Appeals Council should ensure the fundamental guarantees 
of due process-claimants should not be disadvantaged in the name 
of casual experimentation. The individualized discretion of the ALJ 
should remain within legal boundaries, and the Appeals Council 
should require continued compliance with principles of basic fair-
ness. 387 Second, the Appeals Council should also evaluate these dis-
cretionary actions and publicize successful results and techniques. 
The Appeals Council's broad perspective permits it to make useful 
comparisons across the national range of ALJs and DDSs, infusing 
successful innovations into new localities. Rather than merely correct 
individual errors, the Appeals Council should play a positive role in 
fostering system-wide improvements and in exploring potential areas 
of innovation. 
D. Consistency 
Another goal related to policy integrity is decisional consistency. 
This function of the Appeals Council is already important, and we 
have found both notable successes and shortcomings in the present 
level of performance. 
385. M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: THE DILEMMA OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUB-
LIC SERVICE ( 1980). 
386. J. MASHAW, supra note 154. "The error costs from over generalization may here 
outweigh the gains from error avoidance. The adjudicator's feel for this type of case may 
often be better than any rule." /d. at lOS. 
387. Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 469, 
471-78 (1986). 
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Consistency in case adjudication indicates respect for the individ-
ual claimant and ensures that the benefit system is above political or 
other partisan manipulation. As a national program, the SSA should 
provide the same system of benefits to claimants wherever they re-
side. 
The goal of consistency has special relevance where accuracy re-
mains elusive. Even if we are unable to measure or even define the 
"correctness" of an adjudication, we may be able to appraise its 
"similarity" to comparable cases. If a mistake is repeated in like 
cases, perfect accuracy is not achieved, but a sort of fairness results; 
and fairness may be the most that is attainable in a second-best 
world. 
We discern two dimensions of consistency. "Vertical consistency" 
is achieved when decisionmakers evaluate a case according to the 
same procedures and legal standards at each tier of the appellate re-
view ladder. It requires harmony among all the adjudicatory levels 
regarding standards for case handling, definitions of eligibility, and 
interpretations of policy. "Horizontal consistency" refers to the sim-
ilarity of decisions in different venues. Claimants in Michigan, Geor-
gia and New Mexico, for example, should receive similar treatment 
from their local DDSs, similar hearing procedures before their ALJs, 
and, if their cases are substantially the same, similar outcomes on 
their applications. The data, however, reveal wide variations in both 
horizontal and vertical consistency. 
Vertical consistency is hard to evaluate. ALJ hearings, Appeals 
Council reviews and federal court actions may produce widely diver-
gent award rates for many reasons. As long as the ALJ remains the 
only adjudicator to confront the claimant face to face, for example, 
the system should expect many reversals at that tier. 388 
Other causes of vertical inconsistency are less acceptable. The 
DDSs have operated under different law from the ALJs-not just 
procedural differences, but substantive differences, such as instruc-
tions to adhere to all or only some of the listings at the expense of 
the grids. The 1982 Bellmon Report, too, strongly suggested that 
cases are resolved differently by adjudicators at different levels, even 
when they are presented with identical case files. 
Horizontal inconsistency is even more manifest and alarming. 389 
The award rates among DDSs have varied widely from state to state 
388. D. CoFER, supra note 5, at 12-13; 1986 Hearing, supra note 3, at 28 (statement of 
Eileen P. Sweeney, Staff Attorney, National Senior Citizens Law Center). 
389. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra note 134 at xxi; see also Capowski, supra note 75, at 
343. 
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virtually since the inception of the disability program. The ALJs, 
too, vary in their award rates; some ALJs award benefits in only 
one-quarter of their cases, while others consistently find eligibility in 
three-quarters of the claims. 390 
This inconsistency is created partly because different federal 
courts evolve differeil.t rules in their respective jurisdictions. More 
inconsistency, however, flows from the lower adjudicative levels, as 
different locales generate starkly different success ratios for their 
claimants. Thus, national uniformity in SSA adjudication has always 
been illusory and there is little evidence of ongoing improvement. 
1. Role of the Appeals Council 
The Appeals Council should be uniquely helpful in achieving an 
acceptable level of consistency. The disability system includes ap-
proximately 1300 SSA district offices, 700 ALJs, and 900 federal dis-
trict judges, but only one Appeals Council-it is the one location 
where cases from all regions and administrative tiers are adjudicated. 
The Council is aware of its unique position, and its members take 
seriously their responsibility for maintaining nationwide consistency. 
If the statistics do not reflect much success, one can only speculate 
how much more inconsistency would exist without a single entity at 
the top of the pyramid attempting to reconcile divergent views. 
The Appeals Council itself, however, is no paragon of uniformity. 
Indeed, with its current twenty members, the Council may be too 
large to speak with one voice. The current case handling routines 
further contribute to inconsistency. A case is ordinarily assigned to 
only one or two members; rarely do three members confer upon a 
case, and virtually never will more than three members address a 
matter together. 
Moreover, Council-wide discussion of shared problems remains 
quite rare. Plenary meetings are held approximately monthly, but lit-
tle of this time is devoted to solving common case-handling prob-
lems. Although the members' regional groupings could provide some 
uniformity, the groupings are not used much for this purpose. Mem-
bers told us of daily consultation with each other on novel or tricky 
issues, but we were not persuaded that this collegiality was able to 
produce much of a shared outlook.391 We observed (although the sta-
390. See D. CoFER, supra note 5, at 85. 
391. As far back as 1940, the Social Security Board recognized the importance of collegi-
ality among the members of the Appeals Council: 
To set up such a Council may seem a somewhat expensive means of conducting the 
hearing and review system. The review of cases and their just decision requires qual-
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tistics are difficult to marshal) that members differ in their products; 
some, for example, grant review of cases at least twice as often as 
others do. As a result, the Appeals Council, potentially the best ele-
ment in the network for attaining consistency, operates more as a 
collection of individuals than as an organized unit of a national bu-
reaucracy. 392 
In assessing the Appeals Council's opportunities for promoting 
uniform decisionmaking, we recognized two categories of consis-
tency: procedural and substantive. Procedural consistency is the eas-
ier one to pursue. It is not difficult for a central reviewing body to 
insist that ALJs and DDSs adhere to an established sequence of steps 
in developing and evaluating claims. The accumulation of records, 
the taking of testimony, the proper elaboration of mental impair-
ment allegations, and the sequential evaluation process are all funda-
mental steps that the Appeals Council can monitor. These steps 
should not vary geographically, and the danger is small that stan-
dardized procedures would jeopardize decisional independence. 
On the other hand, substantive consistency-like cases being re-
solved alike-is far more difficult to achieve. Any attempt to harmo-
nize decisions of ALJs inevitably raises concerns about 
compromising the AP A protections necessary to their integrity. Lit-
tle can or should be done by the various tiers of the SSA to enforce a 
substantive uniformity upon ALJs; the danger of manipulation is 
too great. 
Recent history suggests that ALJ s will fiercely resist any reforms 
perceived as challenges to their autonomy. 393 The SSA should never 
return to being "at war with itself," and OHA in particular cannot 
endure the tension and resentment that, to some extent, still charac-
terize relations among ALJs, Appeals Council members, and policy 
officials. 
2. Improving Consistency 
Perfect consistency is unattainable. ALJs will continue to vary and 
will continue to assert their independence. The Appeals Council 
ities of a high order, however, and their review is likely to be better than the initial 
decision which is adequate in the great bulk of cases only if several minds collabo-
rate in the process. 
BASIC PROVISIONS, supra note 194, at 38. 
392. A decade or so ago, there were proposals (partially implemented at that time, but just 
as quickly abandoned) to "regionalize" the Appeals Council by breaking its members into 
district groups that would physically sit in various regional headquarters and handle cases on-
site. We would not support that type of compartmentalization, preferring instead greater inte-
gration of the Appeals Council as a national entity. That regionalization could be so seriously 
considered is itself an indicator of the lack of cohesion among the Council. 
393. D. COFER, supra, note 5, at 170-76. 
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should not challenge this reality, but should endorse it as part of the 
price to be paid for the benefits of an independent quasi-judicial 
corps. Although disparity in reversal rates is greater than it should 
be, a direct assault on the problem is bound to be futile and destruc-
tive. Instead, the Appeals Council might adopt less overt and less 
contentious but perhaps ultimately more successful approaches in its 
pursuit of consistency. 
One such measure begins, as do many of our other recommenda-
tions, with the Appeals Council re-asserting control over its docket. 
Only when the Appeals Council is able to exercise some selectivity in 
the cases it reviews will it be able to play a more important role in 
pursuing consistency. As we elaborate in the final section of this Ar-
ticle, we propose that the SSA bring far fewer cases before the Ap-
peals Council. The categories of cases to be reviewed should be those 
most likely to contain errors, those which would benefit from sys-
tematic scrutiny, or those in which inconsistency has been the great-
est problem. 
Once the caseload is reduced, the Appeals Council should write 
opinions that are not simply conclusory boilerplate, but that care-
fully analyze the evidence and the arguments and explain the out-
come in detail. Current decisions do not contain this elaboration and 
are not, therefore, especially compelling in logic or citation. As a 
result, they do not inspire consistency at the lower levels. 
In this context, it is disturbing that the Appeals Council does little 
to disseminate and publicize its decisions. The Council is ignoring 
the opportunity to promote consistency through promulgation of its 
most significant decisions, together with an appropriate index. The 
absence of a direct feedback mechanism is striking. ALJs and DDSs 
do not regularly track the progress of their cases and are not in-
formed of appellate corrections, unless pure happenstance brings a 
remanded case back to the ALJ or DDS staffer who handled it ini-
tially. Thus, the Council lacks effective mechanisms that would have 
the greatest impact on national consistency. Consistency is difficult 
to attain solely on a case-by-case basis; ALJs and DDSs require more 
systematic guidance. The Appeals Council should take advantage of 
one opportunity to promote consistency within all tiers of the system 
by publishing the proper and improper ways of handling particular 
types of claims. 
Other procedures that could enhance consistency are currently un-
derutilized. For example, little interaction takes place between ALJs 
and Appeals Council members. The Appeals Council has virtually no 
budget for travel to local hearing offices and the "visiting ALJ" 
program (under which ALJs were assigned for one-month temporary 
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duty as Appeals Council members) has been terminated. Further-
more, training or continuing legal or medical education activities 
that might bring ALJ s and Council members together seldom take 
place. 
Similarly, most Appeals Council members have virtually no regu-
lar contact with DDS or district office personnel. Few attempts have 
been made to explore the ways in which direct meetings among per-
sonnel from various tiers of review could be arranged to enhance 
understanding of the program and consistency in its application. 
E. Efficient Government 
Cost effectiveness cannot be ignored in a program that costs mil-
lions of dollars to administer. The Appeals Council should be in-
volved in improving the efficiency of its own process and that of the 
entire disability system. 
The size of the SSA's disability operation is staggering: over two 
million applications are processed each year, 394 over one million ap-
pellate reviews are conducted.395 Many cases involve highly complex 
medical and scientific matters. Whether by choice or by the pressure 
of events, the SSA has been near the cutting edge of modern devel-
opments in psychiatric impairment, pain, and AIDS cases. 
In 1987, a budget of approximately $650 million for administra-
tion of the disability portion of RSDHI was allocated to these SSA 
disability operations. 396 The SSA calculates that the costs of adminis-
tering the disability provisions of the law is 3.4% of their annual 
income. 397 This figure may seem modest, but it was also four times 
the corresponding figure for the administration of the retirement and 
survivors portions of RSDHI, where the intricacies of disability de-
termination are not at play. 398 
A 1983 study estimated that the average cost of a disability deter-
mination was approximately $500 and the lump sum value of an 
award was about $30,000, generating a processing cost only one six-
tieth of the total cost. 399 We suspect that this ratio has become even 
more favorable over the years, as benefit levels rise faster than over-
head costs. 
394. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 29, 31. 
395. /d. 
396. /d. at 30. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. at 29, 31. These figures exclude the costs of administering the SSI disability pro-
gram for which general revenues, rather than the SSA trust funds, are tapped. 
399. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 81-82. 
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This apparent efficiency, however, does not imply that the SSA 
can be indifferent to costs-indeed, the substantial reduction of the 
agency's manpower pool (shrinking from 74,600 permanent staff in 
1983 to 66,700 in 1987)400 demonstrates that productivity remains 
highly prized. Moreover, the 60:1 ratio does not mean that any 
greater spending on administrative processing would necessarily be 
cost efficient. That is, the value of an "accurate" disability decision 
(if one could be defined) is not the full $30,000; rather, it is the dif-
ference in aggregate social utility between having those funds in the 
hands of taxpayers or in the hands of a proper disability recipient: A 
correct decision is valuable, but it is not worth anywhere near the 
full sum of the payments. 
Focusing on the Appeals Council, the question is whether this 
fourth tier of administrative decisionmaking is worth its cost. Cur-
rently, the Appeals Council changes the result in only about 5117o of 
the cases it reviews. 401 Remands for further action account for per-
haps another 1 OOJo. 402 This contribution is far from trivial; on an an-
nual Appeals Council docket of 50,000 cases, it means that 7500 
cases receive substantial alteration. But the Appeals Council and its 
affiliated support unit, the Office of Appeals Operations, also con-
sume substantial SSA resources: almost $32 million per year, and 
several hundred relatively high-graded employees. 
The timeliness cost of the Appeals Council, moreover, is substan-
tial: even if the system improves to the point that all request-for-
review cases are disposed of within ninety days, the claimant is still 
forced to wait three months with little expectation of favorable ac-
tion. Additionally, Appeals Council reopenings can substantially de-
lay administrative finality and prolong the wait for access to court. 
1. Sources of Inefficiency 
Although it is difficult to assign rigorous costs and benefits inside 
a complex organization such as the SSA or a subunit such as the 
Appeals Council, we identified several factors that prevent the Ap-
peals Council from achieving optimal productivity. 
The first factor is the Appeals Council's current system for pro-
cessing words and data, tracking files, and compiling statistics. The 
computer hardware, software, and support services are at best primi-
400. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note II, at 34. 
401. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
402. /d. 
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tive. 403 For example, members cannot directly make changes or cor-
rections in their own letters or decisions; even typographical errors 
require returning the entire file to the OAO for reprocessing. Fur-
thermore, the Appeals Council has only a rudimentary statistical 
base; the categories for recording various types of case actions are 
anomalous and poorly understood. Even the telephone system is an-
tiquated. 
The kindest conclusion one could draw from the Appeals Coun-
cil's stunted computational capacity is that the situation must have 
beeii far worse not long ago when even the current equipment was 
unavaihible. The promise of better systems, including computer inte-
gration with SSA headquarters, always looms on the horizon, but 
that relief will not arrive soon without outside pressures. 
Another source of inefficiency is the Appeals Council members' 
lack of personal staff support. When cases arrive at the Appeals 
Council from the OAO, no one pre-screens them to sort the pedes-
trian from the significant. The members are thus forced to spend too 
much time on purely ministerial duties, hardly an efficient use of 
their talents. 
We also observed considerable inefficiency in the organization and 
location of OAO analysts. They are spread through several build-
ings, making communications and simple file transfers difficult. The 
OAO branches do not parallel the members' geographic groupings; 
an analyst might send cases to many different members and each 
member may conversely receive work from thirty analysts. The ana-
lysts and Council members, therefore, never become familiar with 
each other's strengths, weaknesses, styles and preferences.404 
2. Protecting Judicial Resources 
One asserted justification for the existence of the Appeals Council 
is its ability to screen cases before they reach the courts, paying the 
more deserving claims administratively and thereby protecting the 
district judges from a potential flood of litigation. 405 This protection 
of judicial resources is important: claimants, the SSA and the federal 
judiciary all benefit if claims can be resolved prior to filing a civil 
403. Despite representations that the Appeals Council's word processing equipment would 
be "state of the art," 1983 Hearing, supra note 258, at 246 (testimony of Louis B. Hays, 
Assoc. Comm'r for Hearings and Appeals), the OHA has, in fact, supplied the Appeals Coun-
cil with only inadequate, obsolete hardware. 
404. We understand that the SSA is currently undertaking measures to redress this prob-
lem by combining OAO and the Appeals Council under one administrator and by matching 
one OAO branch-with one Appeals Council member. 
405. See, e.g., Cleveland Transcript, supra note 257, at 274. 
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action. The strain upon federal courts is already substantial: 15 to 
200Jo of the federal civil cases filed against the United States are SSA 
disability contests. 406 (Because these cases tend to be resolved expedi-
tiously, however, they may account for only 2% of the federal 
courts' actual work. 407) 
The sheer size of the SSA caseload suggests that even minor per-
turbations in the SSA's rate of resolution of disability claims could 
cause major disruptions for a federal judiciary not equipped to han-
dle that volume of traffic. Of the annual two million new disability 
cases, perhaps 10,000 (.5%) will wind up, years later, in court. Thus, 
if the SSA were able to dispatch only 99%, instead of 99.5%, of the 
cases administratively, the burden of federal actions would double. 
The Appeals Council now receives approximately 50,000 cases per 
year. Of these, perhaps 10,000 will result in federal court actions. 
How much protection of the federal docket is provided by the action 
of the Appeals Council, and how much is more properly attributable 
to other factors? 
We conclude that the Appeals Council itself now contributes rela-
tively little to the protection of the federal docket. It does, of course, 
pay some claims and remand others to ALJs who may rule in favor 
of the claimant. But the Appeals Council itself does little to appease 
denied claimants or persuade them not to litigate. Council decisions 
are so standardized and nonresponsive that they "convince" no one; 
the review proceedings are so opaque that few claimants accept this 
process as a satisfying day in court. 
The real deterrent to court action is not the Appeals Council; the 
cost, red tape, and delay involved in federal litigation are the more 
likely deterrents. Typically, the claimant must find a representative 
willing to invest time and money either pro bono or for a contin-
gency fee and then must endure a long period of uncertainty while 
receiving no benefits. Even if the court is sympathetic, a remand for 
a new hearing··is the most likely outcome, rather than an outright 
award of benefits. These factors would operate just as powerfully 
without the Appeals Council guarding the courthouse door. 
There is one mechanism through which the Appeals Council does 
directly reduce the volume of cases going to court, but it is a factor 
that is even more unsettling. Sometimes the Appeals Counsel does 
succeed in exhausting claimants with its delay and impassivity. Far 
from persuading the claimants that their claims are without merit, 
406. Flanders, What Do the Federal Courts Do? A Research Note, 5 REv. oF LITIGATION 
199, 206 (1986). 
407. /d. 
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the Council engenders a sense of defeat, a belief that the benefits are 
not worth the battle against a vast bureaucracy. This process does 
keep cases out of court, but only at the price of justice denied. 
F. Acceptability 
Acceptability of the adjudicatory process among various constitu-
encies is vital for the SSA. Public confidence is necessary to the per-
formance of its primary missions, Congressional support is essential 
for its survival, and a reputation for fairness and competence among 
other groups is important to its operations. 
As the apex of the SSA adjudicatory bureaucracy, the Appeals 
Council can foster greater acceptability of the program in a variety 
of ways. However, the Appeals Council has either ignor\::d this re-
sponsibility altogether or actually aggravated existing poor public 
appraisals of the SSA. 
1. Acceptability with Claimants and the Public 
The most direct and difficult target for building greater acceptabil-
ity of the Appeals Council is the group of disability claimants and 
their representatives. These are the bureaucracy's clients; their satis-
faction is an important element of a mass justice system.408 
Obviously, those who are denied benefits are going to feel some-
what dissatisfied no matter how much sensitivity and care are dem-
onstrated by the system. A program as large as the SSA, moreover, 
will inevitably make mistakes, including some egregious ones, even 
when it operates in good faith with modern management tools. Even 
if the error tate were statistically quite low, the raw number of erro-
neous denials and the incidence of callous bureaucratic treatment 
would be significant. 
Even discounting these problems, though, claimant satisfaction 
with the SSA and the Appeals Council is low. Claimants can distin-
guish between being denied and being badly treated, and can respect 
an organization even after it rejects their claims, if they feel its han-
dling of their cases is fundamentally fair. In the disability appeals 
process, however, claimants and their representatives frequently ex-
press two critical areas of dissatisfaction. 
408. See generally J. MASHAW, DuE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). An 
emerging school of thought, which Mashaw labels as proponent of a "dignitary theory," has 
as its "unifying thread ... the belief that the ways in which legal processes define participants 
and regulate participation, not just the rationality of the substantive results, must be consid-
ered when judging the legitimacy of public decision making." !d. at 161-62. 
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The first source of unhappiness concerns delay. 409 The Appeals 
Council takes too long to affect too few cases. In request-for-review 
situations, the Appeals Council is perceived as a mere way-station 
that must be visited before proceeding to federal court, where the 
chances for victory are greater. In own-motion review cases, claim-
ants see the Appeals Council not only as a delaying factor, but 
worse, as a threat to the benefits they won at the ALJ level. 410 In 
court cases, the Appeals Council is also perceived as a source of un-
warranted delay. The Secretary's motion to remand weak cases that 
would otherwise proceed in court is often interpreted by the claimant 
as covering up, rather than redressing, ALJ errors. Finally, when it 
does take cognizance of a case, the Appeals Council is twice as likely 
to remand as to reverse,411 resulting in subsequent proceedings before 
an ALJ, entailing further delay and perhaps another full hearing. 
Claimants' second major complaint about the Appeals Council 
concerns the remoteness and the impersonality of the process. Claim-
ants never see an Appeals Council member or OAO analyst, and 
even high-volume representatives report little or no personal contact. 
The prevailing impression is that the Appeals Council is aloof and 
impassive. Representatives confess that they know and care little 
about the Appeals Council. The organization is so arcane that they 
rarely take it seriously. 
This perception of the Appeals Council as a ''black box,'' with a 
mysterious internal composition and operation, generates a sense of 
arbitrariness-no one knows why the decisions come out as they do. 
Representatives relate incidents of egregious ALJ errors that the 
Council blithely overlooked, as well as weak, almost casual requests 
for review that the Council granted. 
No claimant ever feels that he or she has had "a day in court" 
before the Appeals Council. Few could feel satisfied that the case 
was fairly heard and carefully scrutinized. Few-regardless of the 
outcome of the cases-come away from the encounter with the Ap-
409. Of course, the Appeals Council is hardly responsible for all of the delays that mark 
the Social Security system; it is merely the latest administrative source of delay. See 1986 
Hearing, supra note 3, at 25-26 (statement of ArthurS. Flemming, Co-Chair, Save Our Secu-
rity Coalition); Linden, supra note 376, at 357 (summarizing results of court-ordered study 
conducted by the SSA regarding processing times for current and retroactive payments). 
410. Our interviews revealed that claimants' representatives believe own-motion review to 
be a major portion of the Appeals Council workload. In fact, the OHA now receives only a 
small number of own-motion cases (perhaps 300 to 400 per month) and the Appeals Council 
grants review in only 60 to 80 per month. Thus, even well-informed claimants' representatives 
lack an understanding of the most important aspects of the Appeals Council operation. 
411. See OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
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peals Council feeling that their dignity as claimants has been ac-
knowledged and respected by the process. 
This sense of remoteness results partly from Council review that is 
entirely on paper, with no possibility of a hearing. 412 The curtness of 
the Council's mailed notifications and decisional documents, as well 
as its self-imposed restraint regarding travel or public appearances, 
augments this remoteness. With a few exceptions by the Deputy 
Chair, Appeals Council members do not attend conferences, offer 
workshops, or deliver speeches to groups of claimants' representa-
tives. 
The "invisibility" of the Appeals Council is even more apparent 
among the public at large. 413 Few people outside the disability proc-
ess have ever heard of the Appeals Council, and only those currently 
or formerly associated with the OHA have even a rudimentary un-
derstanding of its operations. At a time when public confidence in 
the Social Security Administration seems to be in jeopardy, it is 
striking how little has been done to utilize the resources of the Ap-
peals Council to help redress the problem. 
2. Acceptability with ALJs 
The appellate function inherently creates certain tensions between 
tiers on an appellate ladder, but in most contexts, the customary dis-
agreements about cases or practices may be handled civilly and colle-
gially. 
We have observed, however, that the expectation of mutual re-
spect has not prevailed within SSA. ALJs feel a profound disrespect 
for the Appeals Council as an institution. Even ALJs who have had 
personal experience with the Appeals Council, and who appreciate 
the capabilities and sincerity of at least some of its members, have 
little faith in the organization as a whole. ALJ s complain that Ap-
peals Council members are merit system employees, not AP A pro-
tected, and are therefore susceptible to political pressures. ALJs 
assert that it is improper for bonus-eligible employees to review 
quasi-judicial decisions on such fact-based cases. ALJs have repeat-
edly battled the OHA leadership over productivity and performance 
ratings, and have argued that their own statutory independence is an 
essential guarantee of fairness; they have little use for less-secure em-
ployees in an appellate role. 414 
412. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.976(c), 416.147(c) (1986). 
413. See Keitz, Social Security: Legislation to Create an Independent Agency 7 (1986) 
(prepared for Congressional Research Service); J. MAsHAW, supra note 154, at 144. 
414. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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ALJs also resent having their decisions subjected to review by 
members whose qualifications and capabilities are no greater than 
their own. The present job qualifications for Council members and 
ALJs are substantially the same. Indeed, a number of ALJs have 
joined the Appeals Council. Non-lawyers, however, have served on 
the Appeals Council in the not too distant past, and many ALJs be-
lieve that some non-lawyers still are serving. Moreover, most Coun-
cil members have never attended, let alone conducted, a real 
disability hearing. 415 Because the two jobs are graded and paid at the 
same level, the best ALJ s have little incentive to climb the appellate 
ladder. More than one current member of the Appeals Council, in 
fact, expressed a preference for moving in the other direction, taking 
an appointment as an ALJ, if one could be arranged for the Wash-
ington, D.C., or Baltimore area. 
In short, ALJs generally do not see the Appeals Council as a legiti-
mate appellate body. They suspect that it is subject to political mani-
pulations and believe that it has been forced into over-reliance upon 
the work of non-lawyer OAO analysts. ALJs have little opportunity 
to interact with Appeals Council members and, therefore, little occa-
sion to dispel any myths. Within OHA, then, as among the claimants 
and general public, acceptability of the Appeals Council is a genuine 
problem. 
3. Acceptability with the Courts and Congress 
The SSA disability process has experienced considerable judicial 
distrust. Frequently, the federal courts have looked past the actions 
of the Appeals Council to dissect the work of the ALJ. Even in the 
eyes of the reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Council is often deemed 
irrelevant to the process and the results of the hearing level. 416 
The Appeals Council has attempted to become more responsive to 
court activity. It has revised the prior "harmless error" policy and 
now grants review over more ALJ denials, re-writing even correct 
decisions to make the procedure and rationale more acceptable to the 
courts.417 It has also streamlined Secretarial remand procedure on se-
lected cases, providing further administrative work-up on difficult 
415. The original plan for establishing the Appeals Council envisioned a great degree of 
fungibility between its members and hearing examiners: "Members of the Appeals Council 
will be authorized to serve as referees and should exercise such authority from time to time as 
a means of keeping them in touch with the problems connected with conducting hearings and 
developing the records." BAsic PROVISIONS, supra note 194, at 39. 
416. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
417. 8 Soc. SECURITY F. 1 (Feb. 1986). 
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cases. In fact, the Appeals Council may be becoming too preoccu-
pied with court actions at the_ expense of its other roles, because re-
sources directed at court actions cannot be utilized for minimizing 
administrative errors early in the process. 
The SSA's programs-and the Congress' purse strings-are sub-
ject to the vicissitudes of politics. In an era of budget deficits and 
belt-tightening, proposals to increase domestic spending, including 
disability, have poor prospects for success. Whether this phenome-
non relates to Congressional acceptability, however, is difficult to 
assess. 
The OHA has certainly received more than its share of scrutiny in 
recent years. Most of this attention, however, has been lavished on 
the ALJ stage and the controversies over productivity and reversal 
rates. The Appeals Council has attracted far less notice-it is no 
more prominent in the attention of Congressional representatives 
and staff than among other sectors, and is little noticed by them. 
Even legislative proposals that would abolish the Appeals Council 
altogether do so indirectly, almost as an afterthought, such as 
through the creation of a new federal Social Security Court. 418 Con-
gressional staff familiar with the Appeals Council have little to say 
in support or opposition. They perceive the Appeals Council as po-
tentially valuable institutionally but not notably successful in carry-
ing out a particular mandate. Thus, the Appeals Council has little 
impact with the Congress and little success in fostering program ac-
ceptability. 
Ill. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Appeals Council is-or should be-an important institution. 
It alone issues final administrative adjudications on the thousands of 
disability cases pouring in from ALJ s and DDSs around the country. 
It alone sees the full panoply of court cases, and it alone can call 
upon the talents of members and OAO analysts with such a special 
bureaucratic perspective. 
Having investigated the purposes, structure and operation of the 
Appeals Council and having assessed its institutional performance 
and potential, we conclude that four options are available to im-
prove the functioning of the Appeals Council: (1) Retain the Appeals 
Council essentially as it stands; (2) Abolish the Appeals Council en-
tirely, redistributing its responsibilities and resources elsewhere; (3) 
Modify the Appeals Council to optimize its performance as a case-
418. See, e.g., 1986 Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Representative Archer). 
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handling entity; or (4) Reform the Appeals Council, emphasizing its 
role in promulgating improvements in the adjudicatory bureaucracy. 
Each of these options deserves serious consideration and has certain 
merits. For reasons spelled out in this section, however, we strongly 
prefer Model (4) and recommend its immediate adoption. 
A. Model (1): Retain the Appeals Council Essentially As It Stands 
Maintenance of the present system without major alterations is a 
legitimate possibility. One should not rush to dispose of a govern-
ment institution that has weathered bureaucratic storms for almost 
half a century. In fact, the Appeals Council has managed to do its 
job with some success, has helped to promote several important SSA 
objectives, and has managed to churn out 50,000 cases per year. Ad:. 
herents of the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" school might argue 
that the organization, for all its flaws, does something useful and 
that radical change promises no greater success. 
Our review convinces us, however, that something in the system is 
broken. The Appeals Council fails to achieve its goals because of 
deep, permanent flaws in its structure and in the selection of its 
goals. Despite the best efforts of some very capable people, the rec-
ord of the Appeals Council is wholly unsatisfactory. Several areas 
require fundamental changes. 
The Appeals Council's present goals are important but also com-
plex and difficult. Some of those goals, such as enhanced policy de-
velopment, have been abandoned because of the crush of the 
caseload. Others, such as attaining decisional accuracy in the closest 
cases, are too ambitious. Achievement of other goals has been sub-
verted by failures in the organization or operation of the Appeals 
Council. Moreover, current operations of the Appeals Council im-
pose unacceptable costs upon the disability program. These costs 
(money, diverted resources, delay, and public image) are substantial 
and, we believe, avoidable. 
Therefore, we reject Model (1). The existing structure of the Ap-
peals Council is supported by nothing more than bureaucratic iner-
tia. The time has come for profound change. 
B. Model (2): Abolish the Appeals Council 
The converse of Model (1) is Model (2), a proposal for outright 
elimination of the Appeals Council. This action has been recom-
mended repeatedly by many claimants' representatives and several 
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scholars. 419 Congressional legislation that would accomplish this ob-
jective is regularly introduced.420 
Valid reasons exist to support abolition. Appeals Council review is 
now largely superfluous. It changes the results in only 507o of the 
cases, 421 a statistic that may constitute a prima facie case for aboli-
tion. The Appeals Council does not contribute appreciably to the in-
stitutional goals of the SSA, and few factors suggest that a fourth 
tier-a fourth bite at this particular apple-is worthwhile. 
The Appeals Council, moreover, is expensive. It consumes mil-
lions of dollars, employs talented people who could be used produc-
tively elsewhere, and wastes time, delaying the finality ·of the 
adjudicative process and eroding the support and confidence of the 
claimants. 
These problems and the difficulty of adequately restructuring the 
Appeals Council suggest that a clean break may be wise. The Ap-
peals Council might be considered outdated in an era when stream-
lining government is important. Teaching this old dog new tricks 
may not be a sound use of resources. 
Abolition of the Appeals Council would not be difficult. Its per-
sonnel could be redistributed within the agency. Temporary displace-
ments would no doubt occur, but the talents of members and OAO 
analysts could be put to good use in other niches. Similarly, the ves-
tigial functions of the current Appeals Council could be handled 
elsewhere. OAO and other SSA service centers, for example, could 
send their "protest" cases422 back to the originating ALJ. Technical 
errors could be efficiently corrected at the source through a reopen-
ing. The quality-assurance role of the Appeals Council could be 
served by a quality assurance staff that could provide on-the-job 
training for new ALJs in conjunction with the SSA's national Chief 
ALJ. The Bellmon Review423 function could be statutorily removed 
or performed by other units. 
One factor operating against Model (2) is that following abolition 
of the Appeals Council, ALJ decisions would become final agency 
actions and immediately reviewable in court. While this arrangement 
would be a departure from the common structure of administrative 
law (another post-hearing administrative stage usually exists prior to 
a court appeal), we find the arrangement plausible. 
419. See D. CoFER, supra note 5. 
420. See, e.g., supra note 4. 
421. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
422. See supra text accompanying note 238. 
423. For a general discussion of Bellmon Review, see supra note 258. 
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The Model (2) scheme is consistent with the APA, which implicitly 
permits an Appeals Council but does not require it. 424 ALJ s are le-
gally competent to have the last word for the agency. As a practical 
matter, ALJs now deliver the last real word in most cases because 
the Appeals Council caseload prevents it from effectively interven-
ing. 
Once freed from the specter of Appeals Council review, ALJs 
would not necessarily become more aberrational, independent, or 
generous. The ALJs would likely perform as they have in the past. 
Since .the Appeals Council contributes little to ALJ discipline, aboli-
tion would not remove any of the system's important checks. 
Most importantly, abolition of the Appeals Council would not im-
mediately flood the federal courts with massive increases in disability 
filings. Compared to the various other barriers to entry into the fed-
eral courts, including cost, delay, exhaustion, and the need for an 
attorney, the factor of Appeals Council review is negligible. Its re-
moval would not make an appreciable difference to the system. 
We have a great deal of sympathy for this course of action. The 
present operation of the Appeals Council is seriously wanting, and 
remedial actions are not likely to occur. Nevertheless, our skepticism 
about the institution's effectiveness does not obscure our respect for 
its potential. Therefore, we do not recommend abolition at this time. 
On the other hand, should our preferred recommendations or sim-
ilar measures not be accepted and implemented, we would endorse 
the abolition option. The Appeals Council cannot continue as it is. If 
the recommended improvements are not promptly forthcoming, or if 
they prove inefficacious, the Appeals Council should be abolished. 
C. Model (3): Improve the Appeals Council's Case-Handling Role 
The next alternative is a restructuring of the Appeals Council to 
improve the accuracy, consistency, and efficiency of the case-han-
dling process. Under this alternative, the Appeals Council would 
continue to pursue its leading current objectives, but would be reor-
ganized to perform more efficiently. 
Model (3) is based upon the principle that the most important 
function of appellate administrative review is the scrutiny of individ-
ual cases. The Appeals Council can correct ALJ errors before a 
wrongly-denied applicant is forced to litigate or before a wrongly-
allowed applicant is put on the disability rolls. Even if perfect accu-
424. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(l), 1383(c)(l) (1982). 
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racy is elusive, the Appeals Council could still do much to interdict 
blatant errors. 425 
The Appeals Council could also improve consistency within the 
program. Treating like cases alike is fundamental to due process, 
and the absence of central control may result in even greater incon-
sistency among the lower decisionmaking levels. Although the Ap-
peals Council has not been notably successful in generating national 
uniformity, modest reforms would enhance its performance. By han-
dling individual cases more purposefully and by developing addi-
tional feedback procedures that address vertical and horizontal 
inconsistency, the Appeals Council may be able to pursue these goals 
more effectively. 
However, Model (3) has several disadvantages. First, as discussed 
above, decisional "accuracy" is undefinable and unmeasurable. Dis-
ability cases are too subjective and variable; appellate reviews too 
often substitute one authority's judgment for that of another. Even 
if accuracy were not so elusive, exquisite accuracy in close cases is 
not so valuable that we would oppose stopping at three, rather than 
four, levels of administrative adjudication. 426 
Consistency, too, is important. However, we question whether 
consistency can be achieved by reviewing and correcting individual 
cases. Even if the Appeals Council could improve its capacity for 
enforcing consistency, the amount of uniformity that could be 
achieved solely by working the cases is limited. 
Finally, the Appeals Council imposes other costs upon the system, 
such as delay and reduced public acceptability, that would not be 
mitigated merely by refining its present routines. Even if the Appeals 
Council were streamlined, its greater efficiency would not justify its 
lofty position in the bureaucracy. 
Enhancing the Council's case-processing role would require impor-
tant changes. Essentially, the Council would become a more court-
like body designed to handle its docket expeditiously and carefully. 
While we do not recommend adoption of Model (3), it deserves seri-
ous attention and the contrast between it and Model (4) will help 
explain our preference for Model (4). 
Model (3) would incorporate the following six features: 
(1) Legal and Bureaucratic Protection for the Members. Under 
Model (3), the Appeals Council would be serving as a true appellate 
reviewer of the work of ALJs, and it would be inappropriate for 
425. See supra text following note 331. 
426. !d. 
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Council members to lack the protections that ALJs enjoy.427 If the 
relationship between the ALJ level and Appeals Council should ap-
proximate the relationship between a district and circuit court, then 
both tiers would need the same measure of APA independence. The 
fiction of the Appeals Council performing a "political" act, in the 
name of the Secretary, is utterly inapplicable to the high-volume, 
fact-intensive world of Social Security disability. The reality is that 
Appeals Council inembers, like ALJs, perform a quasi-judicial func-
tion, not a quasi-political one; formal guaranties of independence 
are important for propriety and for the appearance of propriety. 
With this enhanced status under Model (3) would come a change 
of title from "member" to "administrative appeals judge," and 
from "Deputy Chair" to "Chief Judge." We assume that the Asso-
ciate Commissioner's position would remain but it would no longer 
carry an ex officio seat on the Appeals Council. 
The Appeals Council, along with the corps of ALJs, would be re-
located outside the SSA hierarchy. Supervision by political officials 
such as a commissioner, deputy commissioner, and associate com-
missioner would be inappropriate for a judicial body. Instead, the 
adjudicators would be physically and administratively insulated from 
the SSA. The Office of Hearings and Appeals, therefore, would be 
moved to the Office of the Secretary of HHS or, better still, to an 
independent adjudicatory agency. 
(2) Less "Second-Guessing, of ALJs. The Appeal Council's stan-
dard of review consists of a check for "substantial evidence" to sup-
port the conclusions of the ALJ. 428 However, it is difficult to believe 
that this standard is always honored. Instead, the Appeals Council 
(like the federal courts that review it) often substitutes its own judg-
ment for that of the prior adjudicator (finding a witness not credible 
or the evidence unpersuasive, for example). This examination con-
sumes too much time, undercuts respect for the ALJ, and favors sec-
ond-hand assessments of demeanor and credibility. 
One solution could be greater restraint on the part of Appeals 
Council members. A more concrete step would be a revision of the 
standard of review. For example, the Appeals Council's power to 
reverse could be limited to ALJ decisions that are found to be "arbi-
trary." Under Model {3), the Appeals Council would reserve its at-
tention for the most egregious ALJ errors, and we conclude that 
such an "arbitrariness" standard would be appropriate for handling 
the cases expeditiously. 
427. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
428. See supra text accompanying note 267. 
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(3) Time Limits. The most frustrating aspect of appellate review 
for claimants and their representatives is the long period of uncer-
tainty they face while waiting for the Appeals Council to act or, 
more often, to decline to act. 429 Under Model (3), the Appeals Coun-
cil would have to improve its efficiency. it could follow fixed time-
tables and allow claimants to proceed directly to court if these 
timetables were not honored. Reopening powers could not be exer-
cised as a way of extending the Appeals Council's time for review. 
(4) Broaden the Caseload. The Appeals Council would not be con-
fined to claimants' requests for review. It would again take a sub-
stantial volume of "own motion" cases: both ALJ awards and 
unappealled ALJ denials. 430 
The appropriate volume of cases for a Model (3) Appeals Council 
is a trickier question. Ideally, an administrative appellate body 
should review all ALJ decisions to promote accuracy and unifor-
mity. On the other hand, even an enhanced Appeals Council could 
not effectively consider a four-fold increase in the current caseload. 
Some selection process would have to be continued. 
(5) Close the Record After the Hearing. As an appellate body, the 
Model (3) Appeals Council would not receive new evidence. It would 
review a closed record. Only the trial (ALJ) level could consider peti-
tions for reopening for new evidence.431 
(6) Improved Support System. The Appeals Council does not have 
adequate space, personnel, or computers. These work elements 
would have to be upgraded. 
Although Model (3) is feasible, it would require a substantial en-
hancement of the current Appeals Council to improve its ability to 
handle prodigious volumes of cases expeditiously. Model (3) focuses 
exclusively on the goals of accuracy and consistency. If the Appeals 
Council were transformed into this highly specialized entity, its per-
formance could be appreciably upgraded at a modest cost. 
On the other hand, we do not consider this option wise and do not 
recommend its adoption for two reasons. First, reviewing cases once 
again for accuracy and consistency is not of overwhelming value in a 
system as large and subjective as the SSA. It would not be worth-
while and it would risk hypertrophy of what should be one of the 
system's lesser capabilities. Second, the disability bureaucracy has 
other needs that the Appeals Council is uniquely suited to address. 
429. See supra text accompanying note 288. 
430. See supra text accompanying notes 248-63. 
431. See supra text accompanying notes 280-85. 
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Model (3) would seriously waste a potentially valuable asset to the 
disability system. 
D. Model (4): Optimize for System Reform 
We support the final option, which would redesign the Appeals 
Council as a different entity. The Appeals Council would still handle 
individual cases and correct errors, but it would function principally 
in a "systems reform" capacity, discovering, elaborating and imple-
menting changes in the entire disability adjudication system that 
could lead to earlier, more accurate, decisionmaking. 
In this scheme, cases would provide raw data for system reform 
analyses. In Model (4), the cases (although far fewer of them) would 
still be the primary input into the operation of the Appeals Council; 
its primary output, however, would be clarifications of policies or 
ideas for change, rather than a mass of corrected adjudications. 
We begin with the premise that the Social Security Administration 
needs more assistance in policy development and program integrity. 
The Appeals Council is admirably suited for providing some of this 
assistance. It retains an experienced corps of senior officials with ac-
cess to a steady stream of diverse cases. The Appeals Council is the 
only place in the bureaucracy where such rich data may be efficiently 
processed and important lessons extracted for the benefit of the en-
tire system. 432 
Moreover, in the long run, no trade-off occurs between the error-
correction function and the systems-reform function. If this plan 
works, the entire SSA adjudicative bureaucracy will operate more ef-
ficiently, making more accurate decisions and making them earlier. 
Fewer errors would reach the Appeals Council stage, and fewer 
wrongful administrative denials would have to be pursued in court. 
There are some disadvantages to Model (4). Under it, the Appeals 
Council would handle fewer cases and catch fewer errors. Therefore, 
those whose claims are now denied by ALJs but granted by the Ap-
peals Council would be disadvantaged. They would have to abandon 
their claims altogether or appeal them in court. The number of 
claimants in this category might be considerable and produce a sig-
nificant cost of transition to the new system. 
It is also possible that some of the current members of the organi-
zation might not adapt well to their new roles. They were not se-
lected for this function and their training and experience have largely 
emphasized other values. Our observation of current members, how-
432. See supra text accompanying note 350. 
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ever, convinces us that they are well-suited to the suggested work and 
can be retrained. In recent years, the SSA has not emphasized sys-
tems reform opportunities for Appeals Council members, but we are 
confident that the current membership could make a substantial con-
tribution and that successors selected with this role in mind could do 
even better. 
Model (4) differs in important ways from the "case-handling" of 
Model (3). In many respects, however, the reforms are similar. Some 
of the recommendations made in this section parallel or expand the 
comments made above. Other recommendations reflect the unique 
demands of an organization dedicated to systems reform. We have 
identified seven basic changes that this model would require: 
1. Control the Caseload 
This is the critical starting point for many of our recommenda-
tions. The Appeals Council must regain control over its docket. As 
long as it labors under the weight of 50,000 or more cases per year, 
its members will not have time for anything else. 433 The cases have 
consumed all the resources of the organization, usurping any oppor-
tunity for policy reflection or innovation. 
We do not know precisely the "right" number of cases for the 
Appeals Council to accept under the recommended plan, but we esti-
mate that 5,000 to 10,000 cases per year at the review level (i.e., 10 
to 20% of the current caseload) would be appropriate. The Appeals 
Council should always handle a substantial number of cases so that 
it does not become just another policy body divorced from the real-
ity of the adjudication process. 
In addition to regulating the volume of its cases, the Appeals 
Council must also control the types of cases it reviews. These cases 
should be selected by the Appeals Council itself, not by disappointed 
claimants or mailroom clerks. The Appeals Council should develop a 
strategy for identifying cases appropriate for scrutiny, and the cate-
gories could change frequently. We envision at least three general 
types of cases that the Appeals Council could consider through care-
ful sampling. 
(a) New Issues. The Appeals Council might select for review a 
fixed number of cases implementing new and potentially difficult re-
gulations or procedures. It could, for example, concentrate on recent 
mental impairment cases, on AIDS-related cases, 434 or on cases that 
433. See supra text accompanying note 309. 
434. See S.S.R. 86-20 (Cum. Ed. 1986). 
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raise some particularly novel issue of the new medical improvement 
standards. Thus, the Appeals Council could provide feedback about 
the ways in which the fieid offices and ALJs are processing new mat-
ters and promptly identify areas needing further clarification or 
training. 
(b) Problem Areas. The Appeals Council might also focus on 
longstanding SSA disability issues with difficult regulations. Allega-
tions of disabling pain unaccompanied by corresponding physical 
findings, for example, or assertions of disability through substance 
abuse, are recurring problems. The intersection between SSA cases 
and the decisions of a particular federal court in an acquiescence sit-
uation might be another example. 
The Appeals Council might also develop a profile of cases in 
which an ALJ or DDS is more likely to err. It might be observed, for 
example, that accuracy is particularly troublesome in cases that raise 
transferability-of-skills disputes, or in cases where the claimant's 
physician and the SSA consulting physician disagree on the diagno-
sis. Mistakes are not distributed randomly throughout the SSA case-
load, and the Appeals Council could conveniently determine the 
sources of repeated errors. 
Targeting particular ALJs, instead of particular types of cases, is 
more difficult. 435 We would not recommend Appeals Council focus 
on "error-prone" ALJs. The trauma of targeted Bellmon Review 
was very destructive for the system and very damaging to the rela-
tionship between the Appeals Council and its clients. We note, how-
ever, that the dispersion of award rates among ALJ s is greater than 
the system can comfortably tolerate. It is possible that review, 
guided at least in part by the track record of specific ALJs or offices, 
could be beneficial. 
In this vein, the Appeals Council should also accept cases "certi-
fied" by ALJs uncertain about the application of a particular policy 
or standard. The Appeals Council moreover could invite certifica-
tion on selected matters, to determine which types of cases are prob-
lematic. 
(c) Random Review. Although we are uncomfortable using chance 
in the selection process since the concept smacks of justice by lot-
tery, we would permit the Appeals Council to review a number of 
cases at random. Careful review of random cases might suggest 
which problems warrant intensive scrutiny .436 Random selection 
435. See supra text accompanying note 259. 
436. Observers in other administrative contexts have supported the value of these "fishing 
expeditions." J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 153. 
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probably will not be an important part of the Appeals Council's 
docket in the near future but it might ultimately become a vehicle for 
identifying additional categories for review. 
The Appeals Council should adjust its own jurisdiction and 
change the makeup of the categories from time to time, thereby re-
maining flexible enough to uncover new areas where it could contrib-
ute to the policymaking process. 
The Appeals Council should review both allowances and denials 
and should analyze the work of both the "best" and the "worst" 
ALJs and hearing offices. Part of the Council's proposed role is to 
discover what procedures work well, what attributes allow the best 
ALJs and offices to excel, and how their successes can be replicated 
throughout the system. 
2. Expand the Appeal Council's Role in Formulating Policy 
The Appeals Council should offer assistance in the policymaking 
and policy-implementing process. The underlying purpose of its case 
review would be to provide a database through which the members 
could advise and assist the SSA officials making policy decisions. 
This purpose could be realized in three ways. 
First, when the issue concerns important areas of policy, the Ap-
peals Council can serve in an advisory capacity. The Council should 
conduct independent studies of its caseload and offer its conclusions 
and recommendations directly to policy officials. The Council mem-
bers should also serve on various agency-wide ad hoc study groups 
designed to propose new policy. The Appeals Council's perspective 
should provide an important source of information for these com-
mittees. 
The Appeals Council already has experience in these capacities; 
members have occasionally served on SSA study groups and have 
suggested new SSRs. 437 We propose that this activity be greatly ex-
panded and made the centerpiece of the members' activities, to tran-
scend the individual cases and recommend regulations, SSRs, and 
other policy changes that could lead to improved disability adjudica-
tion. 438 
Second, the Appeals Council should play a larger role regarding a 
range of smaller policy questions-those that do matter in processing 
437. See supra text accompanying notes 334-40. 
438. Administrative appellate boards are frequently charged with this type of role in poli-
cymaking: "The [intermediate review] Board is expected to contribute through its work to the 
formulation, rather than the mere application, of agency policy." J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, 
at 138. 
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the cases, but do not rise to the level of a regulation or SSR. Here, 
the Appeals Council should directly exercise leadership through care-
fully articulated case decisions and policy pronouncements that 
would have precedential impact on future deliberations. Two vehi-
cles are already available for this purpose: case decisions and Ap-
peals Council "minutes." Most disability cases are so fact-specific 
that occasions for issuing forward-looking decisions are rare. The 
Appeals Council should seek out these occasions, however, and seize 
the opportunity to promote uniformity by publicizing successful ap-
proaches. Similarly, the Appeals Council can pursue the same goal, 
outside the context of any particular case, by returning to its former 
practice of issuing minutes that reflect its posture on case matters. 439 
This practice, too, would upgrade the entire claims adjudication 
process by providing improved mechanics that can be relied upon 
nationally. 440 
The Appeals Council should also publicize its cases and minutes 
throughout the disability system. It should ensure that ALJs, DDSs, 
district offices, and claimants' representatives are familiar with con-
sistent procedures and standards. The Appeals Council would 
thereby promote uniformity and integrity, in contrast to the some-
what arbitrary current system. While this practice would not require 
publication of all Appeals Council decisions, the Appeals Council 
should publish more noteworthy cases as a foundation for consistent 
and equitable decisions. The current OHA Law Reporter offers only 
a small fraction of the publication and indexing we consider neces-
sary for a comprehensive and useful compilation of decisions. 441 
A third avenue for participation in the policy process is experimen-
tation. The various DDSs, district offices and ALJs have a wealth of 
experience in handling claims, but these resources are largely un-
tapped. The Appeals Council should study the lower tiers, discover 
innovative improvements, refine those improvements, and export 
them to other units. Although the substantive definitions and stan-
dards for eligibility should remain consistent throughout the coun-
439. See supra text accompanying note 341. 
440. Policies derived from careful scrutiny of actual cases, rather than solely from ab-
stract theorizing about the agency's needs, are particularly likely to be useful and valid. See 
Capowski, supra note 75, at 376. 
441. Other observers have also noted that an appellate body can play a useful role in the 
agency, promoting consistency in decisionmaking, by advising the lower tiers about which 
adjudicative processes will be ratified on appeal, and which are likely to be rejected. 
"[H]earing examiners have learned that the Review Board's success in the predictable applica-
tion of standards has increased their opportunities to make decisions that will not be appealed 
or that will stand upon appeal." J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 149. 
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try, the implementing procedures need not remain rigid. Local 
experiments, supervised, encouraged and studied by the Appeals 
Council, might create greater efficiency in the future. 442 
3. Revise the Case-Correction Role 
Although the main objective of the Appeals Council should be sys-
tem reform, it would still review many individual cases. Various sub-
sidiary matters arise in this context. 
Our concept of a reformed Appeals Council is that of an appellate 
body with sufficient time to give each case a thoughtful, careful in-
spection. We also envision an organization that operates more colle-
gially, with members collectively analyzing cases. The members 
should discuss cases, compare ideas, and seek common solutions. 
Greater reliance should be placed upon panel decisions. These panels 
could be composed of perhaps three members, and meetings en bane 
would become more frequent as the crush of cases is reduced. 
We also recommend making greater use of the claimants and their 
representatives. The Council should hold oral arguments more fre-
quently to identify precedential aspects of the cases and to raise ideas 
for management initiatives. It should also notify claimants about is-
sues under consideration and encourage them to respond with de-
tailed arguments. Whenever the Appeals Council changes the 
mixture of cases and the types of problems to be addressed, it should 
inform claimants' representatives and invite them to submit amicus 
briefs. Considerable expertise and knowledge is available in the 
claimants' bar; the Council should draw upon it regularly. 
The Appeals Council should slow the decisionmaking process to 
allow for more thoughtful consideration. The process of deciding 
cases within an average of fifteen minutes must be discontinued. 
Council members and analysts should evaluate cases more thor-
oughly, debating their implications and listening to tapes of the hear-
ings if necessary. 
Finally, the Appeals Council will have to substantiate its written 
opinions if they are to have precedential impact and carry due weight 
among the ALJs and street level bureaucrats. The Appeals Council 
442. The preservation of this type of individualized discretion is essential for a complex 
administrative structure such as the SSA. The lower tiers must be accorded the opportunity to 
work the cases with intelligence and sensitivity, not just with blind adherance to policies that 
are inevitably styled with the standard situations foremost in mind. This is not to deny the 
importance of rules, nor to justify extreme departures from them, but we do maintain that the 
role of human judgment must be sustained. See Capowski, supra note 75, at 354, 372 (discre-
tion for ALJs is essential and inevitable for the SSA); ELLIS, supra note 2, at 166-67. 
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should draft opm10ns that are clear, responsive, forward-looking 
and individualized-in other words, free of mindless boilerplate or 
rote summaries of the documentation. 
(a) Role in Correcting the Cases. When the reformed Appeals 
Council moves more slowly and carefully through its cases, three 
possibilities for error correction are feasible. First, the Appeals 
Council might play no role in correcting errors. Even when it discov-
ered mistakes, it could leave the ALJ's work undisturbed, since the 
focus of the Appeals Council would be on the system as a whole, not 
on any one output of it. A second model would permit the Appeals 
Council to remand the errors to the ALJ with a commentary explain-
ing what problems have been identified and suggesting that the ALJ 
might reopen and revise the case. Finally, the Appeals Council might 
retain its current capacity for correcting or remanding any case it 
deems flawed, while still de\'Oting most of its attention to policymak-
ing. 
Each of these variants has advantages. The first two would enable 
the Appeals Council to concentrate upon formulating policy without 
the distraction of effectuating individual cases. The second would 
also ensure that errors are not totally overlooked. 
We consider the third variant the most desirable. Under it, the Ap-
peals Council could focus primarily upon reform without sacrificing 
entirely its current case-handling role. The Council could detect er-
rors, prevent them from slipping through the system, and use the 
occasion of error as an opportunity to instruct the bureaucracy per-
sonally through prompt, focused feedback. By correcting, or re-
manding, the errors that it sees, the Appeals Council would be 
forced to stay in intimate contact with the cases-its legitimate 
source of expertise for a policy role-and assist claimants, ALJs, 
and others directly. 
The mere fact that a serious question may be raised about the Ap-
peals Council role in case correction is itself instructive. It demon-
strates that the primary role of the Council should be to transcend 
the adjudication of individual cases, in order to generalize from 
them and identify the larger issues they present. The question also 
suggests that the reason for the Council to act upon ALJ errors is 
not simply to forestall a losing court battle. Instead, the Appeals 
Council should inquire into all types of errors to determine how they 
can be more efficiently prevented, and how deserving claimants can 
be identified and paid more quickly and easily. 
(b) Standard of Review. When it inspects and corrects cases, the 
Appeals Council should become less "interventionist." Two differ-
ent standards of review are required. First, regarding ALJ determi-
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nations of fact, the Appeals Council should be bound by a standard 
of "arbitrariness," rather than the current "substantial evidence" 
test. As noted earlier, 443 the "substantial evidence" criterion is 
breached too often. This criterion also encourages the Appeals 
Council to attempt to achieve an excessively subtle degree of accu-
racy. Rather, the Appeals Council should correct substantial devia-
tions from established standards and use its experience for larger 
policy purposes. It should not second-guess an ALJ in close cases. 
Secondly, regarding ALJ interpretations of law, the Appeals 
Council should show less deference. An ALJ who misunderstands 
the governing principles of a case or misstates the law should be cor-
rected. The distinction between "factual" and "legal" issues may be 
subtle; nevertheless, it is one that reviewing courts traditionally must 
make, and should be an Appeals Council responsibility too. 
(c) Close the Record After the ALl Stage. The case record should 
be closed before the file is transmitted to the Appeals Council. 444 The 
system should encourage claimants to submit all probative evidence 
to the ALJ. It is often difficult for claimants to assemble all the po-
tential evidence quickly, and where an ongoing condition continues 
to deteriorate, selecting a cutoff date for closing the file seems arbi-
trary. Orderly litigation and respect for administrative judgments, 
however, suggest the importance of segregating trial- and appellate-
level functions more strictly. If new evidence arises, the claimant 
may seek a remand and submit a motion to reopen the case. Absent 
good cause for reopening, the additional evidence should be submit-
ted with a new application. The Appeals Council should not receive 
new evidence; its review should be appellate, on a closed record. 
(d) Timeliness Standards. The problem of Appeals Council delay 
would be greatly mitigated under Model (4); most cases would not 
require Appeals Council review to exhaust administrative remedies. 
Those few that did would receive quicker consideration as an adjunct 
of a reduced caseload. Nevertheless, timeliness standards might be 
advantageous at the outset and the Appeals Council should be re-
quired to adjudicate cases within a specified, short, time frame. 445 
443. See supra text accompanying notes 264-71. 
444. See supra text accompanying notes 272-80. 
445. The OHA leadership recognizes the imperative of improving the agency's perform-
ance on timeliness. Eileen Bradley states: 
There are two themes in terms of overall OHA concerns that I will strike repeatedly, 
sound consistently, and they are: service to our claimants. We need to assure that 
the claimants in this country get their day in court as expeditiously as possible. 
Justice delayed, in my view, is no justice at all. Irrespective of the validity of the 
claimant's claim, that claimant believes he or she is entitled, and we have a right 
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Under Model (4), the Appeals Council should be able to decide 
within thirty days of the ALJ's decision whether the case meets one 
of its current profiles. It could then have an additional sixty days to 
work the case, or more if commentary or other input from the claim-
ant were necessary. Furthermore, the Appeals Council should not re-
open a case merely because it has missed the ordinary deadline. Only 
factors such as fraud, clerical error, or obvious mistake should dis-
turb the finality of the ALJ decision. 
(e) Final Agency Action. Under this system, as in Model (2), the 
vast majority of ALJ decisions would become final agency determi-
nations, allowing prompt payment of awards and immediate review-
ability of denials in federal court. This arrangement is certainly 
unusual for modern administrative practice in that most departments 
provide for some degree of administrative review between the hear-
ing level and the judiciary. 446 Neither the APA nor sound principles 
of SSA management, however, require a fourth administrative tier. 
We find nothing compelling about a "Secretarial" review that has 
long been quasi-judicial anyway. 447 Therefore, little is lost by claim-
ants or the SSA if the final administrative word comes from the 
ALJ, rather than after a cursory review by an over-burdened Ap-
peals Council. 
We do not believe that this model will result in a surge of federal 
court actions. As noted above, other inhibiting factors, such as cost 
and delay, will continue to retard frivolous recourse to the court. 
These factors, rather than the current Appeals Council, have win-
nowed civil actions. Moreover, the reformed Appeals Council should 
actually be able to reduce substantially the burden on the judiciary, 
as the administrative process becomes more accurate, efficient, and 
reliable. 
and an obligation to respect that belief. I find it unconscionable that a claimant 
must wait 365 days to know where he or she stands with respect to a benefit pack-
age. We have got to do better. [The second "theme" is protecting the trust fund.) 
SSA videotape Bradley Speaks, supra note 322. 
446. In child labor civil penalty cases, the Secretary of Labor has delegated to ALJs the 
authority to make final agency decisions. 29 C.F.R. § 580.32 (1986). In addition, the Board of 
Contract Appeals makes final agency decisions in government contracts cases. 31 U .S.C. § 
1304 (a)(3)(C) (1982). 
447. The theory of administrative reviewers performing a "Secretarial" function may 
have some validity in situations where ALJs handle cases involving important aspects of eco-
nomic regulation of key industries or corporations. Today, however, the vast majority of 
ALJs, including those in the SSA, are concerned instead with "micro" decisions, such as 
public benefits in which political factors are irrelevant. See Lubbers, A Uniform Corps of 
ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea on the Federal Level, 65 JuDICATURE 268 (1981). 
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4. Improve the Status of Appeals Council Membership 
Changes made in the personnel policy of the Appeals Council 
should allow it to carry out the systems reform mission more effec-
tively. 
(a) Upgrade the Position. Members of the Appeals Council, like 
Social Security Administration ALJs, are now graded at the GS-15 
level. Members of the Appeals Council should be ranked one step 
higher. Providing a GS-16 rating for the Appeals Council has two 
immediate advantages. First, in a world where pay and status are 
inevitably linked, the promotion would carry a prestige that would 
underscore the new role and importance of the Appeals Council. 448 It 
would symbolize the growth of the institution and SSA's commit-
ment to it. 
Second, and more importantly, the promotion is essential to at-
tract the most qualified people. Membership on the Appeals Council 
is not now a financial step up for an ALJ; little else is available to 
induce the best and brightest of the hearing corps to aspire to mem-
bership on the Appeals Council. Money is only one factor in an indi-
vidual's career decisions, but it is undeniably an important one and 
it is the most visible short-term fix that can be made. Over time, the 
reputation of the Appeals Council should grow, and ALJ s would 
seek appointment to it as the pinnacle of a career. For now, the most 
immediate means of elevating the institution is to dedicate a few su-
pergrade or Senior Executive Service slots to it. 449 
(b) Upgrade Job Prerequisites. As the job of Appeals Council 
member becomes more attractive, the selection process can become 
more selective. 450 The senior ranks of the ALJ corps should be seen 
as a fertile source of new members, and recruitment from this group 
should be encouraged. The ALJs' hearing experience and perspective 
on the cases are unrivaled. The Appeals Council would gain in stat-
ure by attracting the cream of the ALJ crop as members, giving it 
greater credibility among the courts, the public, and the SSA leader-
ship. 
448. Other observers have noted the importance of ensuring that an administrative review 
panel have superior status. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 143. 
449. Upgrading the status of Appeals Council members to GS-16 would not cost the 
agency much money, because most of the current members are already paid near the federal 
salary cap and because we propose reducing the number of Council members. The symbol, 
however, would carry considerable importance. 
450. "There can be no compromise with [the principle of first-rate appointments] if the 
Review Board is to win respect or acceptance from hearing examiners, the agency staff, and 
the practicing bar." J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 143. 
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We would not, however, make ALJ experience an absolute prereq-
uisite for membership on the Appeals Council. Many other people, 
including current members, are capable of playing important roles in 
the Appeals Council even though they may have received their back-
ground training in other parts of the system. The Appeals Council 
should establish membership requirements based upon individual tal-
ents and character traits, not solely experience. In short, we recom-
mend a strong, but not absolute, preference for drawing new 
members from the ranks of the ALJs. 
(c) Member Independence. Appeals Council members should have 
the same high level of independence guaranteed to ALJ s by the 
AP A. It is true that the primary function of the Appeals Council 
under Model (4) would be promotion of policy and program integ-
rity, and we recognize that as a result of their association, Council 
members and SSA senior officials might form a strong bond. The 
APA independence necessary in Model (3), where the members func-
tion exclusively as appellate judges, might therefore not seem so nec-
essary here. 
Nevertheless, we believe that under Model (4) the gains from APA 
protection would outweigh the losses. Independence will enhance 
status and allow the members freedom to suggest novel policies for 
efficient and equitable· case handling without political risk. Further-
more, members would continue to review cases and issue binding de-
cisions; this is a quasi-judicial function that should be acknowledged 
with AP A independence. 
We do not believe that members would abuse their APA-protected 
status by irresponsible deviation from SSA procedure. Historically, 
the Appeals Council has been faithful to SSA policy; the selection 
criteria and the proposed role of the members should serve only to 
reinforce this tendency. 
(d) Council Size. The current Appeals Council has grown to its 
present size of twenty members because of the mushrooming case-
load. A smaller Appeals Council would improve cohesion and pro-
vide greater integration and consistency. A group of approximately 
eleven members seems appropriate. It would be large enough to han-
dle a significant volume of cases, yet small enough to sit comfortably 
around a table, discuss members' observations, and develop a shared 
outlook and policy. 
We envision an Appeals Council that emphasizes internal consul-
tation and collaboration, meets frequently en bane, and thoroughly 
analyzes problems in order to develop a consensus on policies or re-
commendations. To reach this degree of harmony, the Appeals 
Council must be smaller. 
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(e) Title and Location of the Organization. Under Model (4), the 
Appeals Council would no longer take '.'appeals." It would establish 
its own docket, accepting cases that present important policy consid-
erations. A new title, such as "Review Council," therefore seems 
more appropriate. "Members" could retain their current titles, al-
though we recommend that the Deputy Chair be renamed "Chair" 
to clarify who actually presides over Council matters. This new name 
would also emphasize the organization's independence from the As-
sociate Commissioner, who would no longer hold an ex officio seat. 
Under Model (4), the Council will need direct access to the agen-
cy's top policymakers, the ALJs, and lower-level claims processors. 
The Council would act as liason among them, with enough inde-
pendence to adjudicate cases and with enough cohesiveness to affect 
policy. This relationship requires bureaucratic relocation. Placement 
of the Appeals Council under a Deputy and Associate Commissioner 
is logically inconsistent with the role here outlined. Conversely, re-
moval of the Appeals Council (as contemplated in Model (3)) to the 
Office of the Secretary or to an independent agency also seems 
wrong; the Appeals Council must be closer to the action. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the Appeals Council be relocated 
within the Office of the Commissioner.451 The Council's unique man-
date should enable it to assume this special placement. Its diverse 
roles, moreover, would most consistently fit at the top of the SSA 
hierarchy, outside the purview of any line office. 
5. Enhance the Appeals Council's Role in Court Cases 
The greatest opportunities for improvement of the Appeals Coun-
cil may be found at the review level; however, the Appeals Council 
also plays a major role in shaping the SSA's response to cases in 
litigation, and this role represents an important source of experience 
for the systems reform mission of Model (4). 
We recommend that the Appeals Council continue its current 
court interface work essentially as it has been doing. Supplemental 
review has an odd aura about it; it is peculiar that the SSA should 
have a fifth chance to consider a case and to improve the documen-
451. There have been proposals to remove ALJ s still further from agency politics and the 
appearance of sensitivity to agency pressures by creating an independent, integrated corps of 
ALJs available to serve all federal agencies. See Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Pro-
posal to Test the Idea at the Federal Level, 65 JuDICATURE 266, 266-276 (1981). The same 
could be imagined for all federal appellate review boards. This strategy has considerable logi-
cal appeal under Model (3), where Appeals Council members function exclusively as judges, 
but it is Jess applicable under Model (4), where the members are to focus on policy matters 
and a close connection to the agency is essential. 
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tation justifying a denial, rather than defend it as it stands or pay the 
claim. This practice has also introduced for the first time in the 
claims evaluation process a new awards standard authorizing pay-
ment of a ''sympathetic'' case, even if it does not quite fit the legal 
standard of disability. Supplemental review may also be used im-
properly as a crutch, suggesting that careful early claims work is less 
necessary because erroneous denials can be corrected later, if the 
claimant has the tenacity and resources to proceed to court. 
Rather than litigation, we favor alternative dispute resolution 
techniques to negotiate or settle cases. The SSA, however, really has 
little room for negotiation or compromise. The disability program 
should not pay benefits to claimants merely because they are evoca-
tive litigants in court; if lawful eligibility criteria are not met, eligi-
bility should be denied. 
On balance, we have no clearly better alternative strategy to pro-
pose. We note that supplementary review provides the Appeals 
Council with a valuable window to the world of federal litigation, 
complementing its perspective on the administrative processing of 
claims. 
For similar reasons, we endorse the current operation of the Ap-
peals Council in court remand situations.452 Although some internal 
adjustments should be made (for example, less reliance upon "fast 
track" remand and better guidance to the ALJ), we think the Ap-
peals Council can serve usefully as an intermediary in cases re-
manded from the courts, whether or not the Council saw the case 
prior to litigation in court. 
The Appeals Council also should be more involved in advanced 
court litigation strategy. 453 This area of practice is complicated and 
frustrating; lawyers from HHS and the Department of Justice fre-
quently disagree over whether appeals are tactically wise, legally jus-
tified, or sufficiently important. These differences will undoubtedly 
continue, but the Appeals Council should have a voice in discussing 
them. The Appeals Council's special bureaucratic perspective should 
not be ignored in appellate planning. 454 
452. See supra text accompanying notes 331-33. 
453. /d. 
454. SSA officials acknowledge that litigation strategy decisions are complex, and that the 
current process for making them is sometimes tumultous. 
I'm interested in litigation management. I think SSA, and OHA, is [sic] getting 
beaten over the head unnecessarily, that we are losing cases we should be winning 
and that we are appealing cases we shouldn't even appeal or touch and we need to 
have an SSA strategy with OHA making a significant contribution to that whole 
judicial process. That is also the Commissioner's priority, at least in terms of the 
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The Appeals Council should also begin to monitor disability cases 
as they proceed through court. Members should track their cases, 
studying court actions for future guidance. We hope that the federal 
courts will support the SSA improvements under Model (4). The 
SSA's recent performance in the federal courts has been abysmal, 
and the agency's reputation has fallen so low that little deference 
from the courts can be expected. Perhaps this disrepute has bot-
tomed out, and perhaps the worst incidents-the initial wave of Con-
tinuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) and the targeted Bellmon 
Reviews-that triggered the animosity no longer exist. Nevertheless, 
federal courts may be reluctant to retreat promptly to the "substan-
tial evidence" standard of review. The courts see a skewed sam-
pling-only denials where a good argument can be made that the 
claimant has been wronged-and federal judges might naturally see 
themselves as the champions of the disenfranchised, failing to recog-
nize that the SSA pays 99.6% of the awards without judicial inter-
vention. 
As the reorganized Appeals Council improves the administrative 
review process, the SSA's success rate in court should begin to im-
prove, too. We hope that the lag between the two changes will not be 
great and that courts will acknowledge the systematic improvements 
in the disability adjudication process. 
6. Improve Support Systems 
The Appeals Council will require assistance to support the im-
provements called for in Model (4). 
We envision a somewhat smaller operation in the OAO, since 
fewer analysts will be needed to handle the smaller caseload. This 
reduction, however, will be largely offset by greater attention to the 
remaining cases. The OAO should be reorganized into teams of ana-
lysts and support personnel, each affiliated with a small panel of Ap-
peals Council members. These units should become more coherent 
and more mutually supportive than the present organization of the 
OAO. 
Merging the OAO and the Appeals Council into a single unit is 
another possibility, although this is a closer question in Model (4). 
Because members would work primarily for system reform, a greater 
functional distinction might emerge between members and analysts. 
SSA part of it. I would like to see us improve our relationships with the court so 
that they have a better understanding about what SSA Jaw is about. 
SSA videotape Bradley Speaks, supra note 322. 
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Although this distinction might suggest less need to integrate the two 
groups, it would still be preferable to organize these work units 
tightly. In the future, OAO could focus on recruiting analysts skilled 
at both reading the claims files and assisting the members with their 
other functions. Accordingly, we recommend merging the OAO into 
the Appeals Council. 
Members of the Appeals Council should also have personal law 
clerks. These positions would be only a modest expense for the bu-
reaucracy but a significant asset in organizing the work. Hiring law 
clerks should increase Council efficiency and productivity, allowing 
the members to concentrate on their primary obligations. 
The data processing and word processing capabilities of the Ap-
peals Council need major improvement. The current hardware is de-
ficient and obsolete. The software is far below standards in the field, 
and the Appeals Council is unable to perform many necessary func-
tions. Staff support is virtually nonexistent;. indeed, even the current 
level of performance would not be available but for the ingenuity of 
a single, self-taught staff member. 455 
We also recommend changes in the members' office arrangements. 
The OHA is now scattered over five buildings in Arlington, Virginia. 
It should be consolidated in one location, preferably within the SSA 
headquarters complex in Baltimore. We think the principle of using 
physical remoteness to underscore the judicial independence of the 
members is valid, but it bends before the greater value of having the 
455. The needs of the Appeals Council do not demand the highest technology, but a solid 
computer network would be a major asset. Clearly each member should have word processing 
capacity. The time savings for minor corrections alone would be substantial and would be 
even greater if SSA analysts were brought into the modern world. 
The data processing system must also be updated. The Appeals Council is now barely able 
to track the files. Indeed, the system is so unreliable that index cards are used as a backup. 
Yet, the statistical base of Appeals Council operations is important and it would become far 
more so under Model (4), as the Appeals Council attempts to extract policy generalizations 
out of individual adjudications. The data processing capability of the Appeals Council is 
wholly inadequate and immediate upgrading is necessary. 
All Appeals Council and ALJ decisions are now produced by a word processor, but the 
record of each decision is ordinarily erased as soon as it is issued in order to save storage 
capacity. We recommend that this practice be halted immediately and that the full text of all 
OHA adjudications be retained indefinitely. The Appeals Council could use these closed cases 
as part of its research on error prone or otherwise problematic cases. Claimants' representa-
tives might use them, with identifying details removed, to research precedents. Other uses may 
appear with current or future data search techniques. 
The Appeals Council, or the OHA on behalf of the ALJs as well, should seek the advice of 
qualified systems engineers who specialize in the storage and retrieval of such material. Con-
sulting experts in this field are frequently relied upon by private industry and law firms; the 
SSA, too, could benefit from their ability to evaluate the institution's needs and match them 
with the available technology. 
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App~als Council sit nearer the policymakers it assists. Under Model 
(4), the Appeals Council and the whole of the OHA should play a 
greater part in the policy process, requiring a headquarters location. 
7. Increase the Appeals Council's Visibility 
Mashaw wrote of the Social Security claims procedure in general 
that "[t]he internal workings of the process that might inspire confi· 
dence ... are invisible. " 456 Nowhere is this more true than for the 
Appeals Council. Most people know little about the nature and oper· 
ation of the organization, and its members and activities are largely 
shrouded from view. This invisibility may result in part from a de· 
gree of defensiveness or reluctance to publicize the facts about low 
reversal rates and the high volume of cases per member per day. Ob· 
scurity, however, has been costly in terms of public acceptability. 
We recommend a change in this respect. 
We recommend in particular that the Appeals Council publicize 
itself and conduct outreach activities designed to enhance the pub· 
lie's and the claimants bar's knowledge about its work. Claimants 
and their representatives have much to say about the operation of 
the disability adjudication system; the Appeals Council can be one 
point of contact. We do not expect greater interaction to result in 
conformity of views or harmony of interests, but we do think that 
the worst aspects of the Council's image of arbitrariness and futility 
can be ameliorated. Furthermore, it should become easier for claim· 
ants or their representatives to contact the Appeals Council to learn 
the status and scheduling of their cases. 457 
456. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 143. 
457. The current SSA mechanism that a claimant follows in order to inquire about the 
status of his or her case pending before the Appeals Council is one of Rube Goldberg com-
plexity: 
For example, if a claimant were to inquire regarding the status of an appeal, he 
would normally direct his questions through the local district office (DO). The DO 
employee would initially obtain an HA04 query from the OHA Case Control Sys-
tem (CCS) and call OHA's Congressional and Public Inquiries Staff (CPIS). 
The CPIS employee would record the message and obtain another HA04 query to 
identify which OAO branch was acting on the claimant's request for review. The 
CPIS employee would contact the appropriate branch control section. 
The OAO contact would then record the request and institute a manual search of 
the branch to determine which analyst had been assigned the case. The OAO "con-
tact" would then obtain the last known status of the case and inform CPIS. 
The CPIS employee would record the response and reply to the DO employee for 
further communication to the claimant. This practice has not only been time con-
suming, but it also demands involvement of many more personnel than are neces-
sary. 
OMAPI REPORT, supra note 229, at 26. 
318 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:199 
We also believe that Appeals Council members should make more 
public appearances, participate more in bar activities, and write 
about their work to enhance public acceptability. They should meet 
with federal judges to discuss disability matters in general and case-
handling in particular. 
Inside the SSA, the members of the Appeals Council should build 
bridges to the ALJs and to other parts of the organization. To this 
end, the "visiting ALJ" program should be reinstated. At least one 
seat on the Appeals Council should be reserved for ALJs as a tempo-
rary assignment to test whether they would like to apply for member-
ship, to infuse new perspectives into the Appeals Council, and to 
enhance the corps' appreciation for the work of their reviewers. 
Conversely, we think that there should be traffic in the opposite 
direction. Appeals Council members should take occasional assign-
ments as ALJs, conducting hearings in the field. Even those mem-
bers who have "graduated" from the ALJ corps could benefit from 
an occasional refresher. 
Similar interaction and exchange programs should be instituted 
with the other components of the SSA, such as the district offices 
and the state disability determination services. Because Model (4) 
calls for the Appeals Council to participate in enhancing the opera-
tions of the entire disability adjudication operation, the Council 
should have regular contact with the lowest tiers. Thus, the Appeals 
Council might be able to come to grips with the operations of the 
bureaucratic behemoth and help formulate system-wide improve-
ments. 
Most importantly, the Appeals Council will require greater visibil-
ity within the higher echelons of the SSA. The Appeals Council has 
been isolated for too long; it must now re-establish itself as a force 
with direct channels to the leadership. The "policy development" 
role can succeed only if the policymakers support it; they must ac-
cept the Appeals Council members as participants and must con-
sciously alter existing routines in order to admit a new set of 
perspectives. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have observed that the Appeals Council is composed of tal-
ented and dedicated individuals, pursuing in anonymity a set of di-
verse tasks that we consider exceedingly important but virtually 
impossible to accomplish. The size of the current caseload defies ef-
fective management, despite the Appeals Council's efforts to dis-
patch it with diligence and compassion. Although the purposes and 
capabilities of the Appeals Council are impressive, we find the insti-
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tution's functioning unsatisfactory. The Appeals Council is not ef-
fectively achieving its goals, and will not likely perform much better 
in the future. Accordingly, we recommend comprehensive modifica-
tions in the objectives, composition, and operation of the Appeals 
Council. 
Having considered four models for future Appeals Council opera-
tions, we conclude that: (1) the status quo of the Appeals Council is 
too deeply flawed to be sustained and the present structure is not 
performing to anyone's satisfaction; (2) the Appeals Council should 
not be abolished, at least not before one more effort at serious re-
form; (3) a "case correction" role could be expanded and improved, 
but pursuing a chimera of accuracy would prove unsatisfactory and 
waste the Appeals Council's real potential; and (4) the role of system 
reform-suggesting new policies, developing new practices, and im-
plementing new experiments-is the most valuable role for the Ap-
peals Council, enabling it to put its case-handling experience to the 
best use and empowering it to aid the SSA in the most valuable way. 
The systems reform role for the Appeals Council and the specific 
implementation steps we have outlined are not easy or inexpensive, 
nor is success guaranteed. Effectuation will require deliberate meas-
ures by the SSA leadership, including the personal attention of the 
Commissioner. We are confident, however, that the proposal is fea-
sible and that it would be highly advantageous. The Appeals Coun-
cil, as it now stands, is both over- and under-utilized. It is buried in 
case files and unable to marshal its unique expertise or perspective. 
We appreciate the potential of the Appeals Council and despair of its 
wastage; the Social Security Administration can and should do bet-
ter. 
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Chart 1 
SSA' s Sequential Evaluation Process for Assessing Disability 
Preliminary Step: Is the claimant financially eligible no Benefits for RSHDI (fully insured and disability insured status) 
or for SSI (low income and resources)? Denied 
I yes 
Step 1: Is the claimant performing "substantial gain- yes Benefits 
ful activity?" Denied 
I no 
Step 2: Does the claimant have a "severe" impair- no Benefits ment and does the impairment satisfy the 12-month 
duration requirement? Denied 
I yes 
Benefits yes Step 3: Does the claimant's impairment meet or 
Awarded equal a "listing" in Appendix 1? 
I no 
Step4: Does the claimant have the ability to return to yes Benefits 
past work? Denied 
I no 
Benefits yes Step 5: Do the "grid" rules of Appendix 2 cover the yes Benefits 
Awarded claimant, and do they specify an award or a denial? Denied 
I no 
Benefits no Step 6: Is the claimant otherwise capable of per-
yes EJ Awarded forming substantial gainful activity in the national economy? ed 
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Chart 2 
Partial SSA Organization Chart 
l Secretary of HHS l 
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! Commissioner of SSA I 
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Appeals l Office of Chief ALJ Appeals Council Ooerations 
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Chart 3 
OHA Workflow-Review level 
OAOAnalyst 
Need Medical 
or Vocational 
Opinion? 
no 
To Effectuat- Type of Case & 
ing Center Recommended 
to Pay Claim own motion, Action? 
r,~~~~recommend '-----~---r-----/ 
deny 
review 
own motion, 
recommend 
taking review 
request for 
re..new 
"A" Member 
Decision 
propose to 
take review 
"B" Member 
A, B ( + "C") Members Confer 
Decision 
grant review 
Outcome 
Other 
Notify Claimant 
20 Day Comment Period 
Outcome 
yes Medical or 
1------1 Vocational 
Staff 
Mail Denial Notice 
t-----:---1 to Claimant, 
request for File in OAO 
review, 
deny review 
l'fK/UBSt for mlll9w, 
denied 
affirm AW denial 
or reverse AW Award 
File may be returned to OAO at any stage for further workup or rewriting decisional documents. 
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Chart 4 
OHA Workflow-New Court Cases 
OAO - DCA Analyst 
I 
no Affidavit 
Is filing timely? for motion 
to dismiss 
j yes J no 
Does new evidence 
change case? To Regional 
1 yes 
Attorney 
Appeals Council Member 
I Handle similarly to 
review level case remand ( Defend Case no 
where review was or Remand? 
granted I defend 
~ ~ Regional Attorney I 
I 
Defend Case or Seek Supplementary defend Litigate in 
Review? district court 
1 review ~ ~ 
Analyst Presentation 
to Panel 
I 
remand ( 
Remand or Defend? 
I defend 
Regional Attorney 
I 
Defend or Seek defend 
Further Review? 
I 
I review 
Analyst Presentation to Super Panel I 
I 
remand defend 
\. 
Remand or Defend? 
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Fast track 
by analyst 
I 
Reverse 
I 
Chart 5 
OHA Workflow-Court Remands 
District Court 
OAOAnalyst 
Appeals 
Council 
Member 
Fast track by Clarifying 
Appeals Coun- remand order 
cil Member needed 
ALJ 
Recommend 
decision 
Appeals 
Council 
Two Members 
I 
Modify Affirm 
I I 
I 
To effectuating center to pay 
or denial letter to claimant 
I 
Re-Remand f-
